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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Institutional Economics of Gender 
 
Maria Tackett 
 
This dissertation is a collection of essays that incorporate institutional analysis into Economics of 
Gender research. I specifically consider the role of institutional arrangements in the economic 
status of women, opportunities the institutional arrangements create for women, and outcomes of 
changes in institutional arrangements that affect women. In chapter 2 I investigate the 
relationship between income distribution inequality and labor mobility, as globalization is 
viewed in the existing literature as aiding income inequality by allowing greater capital mobility 
but not mobility of labor. The literature argues that globalization creates changes in bargaining 
power for labor and capital owners thus decreasing income share received by labor. I find that 
while male mobility is indeed negatively related to labor share, female mobility has a positive 
association with labor share. In chapter 3 I estimate the relationship between the institutions of 
economic freedom and women’s share of managers. The motivation is policymakers’ concerns 
with low female representation in leadership positions, which among others include women in 
corporate management. I find a positive relationship between the two, implying that less 
regulated markets provide incentives that favor less gender discrimination for this type of 
employment.  In chapter 4, jointly with Andrew Young, we seek to explain the relationship 
between female suffrage rights and government growth while taking spatial dependence effects 
into account. Women and men have different preferences when it comes to publicly provided 
goods. Specifically women prefer higher government spending on health and education. 
Literature has linked this distinction in preferences and women suffrage rights to government 
growth in the U.S. At the same time, local governments have been shown to engage in yardstick 
competition creating spatial spillovers. We find no relationship between government overall 
spending and taxation levels with suffrage rights implementation, after we control for spatial 
correlation. We additionally find that spending on social services by a state has a positive 
association with suffrage rights being implemented in that state and neighboring states. For 
example, that granting female suffrage rights in one state is associated with higher government 
spending on social services in neighboring states.
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
Economics of gender literature finds a strong relationship between economic status of women 
and economic development. This association works both ways. To give an example, gender 
discrimination contributes to lower economic growth through underutilization of human capital, 
while economic development leads to first a decrease in women’s labor force participation levels 
and then an increase (Mammen and Paxson, 2000). At the same time, development literature tells 
us that institutions are important in economic analysis, while economics of gender fails to 
recognize this importance most of the time. In this dissertation I aim to address a largely missing 
part of the economics of gender literature by considering the role of institutional arrangements in 
the economic status of women, opportunities the institutional arrangements create for women, 
and outcomes of changes in institutional arrangements that affect women.  
In the second chapter I analyze the role of globalization in income distribution, as 
measured by labor share. Globalization is often viewed as a process that increases income 
inequality between workers and capital owners, by allowing capital owners to move capital to 
other countries and thus presenting capital owners with higher bargaining power and higher 
income share. I argue that globalization also allows for labor mobility, although in a longer run, 
which could lead to further changes in bargaining power and as such changes in income shares 
awarded to labor and capital. I employ a share-capital schedule theoretical model (Bentolila and 
Saint-Paul, 2003). According to the model bargaining power could be one of the explanations 
why labor and capital owners are not paid value of their marginal product. As women and men 
have been shown to have lower bargaining power than men (Card et al, 2014) I separately 
analyze the relationship between labor share and mobility of men and relationship between labor 
share and mobility of women. I find that while mobility of men is associated with lower labor 
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share, mobility of women is associated with higher labor share. One of the explanations could be 
that, holding everything else constant, exit of those with lower bargaining power (women) 
increases overall bargaining power of those remaining in a country and their labor share and the 
other way around for exit of men. I argue that globalization should not necessarily be viewed as 
creating or decreasing inequality and that immigration and emigration will lead to changes in 
bargaining power and not necessarily in the same direction for both genders. Policy makers 
aiming to constrain globalization processes, including emigration and immigration, will 
inevitably run into unintended consequences.  
The next chapter of my dissertation considers the problem of underrepresentation of 
women in the managerial profession. This problem has been addressed by a few countries’ 
policymakers, requiring a certain share of women in upper level management positions. The 
reason behind policymakers’ concern is underutilization of human capital, if this gender disparity 
is a result of discrimination. Such underutilization of human capital will negatively affect 
economic development. However, as Becker (1971) predicts, employers indulging their taste for 
discrimination and not using resources in the most efficient way, thus not minimizing their costs, 
will only do so in a non-competitive economic environment. Competition between firms will 
drive discriminating employers out of business. To test Becker’s prediction I employ Economic 
Freedom of The World index that measures government involvement in the economy and 
competitiveness of firms both domestically and abroad. I find that in countries with higher values 
of Economic Freedom of the World index the ratio of women to men in management profession 
is higher. I additionally find that it is area 5 of the index measuring the extent of regulation in the 
economy and its subcomponent credit market regulation that have a strong association with the 
number of women in management positions. Thus, I suggest that policy makers concentrate on 
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creating more favorable institutional environment that would empower women, through, for 
example, being able to access credit or find employment at a company that has easy access to 
credit instead of creating mandated gender shares in a profession. 
In chapter 4 jointly with Andrew Young we consider the association of women’s suffrage 
in the beginning of the 20th century in the United States with government growth. Lott and 
Kenny (1999) find that with the introduction of suffrage government tax revenues and 
government spending has increased in the states with higher share of female population. They 
explain this phenomenon with women’s higher preferences for government spending compared 
to men. We argue that introduction of the suffrage laws has spatial correlation and so does 
government spending, omitting this correlation would lead to biased results. Suffrage movement 
often involved neighboring states: through media and rallies. At the same time, yard-stick 
competition is well documented in public finance literature. Increase of spending in one state 
affects spending decisions of neighboring states. We find that while there is correlation between 
spending and taxation decisions of neighboring states there is no association between female 
suffrage and overall government spending and between female suffrage and overall government 
taxation. At the same time, we find that government spending on social services (charities, 
hospital, and prisons) did increase with female suffrage in the United States, and that relationship 
includes spillover effects from neighboring states. As such, giving voting rights to a 
disenfranchised group does not necessarily lead to changes in government size, rather in one of 
its components. A spatial approach to such issues seems to be an important identification 
strategy. 
The contributions of my dissertation are three-pronged. First, I find that mobility of 
women and men as a globalization process creates opposite outcomes for income distribution 
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inequality between labor and capital owners. I argue that globalization and specifically 
immigration and emigration should not be regarded as negative or positive, but rather 
complicated issues that need careful analysis. Second, I find that more competitive economic 
environments with lower levels of regulation and credit regulation specifically have a positive 
association with the number of women in management profession, something that is a concern to 
policy makers. I suggest promoting women’s professional representation by creating facilitating 
economic institutions, rather than restrictive ones, such as a mandated share of women in a 
profession. Finally, with Andrew Young we find that allowing a disenfranchised group to vote 
does not necessarily lead to government growth. A spatial approach to this analysis is key, as it 
allows to control for omitted spatial correlation. This is contrary to previous literature that finds 
that giving women the right to vote in the United States led to government growth. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Gender, Migration, and Labor Share 
2.1. Introduction 
Concerns about income inequality draw the attention of government officials, academics, and the 
general public. The visibility of the Occupy Wall Street movement and the popularity of Thomas 
Piketty’s Capital are illustrative. One specific type of income inequality involves the division of 
income between labor and capital. In this paper I explore the relationship between that division 
and migration flows, paying particular attention to the role of gender.  
While the constancy of labor share is one of the stylized facts of economic growth, many 
countries have experienced declines in the portion of GDP accounted for by wages, salaries, and 
benefits.1 These declines have been observed in OECD countries (Jones 2003) and European 
countries in particular (Blanchard 1997), as well as in low- and middle-income countries 
(Harrison 2005). The concern about these declines is expressed in a chapter title from the 2012 
OECD Employment Outlook: “Labour Losing to Capital: What Explains the Declining Labour 
Share?”  
In answering the question posed above, some have pointed to globalization as a cause. 
Many perceive globalization as favoring firms and their profits over workers and their wages. 
Greater mobility of capital provides its owners the ability to seek out cheaper labor, thus giving 
capital owners greater bargaining power. Piketty goes as far as to state: “It is perfectly clear to 
me that the decline of labor unions, globalization, and the possibility of international investors to 
put [sic] different countries in competition with one another [...] have contributed to the rise in 
                                                 
1 See Young (2010) for a discussion of the interpretation of labor share as “relative stable”. 
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the capital share.”2 There is some empirical evidence to support this view. Harrison (2005) and 
Guscina (2006) find that increasing trade shares are linked to decreases in labor shares. Decreuse 
and Maarek (2013) report that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are associated with declines 
in manufacturing sector labor shares. Jayadev (2007) and Schneider (2011) find that financial 
openness is associated with lower labor shares.3 
However, while Young and Tackett (2015) report evidence on trade and financial flows 
that is consistent with the above studies, they also report that measures of social globalization are 
associated with higher labor shares in a large sample of countries. Young and Tackett employ the 
KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008) for which the social globalization 
component measures individuals’ exposure to different knowledge, cultures, and people outside 
of their country’s borders. As such, the KOF index acknowledges that globalization implies 
greater labor mobility as well as mobility of capital. Great labor mobility may counteract the 
effect of capital mobility on relative bargaining power, leading to higher labor share. 
Alternatively, labor’s bargaining power rests in part on groups of workers solving collective 
action problems (e.g., via unions). Immigrants may weaken bargaining power creating external 
competition for jobs. Furthermore, since collective action problems are more easily solved in 
homogenous (e.g., common language; culture) groups, immigrants may weaken the internal 
cohesion of bargaining groups.  
To my knowledge, the only empirical study focusing on the relationship between labor 
mobility and labor share is Jaumotte and Tytell (2007). They document a negative relationship 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Dolcerocca and Terzioglu (2015). The quote is a transcription from a verbal interview, which should be 
remarked upon given the “[sic]”. 
3 The measure of financial openness in Jayadev (2007) is capital opennes based on IMF Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions annual reports, based on Quinn and Inclan’s (1997) methodology, and calculated by Lee 
and Jayadev (2003). The measure of financial openness in Schneider (2011) is economic restrictions and financial 
flows sub-indices of KOF index of globalization. 
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between immigration flows and labor share for OECD countries. I improve on their study by 
analyzing a larger sample of OECD and non-OECD countries and including measures of 
emigration as well as immigration. Emigration towards better wages and working conditions is 
analogous to capital seeking cheaper labor abroad. Furthermore, Jaumotte and Tytell’s empirical 
model assumes that immigration flows have a contemporaneous effect on labor shares at an 
annual frequency. In this paper I employ panel data and an empirical model where six-year labor 
share averages are related to emigrant and immigrant stocks (taken as percentages of a countries’ 
populations).  
For both emigration and immigration, I also consider the effects of male and female 
stocks separately, which is also a novel contribution to the literature. Immigrants to a country 
may have less bargaining power in its labor markets than the native born, but relative bargaining 
power may also independently differ across male and female workers. A cursory look at the 
medium earnings by gender, nativity and US citizenship status reveals that native males have the 
highest medium earnings, while immigrant women have the lowest (figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Median Income by Gender, Nativity, U.S. Citizenship Status 
 
Source: Current Population Survey. Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by Nativity and U.S. Citizenship 
Status. March 2012. Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/population/foreign/data/cps2012.html 
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Thus, a higher number of immigrants and/or immigrant women to the population could 
be associated with lower bargaining power of labor, holding everything else constant. At the 
same time, greater labor mobility might allow for higher bargaining power, either through a 
threat of fleeing the country or by altering the skill composition within a country. 
Making both of the above distinctions (emigration versus immigration; female versus 
male) turns out to be important in my analysis. For example, some of the more robust results are 
the estimated effects on labor shares in OECD countries associated with emigration. These 
results are qualitatively different depending on whether the emigration of males or females is 
considered. A 3.5 percentage point increase in the stock of male emigrants as a percent of an 
OECD country’s population is associated with a decrease in labor share of between about 26 to 
60 percent, depending on the point estimate. Starting from a mean labor share (of GDP) of about 
0.414, this implies a decrease of between about 10 to 24 percentage points (or around 0.86 to 2 
sample standard deviations). The corresponding effect for female emigration is an increase in 
labor share of about 11 percentage points (just under sample standard deviation).  These results 
are consistent with males generally having more bargaining power, holding everything else 
constant, while labor mobility serves to increase bargaining power. In the case of the negative 
male emigration effect, all else equal, the loss of relatively high bargaining power of males 
dominates in its effect on labor share. 
This paper joins a wealth of studies of the determinants of labor shares. Among the 
potential determinants that have been studied are technological change (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
2003; Karabarbounis and Neiman 2015), structural change (De Serres et al. 2002), institutional 
set up (Rodrick 1999; Young and Zuleta 2013; Young and Lawson 2014). Finally, this study 
relates to previous research of gendered migration causes and outcomes, by showing separate 
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relationships between female and male migration and labor share. Studies in this area among 
other issues include investigations of female brain drain (Naghsh Nejad 2013; Young and 
Naghsh Nejad 2014; Dumont et al. 2007) gendered remittance patterns (Morrison, et al. 2007), 
labor market assimilation of immigrant women (Schoeni 1998), and the transfer of fertility 
norms from destination to source countries (Beine et al. 2013). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section describes theoretical 
background and empirical model, I then describe the data in section 3, I discuss the results in 
section 4, introduce additional robustness checks in section 5, and draw a conclusion in section 6. 
 
2.2. Theoretical background and empirical model 
The theoretical background of this paper originates in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003)4. They 
derive what they refer to as the share-capital schedule. The Share-capital schedule is a 
relationship between labor share and the capital-to-output ratio. Under certain assumptions 
(neoclassical production function; competitive factor markets) labor share of income can be 
shown to be a function of only the capital-to-output ratio.   
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) note that the share-capital schedule will not be altered by 
changes in factor prices and/or changes in labor-augmenting technology. However, the schedule 
will shift if there are changes in capital-augmenting technology or if there is an exogeneous 
change in the median worker’s skill level. An economy can also depart from the share-capital 
schedule if, for example, factor markets are imperfectly competitive and labor and/or capital are 
not paid their marginal products..  
                                                 
4 Other recent empirical papers based on the theory are: Young and Lawson (2014), Young and Zuleta (2013) 
10 
 
C2 
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C0 
Perhaps the best way to explain the three different types of changes and their effect on 
labor share is with a graph (see figure 2.2) similar to the one in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003).  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Labor Share Capital Schedule Changes 
 
A change in factor prices leads to a movement along the share-capital schedule, from point C0 to 
point C1, and each capital to output ratio corresponds to a particular labor share. A change in the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (e.g., change in median skill type of a worker) 
shifts the share-capital schedule from A to B and changes labor share for a given capital to 
output ratio, from point C1 to point C2. Finally, relaxing the assumption of perfect competition 
leads to a movement away from the share capital schedule, once again, labor share moves 
without movements in capital to output ratio, from point C2 to point C3 on the graph. 
The empirical model used to estimate the relationship between labor share and migrant 
stocks in this paper is a log-linearized form of the share-capital schedule: 
Capital to output ratio, k 
L
ab
o
r 
sh
ar
e,
 α
 
A 
B 
C3 
A: initial position of labor share – capital 
schedule, C0  - initial position of the 
economy.  
C1 – position of the economy after a 
change in interest rates 
B: labor-share – capital schedule position 
after a shift caused by change in median 
skill-type of a worker,  
C2 - Position of the economy after the 
change in median skill-type of a worker 
C3 – Position of the economy after a 
change in bargaining power of one of the 
sides 
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ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ln(𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜎𝑋 + 𝛾𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
(2.1) 
where 𝛼𝑖𝑡 denotes country i’s labor share in year t, kit capital to output ratio, Xit a matrix of 
additional control variables, γt year fixed effects, and εit error term.  
The independent variables of interest are: EMIGRATIONit and IMMIGRATIONit. They 
denote, respectively, a country’s emigrants and immigrants as percentages of the country’s 
population. In the light of the theoretical discussion above, immigration and emigration may 
have different effects on labor share. First, changes in immigrant and emigrant stocks might be 
related to changes in the capital to output ratio, which in turn would change labor share for each 
country. This means movements along the share-capital schedule (point C0 to point C1, figure 
2.2)  and no significant association with labor share for the independent variables of interest (if, 
of course, the capital to output ratio is the only channel for the association), since the capital to 
output ratio is included in each specification.  
Second, the association between the independent variables of interest and labor share 
might be represented by the shifts in the share-capital schedule (from A to B, figure 2.2), due to 
changes in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This could happen, for 
example, if there is variation in median skill level of an economy, or human capital stock caused 
by changes in the migrant stock. In this case, although the migrant stocks will enter the 
regressions significantly, controlling for variables that could potentially alter the elasticity of 
substitution (such as sectorial shares), will lead to disappearance of the significance. The 
expected sign will be negative if the median skill of the economy decreases as a result of labor 
mobility and positive if the median skill of the economy increases. For example, if immigrants 
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crowd out natives of domestic work into receiving education and into labor force this could lead 
to a higher labor share. 
Finally, there is a possibility of movements towards/away from the share-capital schedule 
(point C2 to point C3, figure 2.2). In this instance, if there is a wedge between the value of 
marginal product of labor and the wages workers receive as a result of departure from perfectly 
competitive markets assumption, due to, for example, bargaining power of one of the sides might 
have, the wedge will decrease/increase. Again, in this case, emigrant and immigrant stocks will 
enter the regressions significantly, however, the significance will decrease once I control for 
variables that could create a difference between wages and value of the marginal product of 
workers. Higher emigrant and immigrant stock to the population might decrease the ability of 
labor to bargain as a group, which would in turn lead to a greater difference between wages and 
value of the marginal product of workers and imply lower labor share. At the same time, higher 
emigrant stock could pose a threat of labor fleeing the country and increase the bargaining power 
of labor. In this case the expected sign on the relationship between labor share and emigrant 
stock will be positive. 
Additionally, I employ an alternative specification  
ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐸𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿3𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5 ln(𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜇𝑋 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡, 
(2.2) 
The independent variables of interest in this specification are: EMIGRATION_Fit, 
EMIGRATION_Mit, IMMIGRATION_Fit, and IMMIGRATION_Mit. They denote, respectively, a 
country’s female emigrants, male emigrants, female immigrants, and male immigrants as 
percentages of the country’s population. The gender distinction may be important if bargaining 
power differs between females and males. The distribution of income between workers and 
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capital owners can be a function of their relative bargaining power, determining the sort of 
wedge that will exist between workers’ marginal product and their wages. The size of this wedge 
may be a function of the relative amount of female versus male migrants. 
In light of the discussion above, the relationships between female migrant stock and labor 
share and male migrant stock might be different a priori. Higher number of female emigrants, 
holding everything else constant, could be associated with an increase in overall bargaining 
power and higher labor share as a result of lower bargaining power of women relative to that of 
men. Similarly, higher number of male emigrants would then be associated with higher lower 
overall labor share, holding everything else constant. Additionally, if immigrant men and women 
assume different positions in the work force that lead to changes in the median skill level in 
opposite directions we should also see different signs on the relationships between female 
immigrant stock and labor share and male immigrant stock and labor share5. 
 
2.3. Data 
The time periods included in the regressions are: 1980, 1990, and 2000. For each time period, 
labor share and the capital to output ratio are constructed as averages over six-year periods with 
the time period years specified above being first. Thus, labor share and capital to output ratio are 
averages of their respective values from 1980-1985, 1990-1995, and 2000-2005. This is done for 
three reasons: to preserve a large sample size, ensure that business cycle fluctuations are not 
being picked up and account for the fact that labor share association with gendered migration 
stock might not be fully revealed if the problem is investigated in a short-run (in this case, if both 
                                                 
5 See for example, Staut (1999) and Tastsoglou and Miedema (2005) for a discussion of the different positions 
immigrant men and women assume in the host economy. Additionally, see Beneria (2008) who notes that it is 
immigrant women who crowd out native women of child care and care for the elderly. 
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variables were to be recorded in the same year). Migrant labor is allowed time to assimilate and 
complete the job search, while capital owners use the time period to shift the capital to lower-
cost labor. For some of the years not all six values of labor share were available, those are 
replaced with either five or four-year averages6.  Thus the sample for this study is represented by 
an unbalanced panel with three time periods (1980, 1990, and 2000) and 93 countries. 
Labor share is the wage share in GDP from Extended Penn World Tables (EPWT) 
version 4 by Marquetti and Foley (2011)7. The capital to output ratio is constructed by dividing 
each country’s fixed net capital stock by its real GDP levels, both of the variables are from 
EPWT v. 4 (Marquetti and Foley 2011) and both are in 2005 purchasing power parity US dollars. 
The average employee compensation share of GDP for the sample used in this study is 0.414 
(see table 2.1), which is slightly higher for OECD subsample (0.504) and is lower for non-
OECD (0.374) subsample.  
                                                 
6 For example, the labor share data for Brazil is available for year 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995, and is unavailable for 
1990 and 1991. The value recorded for Brazil for 1990 time period is the average of the available values. For the 
whole sample there are 29 cases of only four years of data available and 12 cases of only 5 years of data available. 
7 Extended Penn World Tables version 4 (EPWT v. 4) is an extension of Penn World Tables version 7, by Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2011). 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
α Employee compensation share of GDP 0.414 0.116 202 
ln(α) (log of) Employee compensation share of GDP -0.930 0.327 202 
     
EMIGRATION Emigrant stock as a percent of total population 6.593 7.052 202 
IMMIGRATION Immigrant stock as a percent of total population 6.661 9.964 202 
EMIGRATION_F Female emigrant stock as a percent of total population 3.296 3.578 202 
EMIGRATION_M Male emigrant stock as a percent of total population 3.296 3.552 202 
IMMIGRATION_F Female immigrant stock as a percent of total population 3.112 4.326 202 
IMMIGRATION_M Male immigrant stock as a percent of total population 3.547 6.012 202 
     
IMMIGRATION_ 
NON_OECD 
Immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in non-OECD countries 
4.417 8.554 202 
IMMIGRATION_ 
OECD 
Immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in OECD countries 
2.243 4.075 202 
IMMIGRATION_F_ 
NON_OECD 
Female immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in non-OECD countries 
1.978 3.519 202 
IMMIGRATION_M_ 
NON_OECD 
Male immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in non-OECD countries 
2.438 5.368 202 
IMMIGRATION_F_ 
_OECD 
Female immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in OECD countries 
1.134 2.057 202 
IMMIGRATION_M_ 
_OECD 
Male immigrant stock as a percent of total population 
originating in OECD countries 
1.109 5.368 202 
     
ln(k) (log of) capital to output ratio 0.459 0.376 202 
ln(RGDP) (log of) real GDP per capita in 2005 U.S. dollars 9.015 1.144 202 
INVESTMENT PRICE (log of) Price of investment goods  0.086 0.322 195 
FLOWS KOF Economic Flows Index 56.525 20.596 194 
FREEDOM Economic Freedom of the World Index 6.305 1.208 186 
DEMOC Polity IV Index of Democracy 6.524 4.027 189 
PRIMARY Primary school (gross) enrollment rate 101.036 14.855 188 
SECONDARY Secondary school (gross) enrollment rate 72.334 31.019 171 
     
AG_SHARE agricultural value added as a percentage of GDP 11.982 10.995 161 
MAN_SHARE manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP 16.619 6.466 154 
     
EMBASSY Absolute number of embassies in a country 64.28 36.20 197 
LETTER Outgoing and incoming letters per capita 10.78 24.16 202 
FORMOV Freedom of international movement index 1.58 0.65 198 
DOMMOV Freedom of domestic movement index 1.74 0.59 197 
WOSOC Women’s social rights index 1.49 0.90 185 
 
To construct the EMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION_F, EMIGRATION_M, 
IMMIGRATION_F, and IMMIGRATION_M variables I divided the migrant stocks for 1980, 
1990, and 2000 provided by World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database (Ozden et al 
2011) by the population of each country in each respective time period and multiplied the results 
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by 100. The migration data is collected from countries’ censuses and population registers. Ozden 
etl all (2011) define an immigrant in the data set as a foreign-born resident of the country 
providing the census or population register data8. They then extrapolate emigrant population 
based on source countries of the immigrant population. Total population data is acquired from 
EPWT v. 4 (Marquetti and Foley 2011). The average female emigrant stock in the sample 
employed in current investigation is about 3.3% of total population, male emigrant stock is 3.3%, 
female immigrant stock is about 3.1%, and male immigrant stock is about 3.5% (see table 2.1). 
The additional control variables contained in matrix X are as follows. According to Gollin 
(2002) labor share is consistently underestimated for countries with lower levels of income and a 
relatively high share of GDP value added by agriculture. This happens because a large part of 
labor force in such countries is self-employed, thus their income is mistakenly considered to be 
capital income, understating the value of labor income. Furthemore, Weil (2013) adds that 
capital share variation in developed countries is much lower than in the developing, possibly due 
to better data quality. To address these concerns I separate the sample for some specifications by 
OECD and non-OECD countries for each period in addition to controlling for income levels. 
Each specification includes a natural logarithm of real GDP per worker in 2005 US dollars to 
account for income differences (RGDP).   
Karabarboukis and Neiman (2014) find that the decline in the price of investment goods 
is responsible for the decline in corporate labor share. I include the relative price of investment 
goods in most of the regressions (INVESTMENT_ PRICE).  This variable is an average and is 
calculated over 6 years for each time period, in a manner similar to capital to output ratio and 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that census and population register data have a few limitations, such as undocumented 
migrants providing inaccurate information to census workers. For further discussion of migration data limitations 
see Billsborow et al (1997), Gamlen (2010). 
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labor share. The data source for the price of investment goods and the price of consumption 
goods is Penn World Tables 8.0, (Feenstra et al, 2015) 
Another variable included in most of the specifications is financial flows index (FLOWS), 
as calculated by Dreher (2006). It is comprised of trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment, and income payments to foreign nationals, all as a percent of GDP. Financial flows 
index is a part of a larger KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher 2006) FLOWS variable in this 
study represents the possibilities capital owners potentially undertake in search of low cost labor, 
thus increasing their own bargaining power and conceivably income share. 
Institutional quality is represented by the FREEDOM   and DEMOC variables. 
FREEDOM is economic freedom as measured by Economic Freedom of the World Index 
(Gwartney, et al 2013). The index is chain-linked and scores countries on a scale from 0 to 10 
(with higher values given to countries with greater economic freedom), depending on the level of 
freedom economic agents have to make and execute their decisions. The index is based on the 
following five areas: government size, legal structure and security of property rights, access to 
sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor, and business. The 
fifth area of the index “Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business” includes centralized 
bargaining power in its calculation, which, as mentioned previously, could facilitate movements 
towards/away the labor-share schedule. As Young and Lawson (2014) show, there is a positive 
relationship between economic freedom and labor share of income. 
 DEMOC is a part of polity IV democracy index (Marshall and Jaggars 2010).  It ranks 
countries on a scale from 0 to 10 based on their level of democracy, with higher scores given to 
countries with higher democracy levels. One of the studies mentioning the relationship between 
income distribution and democracy levels is Rodrik (1999) paper, where he shows that there is a 
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positive association between democracy levels and labor share of manufacturing sector. At the 
same time, economic freedom and democracy level differences could serve as push and pull 
factors for migration, thus, excluding institutional quality factors could lead to omitted variable 
bias. 
Human capital is measured as primary and secondary school gross enrollment rate, 
provided by World Bank World Development Indicators, and included in regressions as a 
robustness check under PRIMARY and SECONDARY. As mentioned above, including human 
capital might help us discern between shifts of the share-capital schedule and movements 
towards/away from it.  
As an additional robustness check, I include agricultural and manufacturing value added 
to GDP, titled as AG_SHARE and MAN_SHARE, the data is also available through World Bank 
World Development Indicators. The reason behind including these two variables is an attempt to 
account for the already mentioned labor share in manufacturing sector relationship with 
democracy (Rodrik 1999), the idea documented by Gollin (2002) that labor share would be 
underestimated in societies with relatively higher agricultural value added to GDP, and a remark 
by Tzannatos (1999) that gender shares vary by sector. A greater influx/exit of one of the 
genders compared to the other could then potentially lead to changes in sectorial composition of 
an economy, at least in the employment shares of each sector. The variables’ summary statistics, 
along with their descriptions and short names are presented in table 2.1. 
 
2.4. Results 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 contain results of regressions of (log) labor share on emigrant and immigrant 
and female and male emigrant and immigrant stock and additional control variables for three 
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time periods: 1980, 1990, and 2000 for up to 93 countries. Column 1 of table 2.2 contains a base 
fixed period effects specification, which only controls for the natural logarithm of the capital to 
output ratio, and the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, in addition to the two independent 
variables of interest: the emigrant and immigrant stocks as a percentages of total populations. 
Neither of these variables of interest enter the specification significantly.  
However, separating immigrant and emigrant stocks by gender in further specifications 
produces more interesting results. Column 2 of table 2.2 contains the base fixed effects 
specification, although the independent variables of interest are now male and female emigrant 
and immigrant stocks as percentages of total populations: IMMIGRATION_F, 
IMMIGRATION_M, EMIGRATION_F, and EMIGRATION_M. The estimated coefficients on 
IMMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_F are positive while the estimated coefficients on 
IMMIGRATION_M and EMIGRATION_M are negative. This pattern manifests in most of the 
subsequent specifications.  This suggests that increased opportunities for female migration are 
positively associated with labor share, while the association between male migration and labor 
share is negative.  
I then move on to separating the sample by OECD and non-OECD countries. For each of 
the time periods I consider a country as being part of OECD if it has joined the organization 
during that year 1980, 1990 or 2000 or before.  Separating the sample into OECD and non-
OECD countries provides more informative results, see specifications 4 and 5 of table 2.2. The 
magnitude of the statistically significant variables of interest is as follows. For non-OECD 
countries the estimated coefficient on IMMIGRATION_F is 0.017, meaning that a 4.2 percent 
increase in female immigrant stock (about 1 sample standard deviation) is associated with a 7 
percent increase of labor share in non-OECD countries. Starting from the mean labor share of the 
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sample, 0.414, this translates into just under 3 percentage point increase. This constitutes about 
25 percent of the labor share sample standard deviation. 
Table 2.2 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (log) Labor Share on Emigration and Immigration 
Stock and Female and Male Emigration and Immigration Stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    non-OECD OECD 
EMIGRATION 0.0009     
 (0.0028)     
IMMIGRATION -0.0031     
 (0.0036)     
EMIGRATION_F  0.0145 0.0070 0.0243 0.0764*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0159) (0.0237) (0.0180) 
EMIGRATION_M  -0.0147 0.0010 -0.0083 -0.1026*** 
  (0.0218) (0.0152) (0.0178) (0.0218) 
IMMIGRATION_F  0.0301*** 0.0143* 0.0170* 0.0965*** 
  (0.0058) (0.0074) (0.0089) (0.0307) 
IMMIGRATION_M  -0.0248*** -0.0056 -0.0040 -0.0945*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0088) (0.0107) (0.0322) 
Ln(k) -0.0284 -0.0194 0.0024 -0.0247 0.1157 
 (0.0771) (0.0786) (0.1058) (0.1316) (0.0894) 
Ln(RGDP) 0.1939*** 0.1767*** 0.0796 0.0392 0.1026 
 (0.0277) (0.0294) (0.0692) (0.0954) (0.0712) 
INVESTMENT_PRICE   0.0960 0.1470 0.1026 
   (0.1088) (0.1431) (0.0938) 
FREEDOM   0.0634** 0.0729* 0.0527* 
   (0.0241) (0.0372) (0.0276) 
DEMOC   0.0160 0.0157 0.0433** 
   (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0187) 
FLOWS   0.0002 0.0023 0.0007 
   (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0006) 
PRIMARY   0.0006 0.0000 0.0094*** 
   (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0019) 
SECONDARY   0.0032** 0.0040 -0.0003 
   (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0008) 
      
F-stat (redundant fixed 
effects) 
7.514*** 6.940*** 16.260*** 4.487** 26.792*** 
      
Countries 93 93 71 47 27 
Observations 202 202 145 79 66 
R-squared 0.4144 0.4690 0.6359 0.4523 0.7964 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in 
regressions though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. The null hypothesis for the 
redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
The reason for the positive association between labor share and female immigrant stock 
becomes more clear after considering the results of table 2.4, column 6. It is female immigrants 
21 
 
from OECD countries who are driving this relationship between labor share and female 
immigrant stock. Women who arrive from OECD countries could be more highly skilled and 
thus have more bargaining power than native citizens and especially so women in non-OECD 
countries. For instance, for the OECD subsample the mean secondary school enrollment rate is 
95.62 and for the non-OECD subsample it is 56.2. Moreover, the OECD subsample mean 
secondary school enrollment ratio of girls to boys is 100.06, while for the non-OECD subsample 
the ratio is 92.89. Higher skilled females may have more bargaining power, plausibly accounting 
for this difference in OECD versus non-OECD effects. Holding everything else constant, more 
female immigrants from OECD would then be associated with higher labor share. 
For OECD countries the coefficient on EMIGRATION_F is 0.0764, therefore a 3.5 
percent increase in female emigrant stock (about 1 sample standard deviation) is associated with 
a 11 percentage point increase in labor share, starting from the sample mean of 0.414. The 
coefficient on EMIGRATION_M is -0.1026, meaning a 3.5 percent increase in male emigrant 
stock (again, about one sample standard deviation) is then associated with about a 14 percentage 
point decrease in labor share, starting from the sample mean of 0.414. 
As women have lower bargaining power than men9 the exit of women, would be 
associated with a gain of bargaining power for the labor force overall, holding everything else 
constant. Contrary, the exit of men who have higher bargaining power, holding everything else 
constant, would then be associated with lower labor share. Additionally, if men comprise a 
higher share of union members, exit of men then would decrease the amount of insiders (and 
union members) and decrease bargaining power of labor10. 
                                                 
9 Card et.al. (2014) 
10 See, for example, Even and Macpherson (1993) who state that between 1973 and 1988 private sector unionization 
rate in the U.S. fell for women less than for men by 9.5 percentage points. Antonzyck, Fitzenberger, and 
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The coefficients on IMMIGRATION_F and IMMIGRATION_M are close in magnitude, 
but of opposite signs, 0.0965 and -0.0945 respectively. A 4.3 percent increase in the first one 
(about one sample standard deviation) is associated with approximately a 17 percentage point 
increase of labor share, starting from the sample mean of 0.414, a 6 percent increase in the 
second one (about one sample standard deviation) is associated with approximately a 23 
percentage point decrease of labor share11. 
One explanation could be that as more women migrate to the developed world and 
provide child and elderly care services, native women gain more bargaining power by, for 
example, being able to work full time as opposed to part time12.  Overall then, higher number of 
female immigrants would be associated with higher labor share.  At the same time, it could be 
the case that male immigrants are agreeing to work for lower compensation, undermining the 
bargaining power of native workers. As shown in figure 2.1, median income of men who are not 
U.S. citizens is only larger than that of women who are not U.S. citizens. 
Sectorial shares of GDP are added to the regressions in table 2.3.  For the non-OECD 
subsample, column 2, the only statistically significant variable is EMIGRATION_F, its 
magnitude is 0.0436, meaning that a 3.5 percent increase in female emigrant stock (about one of 
the sample standard deviation) is associated with about a 6percentage point increase in labor 
share, starting from the sample mean of 0.414. 
                                                 
Sommerfeld (2010) document a decrease in collective wage bargaining coverage by 16.5 percentage points for male 
and 19.1 percentage points for female employees in West Germany 
11 To compare with the previous research of determinants of labor share, Guscina (2006) finds that a 1 percentage 
point increase in international trade to GDP ratio leads to a 14 percentage point decrease in labor share. 
12 See, for example, Beneria (2008), who discusses this process. 
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Table 2.3 Further OLS Estimates from Regressions of (log) Labor Shares on Female and Male 
Immigration and Emigration Stock with Sectorial Shares Added to the Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  non-OECD OECD 
EMIGRATION_F 0.0146 0.0436* 0.0935*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0229) (0.0303) 
EMIGRATION_M -0.0122 -0.0229 -0.1362*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0202) (0.0354) 
IMMIGRATION_F 0.0270** 0.0566 0.0680 
 (0.0124) (0.0401) (0.0446) 
IMMIGRATION_M -0.0119 -0.0115 -0.0589 
 (0.0080) (0.0137) (0.0483) 
Ln(k) -0.0139 -0.0626 0.0498 
 (0.0927) (0.1164) (0.0793) 
Ln(RGDP) -0.0553 -0.1135 -0.0988 
 (0.0599) (0.0802) (0.0982) 
INVESTMENT PRICE 0.0664 0.0578 0.0283 
 (0.1221) (0.1589) (0.1421) 
FREEDOM 0.1006*** 0.1121** 0.0852** 
 (0.0342) (0.0531) (0.0326) 
DEMOC 0.0096 0.0045 0.0749* 
 (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0399) 
FLOWS -0.0002 0.0007 0.0001 
 (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0009) 
PRIMARY -0.0018 0.0005 0.0071** 
 (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0032) 
SECONDARY 0.0024 0.0007 -0.0005 
 (0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0010) 
AG_SHARE -0.0208** -0.0190** -0.0203*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0069) 
MAN_SHARE 0.0053 0.0104 0.0019 
 (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0044) 
    
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 15.316*** 5.029** 7.393*** 
    
Countries 64 41 25 
Observations 110 67 43 
R-squared 0.6661 0.5454 0.8503 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in regressions 
though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. The null hypothesis for the redundant 
fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
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Female migrant labor in developing countries could be benefiting from potential brain 
drain as women exit the country, more and more women acquire higher human capital in hopes 
to emigrate and gain bargaining power.13 At the same time, since there are less highly educated 
women and in developing countries, their exit is more noticeable, thus the threat of highly 
educated female labor fleeing allows for a gain in overall bargaining power.14  
For OECD subsample, column 3, the only statistically significant estimated coefficients 
belong to EMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_M. They respectively amount to 0.0935 and -
0.1362, starting from the sample mean of 0.414 this translates into a 13.5 percentage point 
increase in labor share associated with a 3.5 percent increase in female emigrant stock, and a19 
percentage points decrease of labor share is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in male 
emigrant stock.  
Notably, in most regressions in tables 2.2 and 2.3 female migrant stock variables are 
smaller in magnitude than male migrant stock. This could be because more women tend to 
migrate as a part of a family, rather than on their own. As Docquier et al (2009) notice, in 2004 
28.6 percent of women who received U.S. employment based visas were principal visa holders 
(implying, that 71.4 percent were not), while only 34.7 percent of men receiving the same type of 
visa were dependent. In most cases dependents of visa holders are not able to hold a job (legally 
or due to language and skill constraints), to this extent women migrants participate in the labor 
force at lower rates than do migrant men. 
Comparing the results of tables 2.2 and 2.3, the association between immigrant stocks 
separated by gender and labor share becomes not statistically different from zero, holding the 
sectorial shares constant, see columns 4 and 5 of table 2.2 and columns 2 and 3 of table 2.3. 
                                                 
13 See Beine et al (2013) 
14 As noticed by Docquier et al (2009) 
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This loss of statistical significance could be happening for a few reasons. First, immigrant stock 
is only associated with labor share via economy sectors, thus a debate on the effects of 
immigration on labor share should take sectorial shares into account.15 Second, immigrant stock 
is defined as those born abroad, in this sense it could be no different from native population and 
its relationship with labor share.  Third, including extra variables into regressions decreases 
degrees of freedom and increases standard error, thus, there still could be an association between 
immigrant stock and labor share. 
Another difference between tables 2.2 and 2.3 is that the variables with statistically 
significant coefficients in table 2.3, where the sectorial shares are held constant (columns 2 and 
3), EMIGRATION_F for non-OECD countries and EMIGRATION_M and EMIGRATION_F for 
OECD countries are larger in magnitude than in table 2.2, suggesting that leaving out agriculture 
and manufacturing share of GDP creates a downward bias on the independent variables of 
interest. The estimated coefficient on EMIGRATION_F for non-OECD countries increases in 
magnitude by about 80 percent, from 0.0243 to 0.043, the coefficient on EMIGRATION_M  
increases by about 33 percent in magnitude, from -0.1026 to -0.1362 and the coefficient on 
EMIGRATION_F increases by about 23 percent from 0.0764 to 0.0935.  
These results are especially interesting, since, for example, Valentinyi and Herrendorf 
(2008) report different labor shares for different sectors of the economy, Young and Zuleta 
(2013) find that unionization rates have heterogeneous effects on labor share across sectors, 
furthermore Tzannatos (1999) points out that female employment share varies across the sectors, 
finally capital intensity differs across economy sectors.  At the same time the size of each sector 
in the economy could be correlated with income, for example, countries with lower incomes 
                                                 
15 Which is, holding demand for labor constant, similar to a concern that immigration decreases wages for natives 
26 
 
would have a larger agricultural sector, which is in turn a push/pull factor in the migration 
decision. Additionally, as Card et al (2014) show, women hold relatively less bargaining power 
in manufacturing sector. Thus, holding sectors constant, presents us with a clearer picture of the 
relationship between migrant stock and labor share.16  
The coefficients on agricultural share are negative and statistically significant in all three 
specifications of table 2.3, while manufacturing share has a positive, although not statistically 
significant coefficient estimate. The signs on the two could be picking up the fact that labor share 
is higher in more developed countries, where agriculture share of GDP is lower. 
Concerning other statistically significant variables. Economic freedom of the world index 
(FREEDOM) has a positive relationship with labor share across all of the specifications where it 
is included in table 2.2 and 2.3. The coefficient ranges from 5.27 to 11.21 percent increase in 
labor share associated with a 1 point increase in the index, or from approximately 1/5 to slightly 
below ½ of the standard deviation of the labor share in the sample with 1 standard deviation 
increase in FREEDOM, which includes 1/3 of the standard deviation increase in labor share 
reported by Young and Lawson (2014).   
Democracy index (DEMOC) enters the regression significantly for OECD countries only 
in both tables 2.2 and 2.3. The association between DEMOC and labor share is higher than 1 
percentage point increase in labor share with a 1 point increase in democracy index, reported by 
Rodrik (1999). A 1 point increase in democracy index  is associated with a 1.7 percentage point 
increase in labor share before sectorial shares are included and an increase of 3 percentage points 
after, starting from the sample mean of 0.414, nevertheless qualitatively Rodrik’s (1999) 
conclusion still holds, democratic institutions are associated with higher labor share. 
                                                 
16 Although Jaumotte and Tytell (2008) discuss sectorial shares in the paper, they are not included in the regressions. 
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Finally, human capital as measured by primary and secondary education levels, 
PRIMARY and SECONDARY respectively are positive whenever they are not statistically 
significant from zero, in specifications 3 and 5 of table 2.2 and 3 of table 2.3. This could imply 
that higher human capital levels allow labor to have higher bargaining power over income 
distribution and thus be positively associated with labor share. 
Interestingly enough, economic flows index (FLOWS) is not statistically significant in 
any of the specifications. This could be due to a small number of degrees of freedom, however it 
also suggests that studies of the relationship between labor share and globalization should 
include labor mobility as a control variable. 
 
2.5. Robustness Checks 
The results presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3 and discussed in the previous section raise a number 
of reasonable concerns. In this section, I attempt to address these concerns. To begin, the 
relationship between labor share and immigrant stock from OECD and non-OECD countries 
might not be analogous. To account for it I include source of the immigration stock in the 
regressions contained in table 2.4.  
Separating immigration stock by the origin country (OECD or non-OECD) does not produce 
meaningful results, as presented in the regression contained in column 1 of table 2.4.  However, 
separating immigrant stock by gender and origin country while controlling for total emigrant 
stock, column 2, shows that the estimated coefficient on female immigrant stock from OECD 
countries is larger than the coefficient on female immigrant stock contained in table 2.2. At the 
same time, the estimated coefficient on female emigrant stock from non-OECD countries is 
smaller (0.1222, 0.0301, and 0.0235 respectively). 
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Table 2.4 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (log) Labor Share on Emigration Stock and Immigration Stock from OECD and Non-
OECD Countries and on Emigration Stock and Female and Male Immigration Stock from OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   non-OECD OECD  non-OECD OECD 
EMIGRATION 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0022 -0.0003    
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0045) (0.0032)    
EMIGRATION_F      0.0174 0.0238 0.0663* 
     (0.0224) (0.0279) (0.0325) 
EMIGRATION_M     -0.0182 -0.0181 -0.0754* 
     (0.0240) (0.0259) (0.0418) 
IMMIGRATION_OECD 0.0054       
 (0.0050)       
IMMIGRATION_nonOECD -0.0046       
 (0.0040)       
IMMIGRATION_F_OECD  0.1222* 0.2117 -0.0203 0.1367* 0.2400* -0.0111 
  (0.0679) (0.1310) (0.0722) (0.0717) (0.1286) (0.0689) 
IMMIGRATION_F_nonOECD  0.0235*** 0.0175 0.1677 0.0219*** 0.0146 0.1618 
  (0.0064) (0.0106) (0.1120) (0.0066) (0.0102) (0.0979) 
IMMIGRATION_M_OECD  -0.1151* -0.2178* 0.0115 -0.1300* -0.2554** 0.0011 
  (0.0669) (0.1150) (0.0742) (0.0708) (0.1098) (0.0702) 
IMMIGRATION_M_nonOECD  -0.0191*** -0.0106 -0.1473 -0.0170** -0.0066 -0.1312 
  (0.0063) (0.0105) (0.1131) (0.0068) (0.0105) (0.0915) 
ln(k) -0.0171 -0.0260 -0.0478 0.0746 -0.0146 -0.0351 0.1013 
 (0.0767) (0.0753) (0.0804) (0.1259) (0.0780) (0.0828) (0.1310) 
ln(RGDP) 0.1801*** 0.1759*** 0.1469*** 0.3312*** 0.1703*** 0.1388** 0.2747*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0510) (0.0760) (0.0327) (0.0541) (0.0770) 
        
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 12.4135*** 11.6572*** 5.0392*** 29.1272*** 11.5472*** 5.0257*** 27.5971*** 
        
Countries 93 93 69 28 93 69 28 
Observations 202 202 128 74 202 128 74 
R-squared 0.4238 0.4701 0.2588 0.6090 0.4728 0.2632 0.6533 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. “Fixed Effects” 
refer to fixed time period effects. The null hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant.
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 At the same, time both estimated coefficients on male immigrant stock from OECD and 
non-OECD countries, contained in column 2 of table 2.4 are larger than the estimated coefficient 
on total male immigrant stock, although not significant, reported in column 3 of table 2.2. (-
0.1151, -0.0191, and -0.0056 respectively). At the very least, these results suggest that the 
association between female migrant stock and labor share is not similar to that of male migrant 
stock and labor share.  
The regressions contained in columns 3 and 4 of table 2.4 are based on the non-OECD 
and OECD subsamples. For non-OECD countries the only statistically significant estimated 
coefficient is male immigrant stock from OECD countries, it is negative and larger than the 
estimated coefficient presented in table 2.2, albeit not statistically different from zero. 
Throughout the tables the coefficient on male immigrant stock for non-OECD countries only 
enters the regressions significantly in tables 2.4 and 2.8. The takeaway here is that if a 
statistically significant association does exist between labor share and male immigrant stock for 
non-OECD countries it is driven by male immigrants from OECD countries. As Hugo (2014) 
notices, many multinational companies prefer to hire managerial staff from the country where the 
multinationals originate. Thus, the immigrant workers from OECD countries might be capturing 
the lower bargaining power of native workers created by foreign capital. Hence the negative sign 
on  IMMIGRATION_M_OECD. 
None of the estimated coefficients for the variables of interest in the OECD subsample 
enter the regression significantly, as reported in column 4, this could be due to multicollinearity, 
which increases standard errors. Simply put, there is a probability that the size of immigrant 
stock originating in non-OECD countries is highly correlated with immigrant stock originating in 
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OECD countries, pull factors could be very similar for immigrants coming from OECD and non-
OECD countries. 
However, estimated coefficients on female and male immigrant stock from OECD 
countries switch signs, although the magnitude of both is very small (-0.0203 for female 
immigrant stock and 0.0115 for male immigrant stock). At the same time, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient on female and male immigrant stock from non-OECD countries is large 
(0.1677 and -0.1473 respectively). This could imply that it is mostly female immigrants from 
non-OECD countries that have a positive association with labor share and male immigrants from 
non-OECD countries that have a negative one.  
Estimations contained in columns 5, 6, and 7 of table 2.4 control for the gender of 
emigrant stock and origin and gender of immigrant stock. In addition to the results being 
qualitatively similar to that of the estimations contained in columns 2, 3, and 4, the estimated 
coefficient on female immigration stock from OECD countries for non-OECD subsample 
(column 6) becomes statistically significant and remains positive. This sheds some light on the 
relationship between female immigrant stocks and labor shares in non-OECD countries and is 
discussed in the previous section. As mentioned before, the shortage of highly skilled female 
labor is higher in non-OECD countries, which plausibly gives highly skilled women higher 
bargaining power. 
Finally, although none of the estimated coefficients on immigrant stock variables are 
statistically different from zero, EMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_M enter the regression 
contained in column 7 significantly with a positive sign on female emigration stock and a 
negative sign on male emigration stock, similar to the results presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3. The 
magnitude of both estimated coefficients is smaller than that of estimated coefficients on 
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EMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_M reported in column 3 of table 2.3 and column 5 of 
table 2.2.  
Overall, while supporting the results reported in tables 2.2 and 2.3, the results of table 
2.4 give some insight on the association between labor share and migrant stock variables. 
The next concern is that, although women make up a large share of migrant stock it has 
not always been the case that women travelled to join workforce, but rather as a part of a 
family.17 The results presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3 might not be capturing the fact that the share 
of women receiving education and joining workforce has increased overtime and thus reporting 
biased results.18 Moreover, working women in 1980 could have had lower bargaining power than 
working women in 2000, due to their lower education rates. In addition to including period fixed 
effects to the regressions reported in tables 2.2 and 2.3, I conduct a limited sample robustness 
check (table 2.5), by employing observations from year 1990 and 2000 only. 
The sign on EMIGRATION_F becomes negative, columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, although the 
estimated coefficient is not significantly different from zero and of a small magnitude. 
Considering that including period fixed effects in the estimations contained in columns 1 and 4 is 
redundant, as shown by the F-statistic, the estimated coefficient on EMIGRATION_F is only -
0.003. As mentioned above, period fixed effects are redundant in the estimations contained in 
columns 1 and 4 of table 2.5. Thus, I report results of similar regressions without period fixed 
effects in columns 2 and 5 respectively, however, doing so does not produce meaningfully 
different quantitative nor qualitative results. 
                                                 
17 For this sample the mean share of female emigrants is 0.497 
18 For this sample the mean secondary school enrollment ratio of girls to boys is 86.2 in 1980, 98.4 in 1990 and 
100.95 in 2000 
32 
 
Table 2.5 Limited Sample Robustness Check, Year 1980 Excluded. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Labor Shares on 
Female and Male Immigration and Emigration Stock  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     non-OECD non-OECD OECD 
 Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects 
EMIGRATION_F -0.0020 -0.0031 0.0005 -0.0023 -0.0030 0.0875*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0206) (0.0148) (0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0211) 
EMIGRATION_M -0.0005 0.0008 0.0027 0.0015 0.0016 -0.1220*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0218) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0239) 
IMMIGRATION_F 0.0296*** 0.0297*** 0.0198** 0.0250** 0.0235** 0.1052*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0372) 
IMMIGRATION_M -0.0263*** -0.0266*** -0.0127 -0.0162 -0.0151 -0.1046** 
 (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0082) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0393) 
ln(k) -0.0217 -0.0251 0.1252 0.1354 0.1548 0.1519* 
 (0.1375) (0.1341) (0.1148) (0.1645) (0.1570) (0.0859) 
ln(RGDP) 0.1988*** 0.1997*** 0.1349** 0.1403 0.1511* 0.0249 
 (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0647) (0.0866) (0.0800) (0.0712) 
INVESTMENT PRICE 0.0528 0.0592 0.2168* 0.3746** 0.3960** 0.0075 
 (0.1129) (0.1135) (0.1149) (0.1716) (0.1609) (0.1434) 
FREEDOM   0.0537* 0.0380 0.0207 0.0836*** 
   (0.0278) (0.0441) (0.0410) (0.0301) 
DEMOC   0.0133 0.0115 0.0121 0.0607** 
   (0.0134) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0255) 
FLOWS   0.0002 0.0035 0.0038 0.0008 
   (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0009) 
PRIMARY   -0.0002 -0.0027 -0.0024 0.0083*** 
   (0.0027) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0022) 
SECONDARY   0.0026* 0.0050* 0.0046* -0.0006 
   (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0008) 
       
F-stat (Redundant fixed effects) 2.692  9.129*** 0.413  10.441*** 
       
Countries 81 81 63 40 40 27 
Observations 135 135 100 53 53 47 
R-squared 0.4944 0.4836 0.6691 0.5736 0.5691 0.8426 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. The null 
hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. Time periods included in the regressions: 1990 and 2000.
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Considering statistically significant variables for non-OECD and OECD subsamples, 
contained in columns 5 and 6, of table 2.5, the results are similar to that of the estimations 
contained in columns 4 and 5, of table 2.2. The estimated coefficients on IMMIGRATION_F for 
non-OECD countries, IMMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_F for OECD countries are 
positive, and negative on EMIGRATION_M and IMMIGRATION_M for OECD countries. The 
magnitude of the coefficients, reported in table 2.5 is larger, however not by much. The largest 
increase belongs to the estimated coefficient on IMMIGRATION_F for non-OECD countries, the 
smallest in magnitude of the five statistically significant estimated coefficients, reported in table 
2.2 as 0.0170 and 0.0235 in table 2.5, while, for example, the estimated coefficient on 
IMMIGRATION_F for OECD countries changes from 0.0965 in table 2.2 to 0.1052 in table 2.5. 
In general, truncating the sample does not produce meaningfully different results from those 
reported earlier. 
According to the National Bureau of Economics Research an average business cycle 
length in the U.S. is about 69 months, or a little less than five years.19 By averaging the 
dependent variable, labor share, over 4 to 6 years I intend to eliminate short-term fluctuation. 
However, this strategy might not be optimal, as for example, other countries might have longer 
business cycles. Thus, I perform a robustness check by including a 7 to 10 year average labor 
share as an independent variable in the estimations. Capital to output ratio and relative 
investment price are also changed to 7 to 10 year averages in these estimations. The results are 
reported in tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
                                                 
18. http://www.nber.org/cycles.html  
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Table 2.6 OLS Estimates from Regressions of 10 Year Average (Log) Labor Share on 
Emigration and Immigration Stock and Female and Male Emigration and Immigration Stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    non-OECD OECD 
EMIGRATION -0.0022     
 (0.0036)     
IMMIGRATION 0.0019     
 (0.0019)     
EMIGRATION_F  0.0229 0.0066 0.0227 0.0708*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0153) (0.0205) (0.0198) 
EMIGRATION_M  -0.0280 -0.0022 -0.0111 -0.0975*** 
  (0.0267) (0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0236) 
IMMIGRATION_F  0.0164*** 0.0142** 0.0170* 0.0980*** 
  (0.0050) (0.0067) (0.0088) (0.0282) 
IMMIGRATION_M  -0.0104** -0.0060 -0.0049 -0.0978*** 
  (0.0048) (0.0083) (0.0110) (0.0298) 
ln(k) -0.0106 0.0067 -0.0179 -0.0397 0.1130 
 (0.0587) (0.0600) (0.0847) (0.1171) (0.1127) 
ln(RGDP) 0.1799*** 0.1703*** 0.0846 0.0335 0.1042 
 (0.0278) (0.0300) (0.0663) (0.0986) (0.0733) 
INVESTMENT PRICE   0.1085 0.1663 0.0784 
   (0.0923) (0.1187) (0.1388) 
FREEDOM   0.0482** 0.0421 0.0546** 
   (0.0230) (0.0327) (0.0265) 
DEMOC   0.0106 0.0085 0.0356 
   (0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0225) 
FLOWS   0.0005 0.0028 0.0008 
   (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
PRIMARY   0.0003 -0.0001 0.0093*** 
   (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0022) 
SECONDARY   0.0033** 0.0039 -0.0002 
   (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0008) 
      
F-stat (redundant fixed 
effects) 
5.5787*** 5.5462*** 16.9609*** 3.2836** 26.8097*** 
      
Countries 87 87 68 45 26 
Observations 176 176 133 69 64 
R-squared 0.4938 0.5065 0.6507 0.4768 0.7866 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 10 year average ln(α). Constants 
are included in regressions though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. The null 
hypothesis for the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
In column 1 of table 2.6 emigrant and immigrant stock are not separated by gender. The 
estimated coefficients on both EMIGRATION and IMMIGRATION are not statistically different 
from zero, which is similar to the results contained in column 1 of table 2.2. The results of 
estimations based on whole sample reported in column 2 and 3 of table 2.6 are also comparable 
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to the results reported in columns 2 and 3 of table 2.2. In the benchmark specification, column 2, 
the only statistically significant estimated coefficients belong to female immigration stock and 
male immigration stock, once additional control variables are introduced into the regressions, the 
only statistically significant variables is female immigration stock. Interestingly, the statistically 
significant estimated coefficients reported in column 2 of table 2.6 are larger in magnitude, than 
those reported in column 2 of table 2.2, however, with inclusion of additional control variables, 
column 3 of table 2.2 and column 3 of table 2.6, the magnitude of the statistically significant 
variable converges. (0.0142 in table 2.6 and 0.0143 in table 2.2). Qualitatively, the results in 
both tables are similar for statistically significant variables as well: estimated coefficients on 
female immigrant stock are positive and negative on male immigrant stock. 
Dividing the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries, columns 4 and 5 of table 2.6 
again delivers results comparable to the results reported in columns 4 and 5 table 2.2 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Comparing tables 2.3 and 2.7, in which sectorial shares added to the regression. The first 
column of each table contains estimation employing the whole sample. In both tables the only 
statistically significant estimated coefficient belongs to IMMIGRATION_F, the size of the 
coefficient is similar in the two tables (0.0270 in table 2.3 and 0.0212 in table 2.7). The rest of 
the estimated coefficients on independent variables of interest, although not statistically 
significant from zero, keep the same signs: negative for male migrant stock and positive for 
female migrant stock. 
Column 2 of table 2.7 contains results of an estimation based on the non-OECD 
subsample. These results are similar to the results reported in column 2 of table 2.3: the only 
statistically significant coefficient belongs to EMIGRATION_F. However, period fixed effects 
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appear to be redundant in the estimation contained in column 2 of table 2.7. Thus, I estimate a 
similar regression without controlling for period fixed effects, which is contained in column 3 of 
table 2.7. The coefficients on both directions female migrant stock become statistically 
significant, with positive signs and of a comparable magnitude to the coefficients on 
EMIGRATION_F and, IMMIGRATION_F reported in column 2 of table 2.3. Although, the latter 
is not statistically different from zero in table 2.3. 
The last column of table 2.7 reports results of an estimation based on the OECD 
subsample. The estimated coefficients on all four variables of interest are statistically significant, 
as opposed to only statistically significant coefficients on female and male emigrant stock as 
reported in table 2.3. Moreover, all four estimated coefficients are larger in magnitude than the 
estimated coefficients in table 2.3. While the increase in magnitude for estimated coefficients on 
female and male emigrant stock is around 6 percent, the changes are larger for immigrant stock 
variables:  0.0680 to 0.0956 estimated coefficient change on IMMIGRATION_F, a 40 percent 
increase, and a change from -0.0589 to -0.0877 of the estimated coefficient on 
IMMIGRATION_M, a 49 percent increase in magnitude. 
Altogether, while the results from employing 7 to 10 year averages of labor share as an 
independent variable do not refute the findings presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3, the results 
presented in tables 2.6 and 2.7 offer additional insights into the relationship between labor share 
and migration. Such as, the magnitude of the association might be larger than presented earlier, 
furthermore, although female immigration stock for non-OECD countries is not significantly 
different from zero when sectorial shares are controlled for in table 2.3, it might still be 
associated with labor share, as it does enter a similar estimation significantly, (column 3 of table 
2.7).  
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Table 2.7 OLS Estimates from Regressions of 10 Year Average (Log) Labor Shares on Female 
and Male Immigration and Emigration Stock 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  non-OECD non-OECD OECD 
 Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Pooled Fixed Effects 
EMIGRATION_F 0.0101 0.0350* 0.0468* 0.1000*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0205) (0.0235) (0.0331) 
EMIGRATION_M -0.0074 -0.0099 -0.0167 -0.1446*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0191) (0.0208) (0.0383) 
IMMIGRATION_F 0.0212* 0.0446 0.0538** 0.0956** 
 (0.0126) (0.0328) (0.0264) (0.0454) 
IMMIGRATION_M -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0067 -0.0877* 
 (0.0071) (0.0135) (0.0115) (0.0502) 
Ln(k) -0.0530 -0.1270 -0.1329 0.0520 
 (0.1011) (0.1370) (0.1300) (0.0980) 
Ln(RGDP) -0.0119 -0.0684 -0.0528 -0.1331 
 (0.0755) (0.0951) (0.1028) (0.0950) 
INVESTMENT_PRICE 0.0498 0.0292 -0.0082 -0.0353 
 (0.0966) (0.1166) (0.1169) (0.1520) 
FREEDOM 0.0785** 0.0757 0.0452 0.0984** 
 (0.0341) (0.0480) (0.0490) (0.0354) 
DEMOC 0.0065 0.0011 -0.0048 0.0585 
 (0.0102) (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0517) 
FLOWS 0.0003 0.0019 0.0015 0.0006 
 (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0010) 
PRIMARY -0.0001 0.0036 0.0055 0.0068* 
 (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0034) 
SECONDARY 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0005 
 (0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0010) 
AG_SHARE -0.0130 -0.0100 -0.0083 -0.0212** 
 (0.0081) (0.0090) (0.0093) (0.0080) 
MAN_SHARE 0.0039 0.0117 0.0141** 0.0002 
 (0.0051) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0039) 
     
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 12.2927*** 1.9839  17.2044*** 
     
Countries 61 38 38 24 
Observations 98 57 57 41 
R-squared 0.6376 0.5030 0.4573 0.8593 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 10 year average of ln(α). Constants are included 
in regressions though not reported above. “Fixed Effects” refer to fixed time period effects. The null hypothesis for 
the redundant fixed effects test is that the fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
The results presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest an association between labor share 
and migrant stock, however labor share could also serve as a push or pull factor in a decision to 
migrate For example, a relatively low labor share of a country could be the reason why men 
decide to move to other countries. Moreover, policymakers, aware of the positive relationship 
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between mobility of women and labor share and the negative relationship between mobility of 
men and labor share could come up with policies constraining mobility of men and making 
mobility of women easier. There is also a possibility that certain variables correlated with 
migration and labor share have been omitted from the regression. In an attempt to solve the 
endogeneity problem, I use an instrumental variables technique; the results are presented in table 
2.8. 
For instrument variables method not to produce biased results, the instruments have to be 
correlated with the endogenous variables, in this case migrant stock separated by gender, 
IMMIGRATION_F, IMMIGRATION_M, EMIGRATION_F, EMIGRATION_M, they should also 
only have association with the dependent variable, labor share through the endogenous variables. 
At the same time, instrumental variables cannot be correlated with one another to provide 
meaningful results. 
 
The decisions to emigrate and choose a country to migrate to might be influenced by 
opposite factors, furthermore, men and women might have different reasons to migrate20. Thus 
finding strong, valid instrumental variables for all four endogenous variables might prove to be a 
difficult task. I supplement not so sophisticated lagged male and female emigrant, and immigrant 
stocks as instruments with the following variables. There are at least two reasons to employ an 
array of instrumental variables. First, there needs to be at least as many instrumental variables as 
endogenous regressors, ideally more to be able to conduct validity tests21. Second, as the first 
stage of two stage least squares produces a linear combination of instruments to maximize their 
                                                 
20 For example, Ferrant and Tuccio (2015) find that while discrimination serves as a push and pull factor for female 
migrants it does not impact men’s decision to migrate 
21 See Murray (2006) for the discussion 
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correlation with each endogenous variable, a linear combination of highly collinear instrumental 
variables will not capture variation on all endogenous variables. 
Number of embassies (EMBASSY) and number of international letters sent and received 
per capita (LETTER) are components of Dreher (2006, 2008) KOF index of globalization. The 
index measures how open a country is politically, economically, and socially. A higher number 
of embassies and international letters in a country could imply a more globalized environment 
conducive to migration. 
 Freedom of international movement (FORMOV), freedom of domestic movement 
(DOMMOV), and women’s social rights (WOSOC) are indexes constructed as a part of CIRI 
Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli et al 2014). Freedom of international movement and 
freedom of domestic movement are measured on the scale from 0 to 2. With a score of 0 
signifying extreme constraints for country’s citizens to travel abroad and return and travel inside 
of the country respectively, 1 signifying moderate constraints, and 2 signifying the absence of 
these constraints. WOSOC is measured from 0 to 2, with 0 signifying a country does not allow 
any social rights for women and 2 signifying that all or nearly all social rights are guaranteed by 
the law and enforced by the government.  The CIRI Human Rights variables could serve as push 
and pull factors in a decision and ability, in the case of foreign movement freedom, to migrate.  
Interestingly the association between CIRI Human Rights variables could have positive or 
negative association with female migration, depending on the level of women’s rights in the 
origin country (Naghsh Nejad 2013) and the gap in the rights between origin and destination 
(Naghsh Nejad and Young 2015).   
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Finally, air carrier domestic takeoffs and takeoffs abroad of air carriers registered in the 
country (AIR) is a World Bank world development indicator. This variable could both signify 
openness of a country and correlate with the amount of migrants. 
Table 2.8 2SLS Estimates from Regressions Of (Log) Labor Share on Female and Male 
Emigration and Immigration Stock 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  OECD non-OECD 
EMIGRATION_F -0.0066 0.1242*** 0.0488 
 (0.0221) (0.0246) (0.0302) 
EMIGRATION_M 0.0104 -0.1734*** -0.0368 
 (0.0213) (0.0292) (0.0290) 
IMMIGRATION_F 0.0358*** 0.1460** 0.1090** 
 (0.0120) (0.0727) (0.0447) 
IMMIGRATION_M -0.0255*** -0.1399* -0.0272** 
 (0.0093) (0.0748) (0.0136) 
ln(k) -0.0749 0.0925 -0.0894 
 (0.1066) (0.0858) (0.1095) 
ln(RGDP) -0.0381 -0.1041 -0.1684** 
 (0.0604) (0.0701) (0.0709) 
INVESTMENT_PRICE 0.2159 0.0884 0.3117* 
 (0.1372) (0.1676) (0.1707) 
FREEDOM 0.1151*** 0.1064*** 0.1289** 
 (0.0342) (0.0289) (0.0541) 
DEMOC 0.0107 0.0543 -0.0013 
 (0.0105) (0.0344) (0.0125) 
FLOWS -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0012 
 (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0023) 
PRIMARY -0.0027 0.0085*** 0.0017 
 (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0038) 
SECONDARY 0.0026 -0.0011 0.0028 
 (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0028) 
AG_SHARE -0.0232*** -0.0185*** -0.0253*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0061) (0.0076) 
MAN_SHARE 0.0011 -0.0005 0.0004 
 (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0091) 
    
F-stat (first stage EMIGRATION_F) 33.26*** 83.58*** 41.51*** 
F-stat (first stage EMIGRATION_M) 112.61*** 69.34*** 165.62*** 
F-stat (first stage IMMIGRATION_F) 492.34*** 279.33*** 37.42*** 
F-stat (first stage IMMIGRATION_M) 1083.38*** 257.38*** 535.15*** 
    
J-stat 1.071 1.308 3.304 
    
Countries 58 24 36 
Observations 98 41 56 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in 
regressions though not reported above. Instrumental variables in regression (1) are LETTER, AIR,  lagged emigrant 
and immigrant stock separated by gender, , in regression (2) WOSOC, EMBASSY,  lagged emigrant and immigrant 
stock separated by gender, , in regression (3) FORMOV, DOMMOV, EMBASSY, LETTER, lagged emigrant and 
immigrant stock separated by gender  
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The first column of table 2.8 contains results of a two stage least squares regression of the whole 
sample with the following instrumental variables: LETTER, AIR, lagged male and female 
emigrant and immigrant stock. The estimated coefficients on IMMIGRATION_F and 
IMMIGRATION_M are statistically significant, with a positive sign of female immigrant stock 
and a negative sign on male immigrant stock. The estimated coefficients are 0.0358 
(IMMIGRATION_F) and -0.0255 (IMMIGRATION_M) are larger in magnitude than the 
estimated coefficient on IMMIGRATION_F  0.0270 and IMMIGRATION_M -0.0119 for a 
comparable OLS regression reported in column 1 of table 2.3. Although the latter estimated 
coefficient in column 1 of table 2.3 is not statistically different from zero. The difference of the 
estimated coefficient size for IMMIGRATION_F between OLS and 2SLS is about 33 percent 
changing from 0.0270 to 0.0358. 
The estimated coefficients on the other two variables of interest are not statistically 
different from zero, although it should be noted that the signs are switched, a positive on 
EMIGRATION_M and a negative one on EMIGRATION_F. This could be happening if labor 
share or inequality between workers and capital owners works as a push factor in one’s decision 
to emigrate.  The implication is that women choose to emigrate when inequality levels are low 
(high labor share), judging by the positive signs on female emigrant stock in tables 2.2 and 2.3.   
However, a more plausible explanation is that the small size of the sample might be creating 
bias.  
Column 2 of table 2.8 reports results of a two stage least squares regression for OECD 
subsample. The following instrumental variables are employed in the estimation, WOSOC, 
EMBASSY, and the lagged emigrant and immigrant male and female stock. All four variables of 
interest have significant estimated coefficients, the signs are positive on female emigrant and 
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immigrant stock and negative on male immigrant and emigrant stock. The magnitude for all four 
is larger than the reported estimated coefficients for the same variables in tables 2.2 and 2.3. For 
example, the estimated coefficient on EMIGRATION_F in table for OECD countries in table 2.3 
is 0.0935 and 0.1242 in table 2.8. This implies an increase of 32 percent going from 0.0935 to 
0.1242. One of the important takeaways here is that after all there might be a statistically 
significant association between immigrant stock variables in OECD subsample, that disappears 
in table 2.3 after manufacturing and agricultural shares are controlled for. 
Column 3 of table 2.8 contains results of an instrumental regression based on non-OECD 
subsample. The following instrumental variables are employed in the estimation: FORMOV, 
DOMMOV, EMBASSY, LETTER and lagged emigrant and immigrant stock separated by gender. 
Although estimated coefficients on EMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_M are not statistically 
significant from zero, the signs are equivalent to those on estimated coefficients on 
EMIGRATION_F and EMIGRATION_M, positive for female emigrant stock and negative for 
male emigrant stock. The magnitude of the coefficients estimated by two stage least squares is 
larger than those estimated by ordinary least squares, however, not by much. 
The estimated coefficients that enter the regression significantly belong to male and 
female immigrant stock variables. Again, female immigrant stock estimated coefficient is 
positive and male immigrant stock estimated coefficient is negative. The magnitude of 
IMMIGRATION_F coefficient is much larger than the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on 
IMMIGRATION_F in tables 2.2 and 2.3 for non-OECD countries. It is 0.0170 and statistically 
significant in table 2.2, 0.0680 and statistically not different from zero in table 2.3, and 0.1090 
in table 2.8. Starting from 0.0680 this is about a 60 percent increase. Similarly, the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient on IMMIGRATION_M is larger than the magnitude of the estimated 
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coefficients on IMMIGRATION_M reported in tables 2.2 and 2.3. However, IMMIGRATION_M 
does not enter either of the regressions for non-OECD countries contained in tables 2.2 and 2.3 
significantly. At the same time, it enters the regressions contained in columns 3 and 6 of table 
2.4. As mentioned above, if a statistically meaningful relationship between male immigrant stock 
and labor share does exist in non-OECD countries it is driven by immigrants from OECD 
countries, who are capturing the presence of foreign capital in non-OECD countries.  
The F-statistic of the first stages of all three regressions is reported in table 2.8 as well. It 
is above the conventional magnitude of 10 and implies that the instrumental variables are strong. 
Furthermore, there is not enough evidence to reject the validity of the instrumental variables, 
according to J-stat of Sargan-Hansen J-test of over identifying restrictions, also reported in table 
2.8. The null of the test is that the instruments are valid and rejecting the null would be a reason 
for concern. At the same time the sample size is small, which potentially creates biased 
coefficient estimates. Thus, the results must be interpreted with caution. I use instrumental 
variable regression results as a robustness check, while relying on the magnitude reported by 
ordinary least squares estimation in tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
Finally, there could be potential heterogeneity between countries. For example, the 
quality of education, might differ from one country to another. Including country fixed effects 
would solve this problem. However, the panel is unbalanced with only three periods. Including 
country fixed effects would lead to a loss in degrees of freedom. Thus, I attempt to capture the 
heterogeneity by including region fixed effects22. The results of the estimations employing fixed 
regional effects are reported in table 2.9. For most of the estimations, columns 2, 4, and 5 the 
region fixed effects appear to be redundant as reported by F-statistics. At the same time, it is 
                                                 
22 According to United Nations regional division. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
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worth noting that all of the statistically significant estimated coefficients are of a comparable size 
and of the same sign as the estimated coefficients reported in table 2.2. 
Table 2.9 Region Fixed Effects Robustness Check. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (log) 
Labor Shares on Female and Male Immigrant and Emigrant Stock with United Nations Regions 
Fixed Effects Added to Each Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    non-OECD OECD 
EMIGRATION 0.0006     
 (0.0029)     
IMMIGRATION -0.0016     
 (0.0041)     
EMIGRATION_F  0.0173 0.0068 0.0210 0.0726*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0216) (0.0225) 
EMIGRATION_M  -0.0180 0.0041 -0.0005 -0.1002*** 
  (0.0213) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0277) 
IMMIGRATION_F  0.0283*** 0.0145* 0.0212* 0.0933** 
  (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0106) (0.0383) 
IMMIGRATION_M  -0.0217*** -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0842** 
  (0.0053) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0398) 
Ln(K) -0.0073 -0.0059 -0.0043 -0.0295 0.1149 
 (0.0822) (0.0830) (0.1205) (0.1351) (0.0744) 
ln(RGDP) 0.1279*** 0.1228** 0.0701 0.0483 0.0024 
 (0.0479) (0.0484) (0.0791) (0.0986) (0.0706) 
INVESTMENT_PRICE   0.0877 0.0635 0.0837 
   (0.1161) (0.1569) (0.1165) 
FREEDOM   0.0716*** 0.1220*** 0.0841*** 
   (0.0269) (0.0417) (0.0255) 
DEMOC   0.0184* 0.0175 0.0488** 
   (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0229) 
FLOWS   -0.0005 0.0012 -0.0005 
   (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0009) 
PRIMARY   0.0013 0.0014 0.0088*** 
   (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0020) 
SECONDARY   0.0039*** 0.0037 0.0001 
      
F-stat (redundant year 
fixed effects) 
10.2094*** 9.4564*** 21.1388*** 9.0647*** 20.6963*** 
F-stat (redundant 
region fixed effects) 
2.3466** 1.4212 3.5417*** 2.2515* 2.1315 
      
Countries 93 93 70 47 27 
Observations 202 202 145 79 66 
R-squared 0.4476 0.4928 0.6541 0.5020 0.8275 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(α). Constants are included in regressions 
though not reported above. The null hypothesis for the redundant year fixed effects test is that the period fixed 
effects are jointly insignificant. The null hypothesis for the redundant region fixed effects test is that the region fixed 
effects are jointly insignificant. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
Globalization is often named as one of the factors contributing to income inequality. This 
happens through distribution of income away from workers and towards capital owners by 
increasing capital owners’ bargaining power.  This increase in bargaining power could be caused 
by capital mobility. At the same time, globalization allows for increased worker mobility. Thus, 
owners of both factors should be able to have bargaining power.  
In this paper I investigate the relationship of labor mobility, measured by immigrant and 
emigrant stock, and the labor share of national income. I am specifically interested in the 
relationship between labor share and migrant stock in OECD and non-OECD countries and the 
different relationship female and male migrant stocks might have with the labor share, since 
women have been shown to have lower bargaining power. 
I find that female immigrant stock has a positive association with labor share in OECD 
countries, somewhat driven by immigrants from non-OECD countries who crowd out native 
women of domestic work, which in turn allows native women to gain higher bargaining power. 
At the same time, male immigrant stock has a negative association with labor share in OECD 
countries, plausibly due to lower reservation wages of immigrants, which undermines bargaining 
power of natives.  
Female emigrant stock has a positive association with labor share in OECD countries, 
while male emigrant stock has a negative one. If women do have lower bargaining power, their 
exit, holding everything else constant, will be associated with an overall higher bargaining power 
of labor, and, conversely, exit of men, who hold higher bargaining power would then be 
associated with lower bargaining power overall. 
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Interestingly, while the magnitude of the association between female immigrant stock and 
labor share is roughly equal to the magnitude of the association between male immigrant stock 
and labor share in OECD countries, this is not the case for female and male emigrant stock. The 
association between male emigrant stock and labor share is larger in size than the association 
between female emigrant stock and labor share in OECD countries. The explanation for this 
could be that women migrate as a part of family, as opposed to become a part of workforce, more 
often than men do. Additionally, this difference supports the idea that migration research should 
not omit separating migrant stock by gender. 
For non-OECD countries, female emigrant stock and female immigrant stock are 
positively associated with labor share, which could be explained by relative shortage of highly 
skilled women. At the same time, male immigrant stock is negatively associated with labor share 
in non-OECD countries, which is driven by primarily men immigrating from OECD countries 
and accompanying movement of capital in the same direction. 
In this paper, I reveal that increased labor mobility possibilities, as a part of globalization, are not 
necessarily creating or decreasing inequality. The migration issue is multifaceted; I show the 
importance of gendered approach to migration studies, and the different associations with labor 
share created by globalization along with potential processes explaining the associations. The 
findings suggest that policy focused on income inequality as a result of decreasing labor share 
should not view globalization as necessarily causing or decreasing income inequality and instead 
take into account the disparity in bargaining power between men and women.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Women in Management and Economic Freedom 
3.1. Introduction 
Female underrepresentation in firm leadership positions is increasingly viewed as a concern for 
policymakers. In a lecture titled “Breaking the Glass Ceiling” Lise D. Versterlund, Andrew W. 
Mellon Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh, notes that although one third of 
MBA graduates in the U.S. are female, only 1.2% of Fortune 500 companies have female CEOs. 
Furthermore, executive officer positions filled by women in the Fortune 500 are below 15% and 
that number has not increased significantly over the last 5 years (Catalyst, 2014). The situation is 
similar in other countries. According to the Australian Census of Women in Leadership (2012) 
only 6% of managers of revenue generating departments of the ASX 20023 are women. In 
response to female underrepresentation, Europe is on the verge of passing mandatory quotas to 
increase the share of women on corporate boards and German companies such as Daimler, 
Deutsche Telekom and Lufthansa are voluntarily increasing the number of women carrying out 
leading roles, such as supervisory board members and middle and upper-management 
positions24. 
This paper focuses on women’s representation in firm management25. Women make up 
about half of labor force but their representation in management is much lower than that26. In the 
sample of 81 countries that I examine in this paper the average female labor force share is around 
                                                 
23 Top 200 companies listed on Australian Securities Exchange 
24 According to Spiegel (Germany) issue from November 26th, 2013 and Time issue from March 22nd 2010 
25 Occupations in this group include chief executives, commercial production, specialized services, hospitality, 
retail, and other services managers. 
26 See for example, the issue of Argus (U.K.) from May 22nd, 2014. 
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50% while the average share of women in the managerial profession is around 30 % (figures 3.1 
and 3.2). 
Figure 3.1 Share of Women in the Managerial Profession in a Sample of 81 Countries 
 
 
Source: International Labour Organization (2013). Employment Distribution by Sex and Occupation. Retrieved from 
http://unstats.un.org 
 
Figure 3.2 Share of Women in the Labor Force in a Sample of 81 Countries 
Source: World Bank. (2012). Labor force participation rate, female. From International Labour Organization, Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market database. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org 
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Policymakers’ concerns regarding female underrepresentation in firm management stem 
mainly from a belief that the source of the underrepresentation is gender discrimination. If 
women are passed up for management positions because shareholders and/or existing 
management simply prefer to hire men, then such discrimination may negatively affect an 
economy. Employers are essentially prejudiced against utilizing half or more of available human 
capital. Such prejudice may be especially inefficient when it comes to management positions. 
However, the source of female underrepresentation may be rooted not only in the 
preferences of employers, but also those of employees, customers, or policymakers (Becker, 
1971). If employers wish to indulge their own tastes for discrimination they will likely forgo 
profits to the extent that doing so is inconsistent with cost minimization. Market competition 
may then drive firms with stronger tastes for discrimination out of business. Alternatively, 
market forces will not punish discriminating employers if their employees or customers have 
tastes for discrimination 27. In particular, if discrimination is rooted in consumer preferences then 
it will not occur at the expense of profits. Policymakers may also create incentives for employers 
to discriminate. Their motives could be rooted in their own preferences or those of voters. The 
group discriminated against may not have the political power to affect changes in those policies. 
Finally, a certain group can be underrepresented in a particular type of employment if their 
average productivity is lower than that of other individuals. 
In this paper I explore the relationship between economic freedom and women’s 
representation in management positions in a cross-section of up to 81 countries. The Fraser 
Institute’s Economic freedom of the World (EFW) index is used as a measure of the involvement 
of a country’s government and the extent to which their markets are open and competitive, both 
                                                 
27 In the case where employees have a taste for discrimination we are, all else equal, more likely to see segregation 
rather than discrimination (i.e. firms that only hire men or only hire women) 
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domestically and in relation to firms abroad. As DeHaan et al (2006) simply put it “Economic 
Freedom implies competition”. By employing the index I aim to provide insights into the sources 
of female underrepresentation in the managerial profession.  
If the observed underrepresentation is rooted in employer preferences for discrimination 
then greater economic freedom is likely to be positively related to the representation of women 
in management. Market forces will tend to drive discriminating employers out of profitability. 
Likewise, if discrimination is driven by policy, greater economic freedom is likely to be less 
associated with discrimination. This will be the case because greater economic freedom implies a 
smaller role for policy in determining labor market outcomes. Alternatively, if real productivity 
differences between males and females drive discrimination, then economic freedom may have 
no relationship to female representation in management, or even a negative one as greater 
freedom allows employers to better exploit those productivity differentials towards higher 
profits. In a similar fashion, greater economic freedom would not constrain discrimination 
stemming from employees and customers. Indeed, there may be in those cases a negative 
relationship between economic freedom and female representation in the managerial profession, 
as firms would hire less women to minimize costs and maximize profits. 
This paper joins a number of studies that test implications of the Becker (1971) model of 
discrimination. For example, Kawaguchi (2007) reports that Japanese firms that are more willing 
to hire females tend to be more profitable. Weber and Zulehner (2014) also report that Austrian 
firms with lower female employee shares have lower survival rates.  
Another stream of literature explores the effect of competition (measured in a variety of 
ways) on the relative status of minorities in the labor force. For instance, Black and Brainerd 
(2004) measure competition as an increase in international trade and find that competition 
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decreased gender wage gaps across industries in the U.S., more so in the concentrated industries 
than in competitive industries that are more likely to already have lower wage gaps due to more 
efficient resource allocation, which is in accordance with Becker (1971) model28. Levine, 
Levkov, and Rubinstein (2008) adopt a similar approach to measure the impact of the economic 
environment on the racial wage gap. They find that increase in competition (as measured by 
banking sector deregulation) lowered the wage gap between blacks and whites in the economy 
overall. Furthermore, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) utilize the Frasers Institute’s 
EFW index and report that in a cross-country sample more open and competitive environments 
are associated with smaller gender wage gaps. 
This paper belongs to the latter set of the studies. However, it concentrates on firm 
management and analyzes cross-country variation in female management employment shares 
and the ratios of women to men in management. To the best of my knowledge there are only two 
other studies that investigate the effect of market forces on the share of women in professional 
employments, both of which focus on the banking industry within the United States. Ashenfelter 
and Hannan (1986) show that market concentration negatively affects the share of women in 
managerial positions.  Black and Strahan (2001) report that deregulation of banking industry 
since 1970s increased the amount of women in managerial positions. While there are benefits to 
focusing on a single industry (e.g. by limiting the amount of uncontrolled for heterogeneity in the 
sample) the present study offers a more general look at whether or not increased economic 
freedom (including less regulation) is associated with more women in management.  
                                                 
28 Although this is not the finding Berik et al (2004) arrive at for Taiwan and South Korea while utilizing 
international trade as a proxy for competition. They show that the gender wage gap in concentrated industries 
increases. 
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Similar to Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2007) I utilize the Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index as a proxy for the competitiveness of markets to 
analyze its relationship with the representation of women in management. I find that 
economically freer environments are associated with greater gender equality in management. In 
particular, a 1 point increase a country’s EFW score is associated with about a 0.66 percentage 
point increase in female managers as a share of the employed. That effect constitutes about 1/2 
of a sample standard deviation in that share of the employed.  Additionally, I find that a 1 point 
increase in a country’s EFW score is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the ratio 
of women to men in management positions. This is approximately the difference, for example, 
between Mexico and Montenegro or Luxembourg and Malaysia or France and Ukraine in 2011. 
These findings support the argument that market competition is associated with lower levels of 
discrimination based on the preferences of the employers. 
Gender inequality and its effects on economic growth have been widely explored in the 
economic literature. For example, Dollar and Gatti (1999), Hill and King (1995), and Forbes 
(2000) show that gender inequality in education is detrimental to economic growth. Lamanna 
and Klasen (2009) find that gender inequality in education and employment hinder economic 
development. Furthermore, Esteve-Volart (2004) develops a theoretical model to demonstrate the 
inverse relationship between economic growth and discrimination-based exclusion of women 
from labor force, in general and from the managerial positions specifically. If economic growth 
is in part a function of gender inequality, it is natural to ask about the sources of that inequality. 
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This paper contributes to our understanding of whether or not market mechanisms tend to 
eliminate costly discrimination against women in the management of firms.29  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the empirical specification 
and the data utilized in the study, section 3 goes on to present and discuss the results of the 
empirical analysis, section 4 contains robustness checks, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2. Empirical Specification and Data Description 
I employ the following empirical specifications to investigate the association between economic 
institutions and the representation of women in the managerial profession: 
𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽2,…,𝑘𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖, (3.1); 
𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐹𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐹𝑊𝑖 + 𝛽2,…,𝑘𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖, (3.2) 
Where MANAGERSRi is a ratio of female to male managers, MANAGERSFi is the level of 
female managers among the employed, EFWi is a measure of economic freedom, Xi is a vector of 
additional control variables for country i, 𝛾 is a year-specific binary variable, and 𝜀 and 𝜖 are 
error terms. 
The first dependent variable MANAGERSR that will be utilized to estimate the 
association between the changes in economic freedom and the amount of female managers 
relative to that of male managers in a country. Its mean value for the sample is 44.957%; 
meaning that for each 100 male managers there are roughly 45 female managers. The second 
dependent variable MANAGERSF represent the level of female managers among the employed. 
                                                 
29 Regarding other factors that may be associated with female representation in the labor force, Tzannatos (1999) 
suggests that religion and industry composition are both important; Goldin (1995) finds that education has a large 
impact on the share of women in labor force. 
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The mean score of the sample of the second dependent variable is 1.676%, implying that for each 
100 employed persons there are about 1.7 female managers. 
 The data are organized as a cross-section. Most of the dependent variable observations 
are for the year 2011, but for some countries they are for one of the years 2009, 2010, 2012, or 
2013. (Specifically, 57 out of 81 observations for MANAGERSR are from 2011, similarly, 57 out 
of 81 observations for MANAGERSF are from 2011.) The heterogeneity in the observation 
period of the dependent variable creates a dilemma what year to employ for independent 
variables. All of the control variable observations are the year 2005 except for the religion 
variables, which are for the year 1980. Anything after 2005 seems to have closer association with 
2009 and not 2011. One can think of this as medium-run versus short-run problem. 
The variable of interest is the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) chain-linked index 
produced by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013). The EFW index scores countries on a scale of 
0 to 10 for each of the following five areas: (i) size of government, (ii) legal structure and 
property rights, (iii) access to sound money, (iv) freedom to trade internationally, and (v) the 
regulation of credit, labor, and business30. A higher EFW index score corresponds to lower 
government involvement in activities of private markets, allowing for competitive resource 
allocation in product and factor markets, including the allocations of human capital and labor 
services. The more economically free a country is, the greater the role for private markets and 
competition in allocating resources, including human capital and labor services. The 2005 EFW 
scores are used for all of the 8, the mean score for the sample is 7.038.  
 
                                                 
30 See table 3.1 for a more complete description of Economic Freedom of the World Index. 
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Table 3.1.  The Areas and Components of EFW Index 
 
Area 1. Size of Government.  
Measures public as opposed to private involvement in resource allocation through 
 Government consumption as a share of total consumption 
 Transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP 
 Government investment and government enterprises 
 Top marginal tax rate 
- Top marginal income tax rate 
- Top marginal payroll tax rate 
Area 2. Legal Institutions and Security of Property Rights 
Measures the extent to which the government provides protection to its agents and their property by ensuring 
 Judicial independence 
 Impartial courts 
 Protection of property rights 
 Military noninterference in rule of law and politics 
 Integrity of the legal system 
 Legal enforcement of contracts 
 Non-existent regulatory costs of the sale of real property 
 Reliability of police 
 Non-existent business costs of crime 
Area 3. Sound Money 
Measures consistency of monetary policy and institutions and ease of holding foreign currency through 
 Money growth 
 Standard deviation of inflation 
 Inflation in the most recent year 
 Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts 
Area 4. Freedom to Trade Internationally 
Measures the extent to which international trade is restricted through 
 Tariffs 
- Revenue from trade taxes (%) 
- Mean tariff rate 
- Standard deviation of tariff rates 
 Regulatory trade barriers 
- Non-tariff trade barriers 
- Compliance cost of importing and exporting 
 Black market exchange rates 
 Controls of the movement of capital and people 
- Foreign ownership/investment restrictions 
- Capital controls 
- Freedom of foreigners to visit 
 
Area 5. Regulations 
Measures the extent to which regulation constraints and creates 
 Credit market regulations 
- Ownership of banks 
- Private sector credit 
- Interest rate/negative real interest rate 
 Labor market regulations 
- Hiring and minimum wage 
- Hiring and firing costs 
- Centralized collective bargaining 
- Hours 
- Cost of worker dismissal 
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- Conscription 
 Business regulations 
- Administrative procedures 
- Bureaucracy costs 
- Starting a business 
- Extra payments, bribes, and favoritism 
- Licensing restrictions 
- Cost of tax compliance 
 
 
Different areas of the index might have different channels of association with the 
representation of women in management profession. As managerial profession requires certain 
human capital, higher government transfers to women with children might disincentivise31 
women to gain the needed human capital for the profession and give women an incentive to bear 
children instead. At the same time childcare subsidies might allow women to join workforce. 
Thus, the relationship between the size of government and share of women in a managerial 
profession at least ex-ante is ambiguous. Government transfers and subsidies are a component of 
area 1 of the index. Property rights, including women’s property rights, are a part of the area 2 of 
the index. Women’s property rights have been found in the literature (see for example, Agarwal, 
1994) to be one of the most important factors determining women’s social status and economic 
well-being, especially so in developing countries. Freedom to trade internationally, area 4 of the 
index, would create a more competitive environment and punish discriminating employers, 
Bhagwati (2007) discusses this issue in depth. Finally, regulation, area 5 of the index, plausibly 
pertains to this paper the most. Credit market regulations could hurt women if they have lower 
levels of human capital (due to taking a career break to have children), as they will be the first 
ones to let go and the last ones to hire, similar to young people if there is not enough credit 
available to employers due to credit market regulations, as found by Feldmann (2006). 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Tanner and Hughes (2013) on the role government transfers play in dicincentivising population 
from joining labor force. 
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Additionally higher credit market regulations could be associated with lower dynamism in terms 
of firms entering and exiting markets, as these regulations would present an additional constraint 
faced by firms. Thus decreasing competition and allowing employer taste-based discrimination.  
Labor market regulations and business regulations could also undermine women’s ability to 
assume management positions. If there are, for example, maternity leave regulations, an 
employer, all else equal, will prefer to hire a male. Business regulations could decrease degree of 
competition for firms, through for example, mandated costs to starting a new business. Less 
competitive environments will then allow employers to indulge their taste for discrimination 
(Becker, 1971). 
This paper joins a wealth of papers utilizing cross-country samples to explore the 
relationship between the dimensions of institutional quality measured by the EFW and various 
development variables, such as  economic growth (e.g. Ayal and Karras, 1998; Dawson, 1998; 
Gwartney et al., 1999; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Young and Sheehan, 2013)32, health, 
education and disease prevention outcomes (Stroup, 2007), political freedoms (Lawson and 
Clark, 2010), and subjective well-being ( Gehring, 2013; Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; 
Nikolaev, 2014)  To my knowledge the present paper is the first to examine the cross-country 
relationship between economic freedom and the relative representation of females in professional 
employment.  
The additional control variable vector X includes the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
to control for the income levels in all of the specifications. The rest of the control variables are 
divided into two sets. The first set describes the well-being of women in each country: female to 
male life-expectancy ratio (LIFE), fertility rates (FERTILITY), female to male secondary school 
                                                 
32 See De Haan and Sturm (2006) for an extensive survey of the literature examining the relationship between 
market-oriented institutions and policies (as measured by EFW) and economic growth 
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enrollment (SCHOOL), and female to male labor force participation (LABOR). The set is 
included to account for country-specific cultural or other determinants of female representation 
in management. Ultimately, higher well-being of women in a society indicates that women’s 
issues are of significant importance and women are treated as being equal to men. Additionally, 
any formal or informal institution that would affect the share of women in the managerial 
profession is likely to affect this well-being set of variables as well. 
 Countries with relatively more women in the labor force and relatively more women 
receiving education could be speculated to have relatively more female managers, while holding 
other factors constant. Relative life expectancy proxies for a few factors, such as relative 
healthcare accessibility and relative access to various consumption goods (drinking water, 
nutrition, etc). 
 The expected sign on fertility rates is ambiguous.  Higher fertility rates, first of all, are an 
opportunity cost of becoming a manager, and, second, account for the role of women in a society 
(all else equal, societies where women are less likely to be in the workforce, and/or become 
managers and are more likely to tend after the children and the house will have higher fertility 
rates). At the same time countries where formal and informal institutions present more 
opportunities for women to become managers, women are more likely to be able to provide for 
their children while holding a job (i.e. through government aid for single mothers)  
All four of the well-being variables have been shown to be correlated with economic 
environment as measured by the Economic Freedom of the World Index in Stroup (2008). If 
including the variables decreases the significance of the relationship between economic freedom 
and the dependent variable it would mean that the well-being indicators are the channels of 
association between economic freedom and representation of women in management. 
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The second set includes the variables that control for the main religion of a country:   
percent of Muslim (MUSLIM) and percent of Catholic (CATHOLIC) population as measured by 
La Porta et al (1999). As Tzanatos (1999) argues, including “noneconomic” determinants (such 
as religion) of female labor force participation in the analysis should give us better understanding 
of the participation decision, as he finds that including religion variables increases explanatory 
power of the regressions. Additionally, Rosson and Fields (2008) find a negative significant 
relationship between economic freedom of the world and growth of evangelical christianism. 
Thus, omitting the religion variables could potentially lead to biased results.  Descriptions and 
summary statistics for all variables are contained in table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Summary Descriptions and Statistics of Variables Included in Regressions 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev Obs Source 
MANAGERSF Share of female managers in the employed population 1.676 1.160 81 International Labour Organization 
MANAGERSR Ratio of female to male managers 
 
 
44.957 18.705 81 100*(female managers/male managers) 
      
EFW Economic freedom of the world index 7.038 0.911 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
GOVT_SIZE 
EFW Area 1 
Size of Government component of EFW 6.384 1.298 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
PROP_RIGHT 
EFW Area 1 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
component of EFW 
6.176 1.648 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
MONEY 
EFW Area 3 
Access to Sound Money component of EFW 8.253 1.755 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
TRADE 
EFW Area 4 
Freedom to Trade Internationally component of EFW 7.349 1.123 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
REGULATION 
EFW Area 5 
Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business component of 
EFW 
7.037 0.927 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
CREDIT 
EFW Area 5A 
Regulation of Credit subcomponent of EFW 8.84 1.184 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
LABOR 
EFW Area 5B 
Regulation of Labor subcomponent of EFW 6.041 1.376 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
BUSINESS 
EFW Area 5C 
Regulation of Business subcomponent of EFW 6.207 1.179 70 Gwartney, Lawson, Hall (2013) 
EFW2005-EFW2000 Change in the economic freedom of the world index from 
2000 to 2005 
0.222 0.636 60 Economic Freedom of the World Index2005 – 
Economic Freedom of the World Index2000 
EFW2005-EFW1995 Change in the economic freedom of the world index from 
1995 to 2005 
0.646 1.027 60 Economic Freedom of the World Index2005 – 
Economic Freedom of the World Index1995 
      
ln(GDP) (log of) GDP per capita in current US$ 8.642 1.604 81 World Bank, World Development 
Indicators LIFE Ratio of female to male life expectancy at birth in years , 
% 
108.052 3.923 81 Female life expectancy at birth in years 
100*(world bank, WDI)/male life 
expectancy at birth in years (world bank, 
WDI) FERTILITY Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 2.284 1.290 81 orld Bank, World Development 
Indicators SCHOOL Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment, % 98.374 11.470 71 World Bank, Word Development Indicators 
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LABOR Ratio of female to male labor force participation, % 71.247 16.945 79 100*(Female labor force participation 
(World Bank, WDI) /male labor force 
participation (World Bank, WDI)) 
CATHOLIC Catholic population as a percent of total population 35.911 38.905 81 La Porta et al (1999) 
MUSLIM Muslim population as a percent of total population 12.723 27.749 80 La Porta et al (1999) 
      
MAN_SHARE Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP) 14.922 6.467 79 World Bank, World Development 
Indicators AG_SHARE Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 10.012 11.898 81 World Bank, World Development 
Indicators DEMOC Polity IV Index of Democracy 7.254 3.479 71 Marshall and Jaggars (2010) 
POL_RIGHTS Women’s political rights index 2.080 0.514 75 Cingranelli, Richards, Clay (2014) 
ECON_RIGHTS Women’s economic rights index 1.573 0.661 75 Cingranelli, Richards, Clay (2014) 
JOBS_SCARCITY Percentage of those disagreeing that men deserve a job 
more than women when jobs are scarce 
58.954 20.281 53 World Value Survey, Wave 5. (2004-2008) 
European Value Survey. (2008) 
HOUSEWIFE Average response to the statement “Being a housewife is 
just as fulfilling as working for pay”, with “Strongly 
agree” rated at 1 and “Strongly disagree” rated at 4. 
2.307 0.311 54 World Value Survey, Wave 5. (2004-2008) 
European Value Survey. (2008) 
Note: Observation period for the dependent variables is from 2009-2013. The independent variables are measured for the year 2005.  CATHOLIC and MUSLIM 
are measured for the year 1980. Full sample includes 81 countries. 
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3.3. Results 
Table 3.3 contains the results of regressing the share of female managers in the employed 
population of a country (MANAGERSF) on economic freedom (EFW) and the set of control 
variables discussed in the previous section. The second column reports the regression results 
with the well-being control variables included, the third with the religion variables included and 
the fourth combines both sets.  In all of the specifications, where Economic Freedom is included, 
it appears to be positively and significantly associated with the representation of female 
managers in a country’s employed population. 
Table 3.3 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Employed 
Population on Economic Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
EFW  0.379* 
(0.206) 
0.466*** 
(0.146) 
0.390* 
(0.215)   
     
ln(GDP) 0.286*** 
(0.089) 
0.126 
(0.140) 
-0.039 
(0.130) 
0.127 
(0.166)  
     
     
LIFE  0.108** 
(0.0414) 
 0.109** 
(0.045)    
FERTILITY  0.247 
(0.193) 
 0.245 
(0.225)    
SCHOOL  -0.014 
(0.017) 
 -0.015 
(0.018)    
LABOR  0.0163** 
(0.009) 
 0.018 
(0.014)    
CATHOLIC   -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005)    
MUSLIM   -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.010)    
     
F-stat (redundant year binary 
variables) 
40.301*** 7.156*** 299.234*** 4.996*** 
     
Observations 81 64 69 63 
R-squared 0.223 0.403 0.276 0.405 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSF Year binary variable coefficients are included in the 
regressions although not reported above 
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The results of table 3.3 suggest that a 1 point increase in EFW is associated with at least 
a 39% increase in MANAGERSF. Starting from the mean of about 1.7% this increase would 
translate, all else equal, into a 0.66 percentage point change, which is equivalent to a little over 
one half of a standard deviation in the female representation of management among the 
employed population. To give an example, a 1 point increase in the EFW corresponds to the 
difference between the economic environment of Iran and the economic environment of Italy in 
2005, and a 0.66 percentage point change corresponds to the difference between MANAGERSF 
in Slovakia and Costa Rica in 2011.  
Table 3.4 reports the alternative dependent variable: the ratio of female to male managers 
in a country (MANAGERSR). This dependent variable may relate more closely to the suggested 
policies that involve quotas in terms of the ratio of women to men in a certain profession. In all 
of the specifications the coefficient on EFW is positive and statistically significant. As in the 
table 3.3, the second and the third columns contain the results of estimations including the two 
different sets of control variables separately, and the fourth column reports the results of an 
estimation including both sets of controls. Based on the results reported in table 3.4, a 1 point 
increase in EFW is, all else equal, associated with a  5.6% increase in the ratio of female to male 
managers, This is about 2.5 percentage points starting from the mean of MANAGERSR in the 
sample. This is approximately the difference, for example, between Mexico and Montenegro in 
2011.  
Notably once the well-being variables are reintroduced into the regression (column 4 of 
tables 3.3 and 3.4) the coefficient on the Economic Freedom of the World Index decreases 
compared to the column 3 of each table, suggesting that the well-being of women could be the 
channel of association between economic environment and the amount of female managers. 
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Indeed, as mentioned above, Stroup (2008) finds that markets as measured by the Economic 
Freedom of the World index, are associated with the well-being variables perused in this paper. 
Due to the heterogeneity of the dependent variable observation periods year-specific 
binary variables are included in each regression; the F-test of the year-specific effects rejects 
their redundancy. 
Table 3.4 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on 
Economic Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
EFW  4.956* 
(2.960) 
7.155*** 
(2.544) 
5.641* 
(3.002) 
     
ln(GDP) 1.136 
(1.552) 
0.153 
(2.061) 
-5.897** 
(2.276) 
-1.946 
(2.137) 
LIFE  2.341*** 
(0.599) 
 2.012*** 
(0.645) 
FERTILITY  12.700*** 
(4.026) 
 9.541** 
(4.202)   
SCHOOL  0.413 
(0.329) 
 0.274 
(0.325)    
LABOR  0.325** 
(0.137) 
 0.314 
(0.213)    
CATHOLIC   0.0745 
(0.0568) 
0.081 
(0.064)    
MUSLIM   -0.321*** 
(0.0529) 
-0.102 
(0.115)    
     
F-stat (redundant year binary variables)  8.033*** 299.234*** 5.861*** 
     
Observations 81 64 69 63 
R-squared 0.074 0.492 0.347 0.545 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSR. Year binary variable coefficients are included in the 
regressions although not reported above 
 
One more control variable that is positively and significantly associated with both of the 
dependent variables is the life expectancy ratio of women to that of men. This could be due to 
the fact that relatively longer lives also mean relatively longer time available to climb the career 
ladder for women. 
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Fertility seems to be also correlated with the relative number of female to male managers 
positively, as can be seen from table 3.4. As Mammen and Paxson (2000) discuss, fertility and 
income could have a positive correlation with income if the income effect of higher wages 
outweighs the substitution effect and a negative one if the substitution effect outweighs the 
income effect. If we assume that women in managerial positions enjoy higher wages it would 
mean that the income effect allows them to afford more children.  
Interestingly, the fertility variable is not correlated with the number of female managers 
among the employed rather their amount relative to male managers. One could speculate that 
higher managerial wages for men produce a substitution effect that outweighs the income effect. 
As one would expect a high share of population that practice Muslim religion is 
negatively and significantly associated with both of the dependent variables, however, once the 
well-being variables are controlled for the significance and the power of the variable MUSLIM 
goes away. This could indicate that the religion variables are associated with the number of 
women in managerial positions through well-being variables. 
Table 3.5 contains the relation between separate areas of EFW index with the two 
dependent variables. Area five of the index, that measures the amount of government regulation 
in an economy, does have a positive and significant association with the share of female 
managers in the labor force. This is not surprising as this particular area includes policies such as 
minimum wage, maternity leave, and other possible labor regulations, which create additional 
constraints for employers. However, none of the areas seem to be associated with the variation in 
the gender ratio in the managerial profession. This could be because the components of the index 
separately are strongly correlated with the quality of life and religion variables controlled for in 
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the regression and are correlated with each other, which presents a multicollinearity issues 
(Lawson, 2006). 
Table 3.5 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Employed 
Population and the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on the Separate Areas of Economic 
Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSR 
GOVT_SIZE 
EFW Area 1 
0.083 
(0.117) 
1.549 
(1.603) 
 
PROP_RIGHT 
EFW Area 2 
0.134 
(0.160) 
-0.075 
(2.112) 
 
MONEY 
EFW Area 3 
-0.146 
(0.109) 
-0.068 
(1.927) 
 
TRADE 
EFW Area 4 
0.133 
(0.258) 
2.754 
(3.911) 
 
REGULATION 
EFW Area 5 
0.460*** 
(0.162) 
3.189 
(2.502) 
 
   
ln(GDP) 0.047 
(0.187) 
-1.229 
(2.778)  
LIFE 0.102** 
(0.049) 
1.884** 
(0.709)  
FERTILITY 0.244 
(0.250) 
9.581** 
(4.479)  
SCHOOL -0.016 
(0.019) 
0.227 
(0.312)  
LABOR 0.013 
(0.018) 
0.344 
(0.267)  
CATHOLIC 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.086 
(0.065)  
MUSLIM 0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.069 
(0.137)  
   
F-stat (redundant year binary variables) 5.916*** 5.473*** 
   
Observations 63 63 
R-squared 0.485 0.558 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variables is MANAGERSF in the first regression and MANAGERSR in regression 2. 
Year binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions although not reported above
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Table 3.6 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total Worker Population and the Ratio of Female 
to Male Managers on Area 5 of Economic Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSR MANAGERSR MANAGERSR 
REGULATION. EFW Area 5  0.5646*** 0.4496***  6.4389*** 3.6577*  
 (0.1166) (0.1595)  (2.3001) (2.0638)  
CREDIT. EFW Area 5A   0.3246***   6.9201*** 
   (0.0978)   (1.7796) 
LABOR. EFW Area 5B   0.2129**   0.0996 
   (0.1036)   (1.7955) 
BUSINESS. EFW Area 5C   0.0177   0.4646 
   (0.1387)   (2.3557) 
       
ln(GDP) -0.0070 0.1428 0.0601 -3.3564* -0.8058 -3.5642 
 (0.0960) (0.1320) (0.1397) (1.8989) (1.9128) (2.6876) 
LIFE  0.1095**   2.0574***  
  (0.0458)   (0.6558)  
FERTILITY  0.2432   9.6715**  
  (0.2292)   (4.4964)  
SCHOOL  -0.0164   0.2413  
  (0.0163)   (0.3317)  
LABOR  0.0102   0.2427  
  (0.0159)   (0.2308)  
CATHOLIC  0.0015   0.0773  
  (0.0047)   (0.0623)  
MUSLIM  -0.0006   -0.1295  
  (0.0097)   (0.1145)  
       
F-stat (redundant year binary 
variables) 
42.4238*** 12.560*** 27.543*** 557.649*** 7.002*** 19.141*** 
       
Observations 70 63 70 70 63 70 
R-squared 0.3011 0.4433 0.3481 0.1412 0.5362 0.2308 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 
MANAGERSF in columns (1), (2), and (3) and MANAGERSR in columns (4), (5), and (6) Year binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions 
although not reported above 
68 
 
One way to avoid the multicollinearity issue would be to consider one of the areas of the 
index separately. In the regressions reported in Table 3.6 I concentrate on area 5 of the EFW 
index, namely, REGULATION. I additionally consider its three subcomponents: credit market 
regulations, labor market regulations, and business regulations. Conceptually, it seems that for 
the purpose of this paper market regulation should be the most relevant of the five areas of the 
index. Policies imposing a certain gender share in a profession would be captured by labor 
market regulation subcomponent and area 5 of the EFW index. In all of the specifications 
contained in table 3.6 where REGULATION is the independent variable of interest, its estimated 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, with a magnitude above that of the estimated 
coefficient for the whole index for MANAGERSF (compare 0.4496 and 0.390, table 3.3) and 
below that of the estimated coefficient for the whole index for MANAGERSR (compare 3.6577 
and 5.641, table 3.4). 
Interestingly, it is credit market regulations index that has a statistically significant 
positive association with both MANAGERSF and MANAGERSR. As mentioned earlier, 
Feldmann (2006) finds that credit market regulations hurt young people and women in particular, 
creating higher unemployment rates for both groups. As women might have lower levels of on 
the job training, for example if they take a career break to have children, they would be the first 
ones to be fired and last ones to get hired when the credit flow is tight for the companies. It could 
also be the case that it is more difficult for women to access credit due to their lower levels of 
education and cultural norms in developing countries (Marvel, 2012), preventing them from 
receiving education or increasing their income and as such creating a vicious circle. At the same 
time, labor market regulations index has a statistically significant and positive association with 
female managers as a share of the employed but not in relation to male managers. It could be the 
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case that lower labor market regulations (which would imply higher labor market regulation 
index) allow for both more male and female managers. Overall, there seems to be a positive 
association between women in the managerial profession and economic freedom of the world 
index, suggesting that employers in less constrained markets would aim to hire managers in a 
more efficient way and discriminate less.  At the same time, the issue of causation is not 
addressed in this paper, as such I am not claiming that in order to increase the amount of women 
in managerial profession an economy needs to change its institutional arrangement. 
 
3.4. Robustness Checks. 
In this section I employ alternative specifications, as there could be certain variables affecting 
both number of women in the management profession in each country and its economic 
institutions that I have yet to include in the analysis. First, to check for the robustness of results I 
employ the value added to GDP by manufacturing (MAN_SHARE) and agriculture sectors 
(AG_SHARE). As found by Tzanatos (1999), women are less likely to be in the administrative 
positions that men in the manufacturing sector, which is the motivation behind using 
MAN_SHARE variable. Furthermore, according to Goldin (1995) women will be active 
participants of labor force in low-income agriculture-dominated economies, given the agriculture 
is of certain types, taking this relationship into consideration I am including AG_SHARE variable 
as an additional control variable. The results of regressions containing AG_SHARE and 
MAN_SHARE as additional control variables are contained in table 3.7. While the estimated 
coefficients on EFW are positive and significant for both dependent variables MANAGERSF and 
MANAGERSR are positive and significant, Tzanatos’ (1999) prediction of lower number of 
women in the administrative positions in manufacturing sector is also confirmed. The estimated 
70 
 
coefficients on MAN_SHARE are negative and significant, suggesting a lower number of women 
in the managerial profession in countries with prevailing manufacturing sector. Additionally, the 
estimated coefficients on AG_SHARE are negative and significant, suggesting that in countries 
with higher agricultural share there are less women managers. Assuming that countries with 
higher agricultural shares are also low income countries where women, although they are a part 
of labor force, as suggested by Goldin (1995), will have lower education rates, compared to men, 
which could plausibly prevent women from assuming managerial positions. 
Table 3.7 OLS Estimates from Regressions with Additional Control Variables of Female to 
Male Managers Ratio on Economic Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.4075** 5.8475** 
 (0.1676) (2.8257) 
   
ln(GDP) -0.4088 -9.0658** 
 (0.3120) (4.2201) 
LIFE 0.0754 1.5617** 
 (0.0475) (0.6207) 
FERTILITY 0.2644 10.0904** 
 (0.2286) (4.6200) 
SCHOOL -0.0341* 0.0052 
 (0.0187) (0.3557) 
LABOR 0.0311* 0.5132** 
 (0.0159) (0.2168) 
CATHOLIC 0.0026 0.1104* 
 (0.0043) (0.0600) 
MUSLIM 0.0065 -0.0160 
 (0.0086) (0.1132) 
MAN_SHARE -0.0569*** -0.7441** 
 (0.0182) (0.2941) 
AG_SHARE -0.0944* -1.3087* 
 (0.0561) (0.7175) 
   
F-stat (redundant year binary variables) 6.522*** 5.199*** 
   
Observations 61 61 
R-squared 0.5211 0.6111 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variables are MANAGERSF in column (1) and MANAGERSR in column (2). Year 
binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions although not reported above 
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I next include DEMOC variable in my analysis to control for democratic institutions. 
DEMOC is a part of Polity IV democracy index (Marshall and Jaggars 2010).  It ranks countries 
on a scale from 0 to 10 based on their level of democracy, with higher scores given to countries 
with higher democracy levels. Stroup (2008) not only investigates the relationship between the 
institutions of economic freedom and women’s well-being, but also compares this relationship to 
the connection between institutions of democracy and women’s well-being, as democratic 
institutions. Stroup (2008) suggests that investigating these two institutional arrangements’ 
association with women’s well-being creates potential biases in the empirical results. While 
Stroup (2008) finds that it is institutions of economic freedom that matter more for women’s 
well-being, democratic institutions still have an association with women’s well-being as well, 
although a weaker one. The results of regressions with both DEMOC and EFW are reported in 
table 3.8. After additional control variables are added to the regressions (columns 2 and 5) the 
association between EFW and women in managerial profession variables disappears. This could 
be explained by multicollinearity between DEMOC and LIFE, FERTILITY, SCHOOL, and 
LABOR. As Stroup (2008) finds, democratic institutional arrangements and democratic 
institutional arrangements interacted with higher levels of economic freedom do have an 
association with women’s fertility, life expectancy, education rates, and the ratio of men to 
women in the labor force. Omitting LIFE, FERTILITY, and SCHOOL (column 3) and 
FERTILITY (column 6) leads to the increase of statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients on MANAGERSF and MANAGERSR respectively. 
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Table 3.8 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total Worker Population and the Ratio of Female 
to Male Managers on Economic Freedom of the World Index with Democracy Control Included in the Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSR MANAGERSR MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.3326* 0.1787 0.3968** 4.1463 4.3953 7.1399* 
 (0.1675) (0.2162) (0.1799) (3.1020) (3.4924) (3.9000) 
       
       
ln(GDP) -0.0922 0.1787 -0.0678 -6.3412** -2.3881 -6.8204*** 
 (0.1293) (0.1554) (0.1414) (2.3966) (2.2762) (2.1319) 
       
       
DEMOC 0.0818* 0.0466 0.0369 2.4793** 0.5048 -0.6331 
 (0.0486) (0.0672) (0.0588) (1.1513) (1.1752) (1.5260) 
LIFE  0.1329***   2.1172***  
  (0.0447)   (0.6944)  
FERTILITY  0.3362   9.1403** 1.1652 
  (0.2375)   (4.4550) (4.3323) 
SCHOOL  -0.0104   0.2439 0.1549 
  (0.0184)   (0.3358) (0.4137) 
LABOR  0.0219 0.0160  0.2945 0.4025 
  (0.0146) (0.0120)  (0.2299) (0.2508) 
CATHOLIC  0.0015 0.0011  0.0954 0.1491** 
  (0.0046) (0.0043)  (0.0616) (0.0611) 
MUSLIM  0.0070 -0.0014  -0.0731 -0.1485 
  (0.0111) (0.0088)  (0.1539) (0.1821) 
       
F-stat (redundant year 
binary variables) 
4.721*** 4.303*** 6.329*** 47.360*** 6.036*** 3.394** 
       
Observations 67 60 66 67 60 60 
R-squared 0.2219 0.4198 0.2668 0.2163 0.5585 0.4535 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 
MANAGERSF in columns (1), (2), and (3) and MANAGERSR in columns (4), (5), and (6) Year binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions 
although not reported above 
   
 
As I attempt to approximate qualitative variables, such as education level by using their 
quantitative counterparts, education rate, I am plausibly omitting the heterogeneity of the quality 
present in a cross-country study. Simply put, education quality could vary from country to 
country. There could also be other omitted variables affecting both the share of women in 
management positions and economic freedom levels. The best way to correct for the omitted bias 
variable problem is to include country fixed effects, however it is not feasible in a cross-country 
study as it would lead to a loss of all degrees of freedom. I instead include region binary 
variables in the regressions33. The results are contained in table 3.9.  With the additional control 
variables introduced into the regression (column 2) the estimated coefficient becomes 
statistically insignificant for the dependent variable MANAGERSF, while it remains significant 
for MANAGERSR (column 4). Additionally, Hausman F-test rejects redundancy of the region 
binary variables. This suggests that there are omitted variables not captured in the previous 
analysis, and it is the ratio of women to men in the managerial profession that has a positive 
association with the institutions of economic freedom, rather than the number of women 
managers among the workers. Additionally, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on EFW 
is larger than that in table 3.3, compare 10.437 and 5.641 (table 3.4).  
                                                 
33 According to United Nations regional division. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
   
 
Table 3.9 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total 
Worker Population and the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on Economic Freedom of the 
World Index with United Nations Regions Binary Variables Added to the Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSR MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.5147*** 0.4692 8.6076*** 8.8096** 
 (0.1907) (0.2797) (2.6346) (3.7629) 
     
ln(GDP) -0.2279 0.0364 -8.7021*** -4.9258** 
 (0.1494) (0.1835) (2.1244) (2.1898) 
LIFE  0.1186**  1.6075** 
  (0.0450)  (0.6585) 
FERTILITY  0.3433  9.7044* 
  (0.3475)  (4.8897) 
SCHOOL  0.0028  0.4289 
  (0.0222)  (0.3347) 
LABOR  0.0082  0.3221 
  (0.0177)  (0.2357) 
CATHOLIC  -0.0023  -0.0015 
  (0.0047)  (0.0556) 
MUSLIM  0.0036  0.0226 
  (0.0100)  (0.1101) 
     
F-stat (redundant year  
binary effects) 
6.411*** 3.083*** 52.282*** 7.836*** 
F-stat (redundant region 
binary effects) 
26.482*** 13.580*** 15.797*** 6.920*** 
     
Observations 70 63 70 63 
R-squared 0.3754 0.5135 0.4605 0.6727 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSF in columns (1), (2) and MANAGERSR in columns (3) and 
(4) Year binary variable coefficients and region binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions although 
not reported above 
 
As the results of table 3.9 show, there are potentially omitted variables in the analysis. In 
some cultures women’s main task might be viewed as child bearing and rearing, additionally 
political and economic rights of women might differ from country to country. I employ the 
following variables: POL_RIGHTS, ECON_RIGHTS, JOBS_SCARCITY, HOUSEWIFE. 
POL_RIGHTS and ECON_RIGHTS are indexes constructed as a part of CIRI Human Rights 
Data Project (Cingranelli et al 2014). I then attempt to control for culture variables. As 
Tzannatos (1999) notices, discrimination might come not only from the work place, but also 
from home and culture of a country in general.   
   
 
Both variables are measured on the scale from 0 to 2. With a score of 0 signifying a 
country that does not allow any political or economic rights for women and 2 signifying that all 
or nearly all political and economic rights are guaranteed by the law and enforced by the 
government. JOBS_SCARCITY and HOUSEWIFE are constructed by using answers to World 
Value Survey (wave 5, 2004 - 2008) and European Value Survey (2008).  
Table 3.10 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total 
Worker Population and the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on Economic Freedom of the 
World Index with Women’s Political, Economic Rights, and Cultural Controls Included in the 
Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.7074* 10.4372* 
 (0.3825) (6.0522) 
   
ln(GDP) -0.5232*** -10.3272** 
 (0.1900) (4.3917) 
POL_RIGHTS -0.3820 -0.4476 
 (0.3577) (4.8027) 
ECON_RIGHTS 0.4778 2.0464 
 (0.3907) (5.1933) 
JOBS_SCARCITY 0.0258** 0.5099** 
 (0.0109) (0.1957) 
HOUSEWIFE -0.6883 -8.0977 
 (0.5190) (10.2140) 
 (0.4939) (8.3974) 
   
F-stat (redundant year binary variables) 15.145*** 6.080*** 
   
Observations 49 49 
R-squared 0.3568 0.3440 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSF in column (1) and MANAGERSR in column (2). Year binary 
variable coefficients are included in the regressions although not reported above 
 
JOBS_SCARCITY represents the percentage for each country of those asked who disagree with 
the following statement: “When jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than 
women”. To construct the variable HOUSEWIFE for each possible response to the question 
“Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay” I gave a score, 1 if the response is 
“strongly agree”, 2 – “agree”, 3 – “disagree”, and 4 if the response is “strongly disagree”. I then 
   
 
averaged the scores for each country. The results of regressions containing POL_RIGHTS, 
ECON_RIGHTS, JOBS_SCARCITY, and HOUSEWIFE are reported in table 3.10. The estimated 
coefficients on EFW remain positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, JOBS_SCARCITY 
also has a positive and significant association with both dependent variables MANAGERSF and 
MANAGERSR, suggesting that in countries where more people disagree with statement that 
“men should have more right to a job than women when the jobs are scarce” there are higher 
number of female managers among the workers and female to male workers. 
Gwartney et al (1999) suggest that for the purposes of economic analysis considering 
only levels and not changes of economic freedom index might not be sufficient, as the levels do 
not capture the trend in which the index is moving. They also note that changes over longer 
periods of time are more credible and lead to more meaningful outcomes.  
Table 3.11 contains results of regressions of MANAGERSF and MANAGERSR on the 
level of EFW in 2005 and its changes from 2000 to 2005 (columns 1 and 3) and from 1995 to 
2005 (columns 2 and 4). While the estimated coefficients on the changes of EFW are not 
statistically different from zero, the estimated coefficients on the levels of EFW are positive and 
statistically significant. Interestingly, when 10-year changes (contrary to 5-year changes) are 
controlled for the magnitude of the coefficients on the level of EFW increases compared to the 
regressions that do not control for changes. Compare 0.517 (column 2) and 0.390 (column 4 of 
table 3.3) for the dependent variable MANAGERSF. Also, compare 6.637 (column 4) and 5.641 
(column 4 of table 3.4) for the dependent variable MANAGERSR. 
   
 
Table 3.11 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total 
Worker Population and the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on Economic Freedom of the 
World Index and Its 5-Year and 10-Year Changes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSF MANAGERSR MANAGERSR 
EFW2005 0.5709** 0.5166** 5.9362* 6.6368** 
 (0.2636) (0.2496) (3.4186) (3.2411) 
EFW2005-EFW2000 -0.2514  2.3250  
 (0.2909)  (3.6390)  
EFW2005-EFW1995  0.0033  2.3943 
  (0.2159)  (2.4186) 
     
ln(GDP) 0.0011 0.1038 -1.6798 -1.5072 
 (0.2307) (0.2203) (3.0384) (2.7362) 
LIFE 0.1338** 0.1357** 2.0495*** 1.9613*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0555) (0.6820) (0.6848) 
FERTILITY 0.3297 0.4370 13.6971*** 14.4692*** 
 (0.2553) (0.2880) (3.6145) (3.7941) 
SCHOOL -0.0339 -0.0237 -0.1363 -0.1264 
 (0.0292) (0.0285) (0.3121) (0.2932) 
LABOR 0.0328** 0.0316** 0.4598** 0.4244** 
 (0.0159) (0.0153) (0.1901) (0.1845) 
CATHOLIC 0.0037 0.0039 0.1179* 0.1164* 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0640) (0.0634) 
MUSLIM 0.0152 0.0142 0.0061 -0.0003 
 (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.1213) (0.1173) 
     
F-stat (redundant year 
binary variables) 
7.285*** 3.976*** 26.407*** 18.328*** 
     
     
Observations 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.4554 0.4469 0.6209 0.6250 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSF in columns (1), (2) and MANAGERSR in columns (3) and 
(4) Year binary variable coefficients and region binary variable coefficients are included in the regressions although 
not reported above 
 
As an additional robustness check I conduct a beta regression analysis, Ferrari and 
Crebari-Neto (2004). This analysis is useful when the dependent variable is contained between 0 
and 1, excluding the boundaries, since its predictions will also be confined to (0, 1) range. I 
change MANAGERSR to (0, 1) range by dividing it by 100. There are no countries in the sample 
with 0 female managers, there are also no countries where the number of female managers is 
equal to the number of male managers. The results of beta regressions are contained in table 
   
 
3.12. It is the post estimation that allows one to interpret the magnitudes of the results presented 
in table 3.11.  
Table 3.12 Estimates of Beta Regressions of the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on 
Economic Freedom of the World Index 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MANAGERSR MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.2887*** 0.2703** 
 (0.1112) (0.1145) 
   
   
ln(GDP) -0.1911* -0.0900 
 (0.1012) (0.0842) 
LIFE  0.0918*** 
  (0.0253) 
FERTILITY  0.4868*** 
  (0.1581) 
STUDENT  0.0126 
  (0.0128) 
LABOR  0.0146* 
  (0.0081) 
CATHOLIC  0.0039 
  (0.0025) 
MUSLIM  -0.0058 
  (0.0045) 
   
Observations 70 63 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSR. Year binary variable coefficients and region binary 
variable coefficients are included in the regressions although not reported above 
 
Specifically, a 1 point increase in EFW index is associated with a 0.071 increase in the 
ratio of women to men in management profession, when no well-being or culture variables are 
included in the regression, and with a 0.063 increase when they are included, which is slightly 
above the estimated coefficient of 5.6% contained in table 3.3. 
Finally, table 3.13 contains results of regressions that employ a subsample, with year 
2011 observations for MANAGERSF and MANAGERSR present only. The results are similar to 
those in columns 4 of tables 3.3 and 3.4, in magnitude, sign, and significance. 
 
   
 
Table 3.13 OLS Estimates from Regressions of the Share of Female Managers in the Total 
Worker Population and the Ratio of Female to Male Managers on Economic Freedom of the 
World Index. Year 2011 Only 
 
 (1) (2) 
 MANAGERSF MANAGERSR 
EFW 0.4394* 6.0665** 
 (0.2214) (2.7996) 
   
ln(GDP) 0.1027 -4.8700 
 (0.2242) (3.0295) 
LIFE 0.1373** 1.4231 
 (0.0665) (0.9421) 
FERTILITY 0.4922** 15.3179*** 
 (0.2268) (2.6203) 
SCHOOL -0.0287 -0.4165 
 (0.0238) (0.3107) 
LABOR 0.0248 0.6263** 
 (0.0216) (0.2667) 
CATHOLIC 0.0031 0.1119* 
 (0.0049) (0.0626) 
MUSLIM 0.0010 -0.1767 
 (0.0124) (0.1557) 
   
Observations 50 50 
R-squared 0.3706 0.6168 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. White HAC standard errors 
are in parentheses. Dependent variable is MANAGERSF in column (1) and MANAGERSR in column (2). 
 
To sum up, the robustness checks presented in this section are based on the existing 
literature on the economic freedom of the world index and are largely aimed at capturing omitted 
variable bias unavoidably present in any cross-country comparison. While the relationship 
between EFW and the ratio of female to male managers proves to be robust, the relationship 
between share of women managers among workers and EFW loses in statistical significance 
when region binary variables are included in the regressions. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Lower gender inequality has been shown to lead to higher economic growth. While everyone 
agrees that discrimination is detrimental to the society, the methods to overcoming 
discrimination are still quite a controversial issue. For instance, European Union has proposed 
   
 
quotas for female board members as a way to increase gender equality in firm management. The 
approach has its opponents and advocates. 
In this paper I investigate a different solution to increasing gender diversity of firm 
management, the solution being to consider institutions. I find that less constrained markets are 
associated with greater amount of women managers among the employed population of a 
country and in relation to male managers. To be more specific one point increase in economic 
freedom index is associated with about ½ of the standard deviation increase in the share of 
female managers in the labor force. At the same time a one point increase in the index is 
associated with the increase of 2.5 percentage points in the ratio of female to male managers, 
which is about 0.12 of the standard deviation.  
Although the relationship might seem to be very small, it is the direct association of the 
market forces with the representation of women in the managerial profession compared to that of 
men. The indirect association works through female to male life expectancy ratio, fertility rates,  
female to male secondary school enrollment ratio, female to male labor force participation that 
have also been shown to be affected by the Economic Freedom of the World Index.  
While it is attractive to correct gender underrepresentation in a profession by passing a 
policy that requires a certain share of women in that profession, the unintended consequences of 
such policy could potentially hurt firms and employees. The solution I offer in this paper is to 
consider institutional arrangements. Specifically, it is area 5 of the index and credit market 
regulations that have been shown in the literature and in this paper to have a negative association 
with women’s economic status and their representation in management. Thus, I believe credit 
market regulations need special attention from policy makers whose aim is decreasing unequal 
gender representation in managerial profession. 
 
   
 
Chapter 4 
 
Revisiting the Relationship between Women’s Suffrage and Government 
4.1. Introduction 
“They depend on government because they are not depending on their husbands” 
-Jesse Watters, Fox News Host (2014) 
In a widely cited paper, John Lott and Lawrence Kenny (1999) argue that the institution of 
women’s suffrage in the US resulted in an expansion of the size and scope of government. They 
are motivated by the fact that voting patterns in the US have been, and continue to be, 
systematically different than those of men. In particular, women are more likely to vote 
democratic and support generous and wide-ranging government programs.34 Based on state-level 
data from 1870 to 1940, Lott and Kenny (1998) report evidence in support of their hypothesis. 
Kau and Rubin (2002) also report evidence that women’s suffrage resulted in greater demand for 
government programs.35 And Miller (2008) finds that women’s suffrage was associated with 
significant growth in US public health expenditures. All of these studies provide support for the 
idea that the expansion of suffrage to women was associated with the growth of US government. 
 The Nineteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1920 guaranteed women the right 
to vote nationwide. However, 29 states (out of the then total of 48) granted women’s suffrage 
prior to this amendment (Lott and Kenny 1999, pp. 1166-1167; see their Table 1 for a 
chronology). Both Lott and Kenny (1999, pp. 1168 & 1172) and Miller (2008, pp. 1291-1293) 
                                                 
34 Lott and Kenny cite Langer (1996) to this effect. Furthermore, Thomas (1990, 1994), Duflo (2003), 
Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2004), and Anzia and Berry (2011) report evidence that women place more emphasis on 
the provision of public goods, public health and education spending, and child welfare; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 
(1998) report that women are more risk averse than men, which would be consistent with them having a stronger 
preference for social security programs.  
35 Kau and Rubin (2002) also find that, due to greater female labor force participation over the course of the 
twentieth century, that the growth of US government is linked to increased ability to tax female productivity. 
   
 
point out spatial patterns in the timing of women’s suffrage adoption by those states. In 
particular, western states typically were early adopters of women’s suffrage laws; members of 
the former Confederacy almost all adopted before 1920. Figure 1 provides a map of the 48 
contiguous US states; each is labeled by its year of women’s suffrage adoption and also shaded 
according to the time interval of adoption.  
Figure 4.1 The Years Women Suffrage Rights Were First Introduced in the U.S. 
 
 
Casual observation suggests spatial correlation in the timings of adoption. (Notably, the states 
that did not ratify the Nineteenth Amendment are for the most part neighbors to one another.) To 
our knowledge, however, no researchers have taken this spatial correlation into account formally 
while estimating the relationship between women’s suffrage and government. In this paper we 
revisit this relationship, employing spatial econometrics to explicitly take these patterns into 
account. 
 Ignoring spatial dependence can lead to biased estimates of the relationship between 
women’s suffrage and government. There is considerable mobility of individuals across US 
states. As such, neighboring states are in jurisdictional competition with one another with regards 
to their policies (Tiebout 1956). Individuals in a given state can “vote with their feet”, exercising 
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their exit option if that given state’s policies are contrary to their preferences (Hirschman 1978). 
Given this, state governments compete with their policy offerings to retain and enlarge their tax 
bases. This competition raises two potential sources of spatial dependence in the state-level 
relationship between women’s suffrage and government. First, a state’s adoption of women’s 
suffrage may have been dependent on whether its neighbors had already adopted. Second, if 
women’s suffrage resulted in an expansion of a particular state’s government, then its neighbors 
may have made policy responses to attract new citizens and/or retain their own. These policy 
responses could have included suffrage adoption, but also other policies that might have been 
perceived as substitutes for the vote. To the extent that one or both of these mechanisms were 
operative, the government variables and suffrage policies of a state’s neighbors are relevant 
omitted variables and sources of biases.   
 Historical evidence regarding the women’s suffrage movement is consistent with Tiebout 
(1956) competition being a source of spatial dependence in the timings of women’s suffrage 
adoptions across US states. The western states – generally early adopters of women’s suffrage – 
competed with one another over women’s suffrage policies as part of an effort to attract women 
and families. For example, in 1865 California had three men for every woman; in Washington 
(then a territory) the ratio was 4:1 and in Colorado it was actually 20:1 (Flexner 1959, p. 157). 
(Figure 4.2 provides a map of the US where states are shaded according to their female 
population shares.)  
   
 
Figure 4.2 Share of Women 21 Years of Age and Older in the U.S. in 1922 
 
 
Mead (2004) reports that Colorado adopted women’s suffrage in 1893 based on what they 
viewed as the success of that policy in Wyoming (adopted 1869). More generally, Lemke (2016) 
reports that jurisdictional competition around the turn of the century led to not only suffrage but 
also to various other political and economic rights being extended to women.  
 There is also some anecdotal evidence that political strategies associated with the 
women’s suffrage movement led to spatial dependence in the timings of adoptions across states. 
For example, suffragists campaigning in Nevada (adopted 1914) leveraged the fact that all of its 
neighboring states had already granted women the vote. They distributed maps with Nevada 
shaded in black and featuring the slogan: “Out, Damned Spot!” (Catt and Shuler 1923). Media in 
Washington State (adopted 1910) provided extensive coverage of 1858 and 1860 suffrage 
campaigns in the neighboring state of Oregon ( adopted 1912); similarly, New Jersey suffragists, 
following adoption in that state, moved on to participate in rallies in New York (Catt and Shuler 
1923).  
 Lesage and Dominguez (2012) discuss the importance of employing spatial econometric 
models in empirical public choice studies. In the present context, a state’s government revenue 
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and expenditures policies may have been determined in part by those of neighboring states.36 
Furthermore, while a state’s adoption of women’s suffrage may have affected its revenue and 
expenditure policies, the timing of its adoption may itself have been affected by the adoption of 
women’s suffrage by neighboring states. As such, any estimate of the relationship between 
women’s suffrage and government must include appropriate estimates of both the direct and 
indirect effects (LeSage and Pace 2009). The latter are cumulative changes that include feedback 
effects. The total effect of women’s suffrage on government expenditures or revenues must be 
correctly calculated as the sum of the direct and indirect effects.  
 Based on the estimation of spatial Durbin models (SDMs) we report that women’s 
suffrage is not meaningfully related to total state revenues or expenditures in a statistically 
significant way. However, disaggregating state government expenditures into different categories 
does yield some significant results. In particular, women’s suffrage appears to have had 
statistically significant and positive indirect effects on social service expenditures; also positive 
and statistically significant direct effects on transportation expenditures. Following Lott and 
Kenny (1999) our women’s suffrage variable is an interaction between a suffrage dummy (1 if 
yes; 0 otherwise) and the 21-or-older female population share. To place the above results in a 
quantitative perspective, conditional on women being granted suffrage in a state a standard 
deviation increase in the female population share is associated with about a cumulative 1.5% 
increase in social service expenditures; around a 14% increase in transportation expenditures.  
 Our results are interesting when compared to those of Lott and Kenny (1999). On the one 
hand, our results are consistent with the general narrative provided by Lott and Kenny: women 
                                                 
36 The revenue and expenditure policies of neighboring states can also be linked because voters use neighboring 
state policies as a “yardstick” against which to evaluate their own state’s policy offerings (Shleifer 1985; Besley and 
Case 1995). 
   
 
have greater demand for government services and women’s suffrage was associated with 
expansions in state governments. On the other hand, Lott and Kenny report statistically 
significant effects in regards to total revenues and expenditures, but do not find meaningful 
effects in regards to different expenditures categories. They argue that those “categories do not 
capture the major trends in taxes and spending” (p. 1178). While their argument is a reasonable 
one, once spatial dependence is accounted for we find that statistically significant effects of 
women’s suffrage are only associated with the social services and transportation categories of 
state expenditures. While our findings are in this way inconsistent with those of Lott and Kenny, 
they are consistent with Miller (2008) who reports that women’s suffrage was associated with 
public health spending in particular. 
 Our paper relates to the broader literature on the determinants of US government growth 
during the twentieth century.37  While this paper studies US government growth during 20th 
century in connection to women’s suffrage, Holcombe (1997), for example, argues that Civil 
War veterans were the first special interest group to obtain monetary transfers from the US 
federal government and that they set a precedent followed by other special interest groups in the 
twentieth century. Alternatively, Higgs (1987) argues that periods of crises – examples of 
particular importance include the Great Depression and the World Wars – led to “ratchet effects” 
in government spending and involvement in the economy.38 And Zywicki (1994) argues that the 
                                                 
37 See Holcombe (2005) for a review of different theories of US government growth. See also Shelton (2007) for a 
review of the theories in the context of accounting for cross-country experiences; also an empirical analysis the 
competing hypotheses for a large panel of countries, 1970-2000. 
38 Peacock and Wiseman (1961) originally put forth the idea of ratchet effects, where government expands in size 
and scope during a crisis period and then subsequently contracts, though not all the way to its initial size and scope; 
they support their hypothesis using British data. Rasler and Thompson (1985) provide evidence in support of ratchet 
effects based on the British, French, Japanese, and US experiences. However, Holcombe (1993) notes that the 
estimated trend growth in US federal government expenditures any Great Depression/WWII ratchet effect that is 
discernable in the data. Also, Bologna and Young (2015) examine a panel of 70 countries from 1966-2010; based on 
Reinhart and Rogoff  (2009, 2011) crises dates, report effects on measures of government size and scope that are for 
the most part statistically insignificant.   
   
 
movement towards popular election of the US Senate (culminating in the Seventeenth 
Amendment) combined with the increasing importance of interstate special interest groups led to 
an expansion in federal government size and scope.39 Related closely to the issue studied in the 
present paper, Husted and Kenny (1997) argue that the removal of poll taxes and literacy tests in 
the mid-Twentieth century resulted in an effective expansion of the franchise to poorer 
individuals and an increase in government welfare expenditures.  
 Though we are ultimately interested in accounting for US government growth, the spatial 
dependence of women’s suffrage policies is fundamental to our analysis. Our paper, then, is also 
related to the growing number of studies that consider spatial dependence and spillovers in 
policies and institutions (e.g., Baicker 2005; Hall and Ross 2010; Bologna 2014; Bologna et al. 
2014).  
 We proceed as follows. In section 2 we discuss the Lott and Kenny (1999) data that we 
revisit and the spatial econometric methodology that we employ. We then present our main 
results in section 3. Having established those main results, we report on a number of alternative 
specifications and robustness checks in section 4. Finally, we provide some concluding 
discussion in section 5. 
 
4.2. Data and Methodology 
We work with the same data that Lott and Kenny (1999) employ.40 These data are for the 48 
contiguous US states, annually from 1870 to 1940. Taxation and spending data are drawn from 
                                                 
39 However, Tarabar and Hall (2015) fail to find any structural break senators ideology (NOMINATE scores: Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997) associated with the Seventeenth Amendment. This is consistent with Romero’s (2007) finding 
that there is no statistically significant difference in the percentage of roll call in favor of “Progressive” reforms pre- 
and post-Amendment. 
40 Lawrence Kenny generously made the data available to us. 
   
 
the Financial Statistics of States or provided to Lott and Kenny by John Wallis (Lott and Kenny 
1999, pp. 1168-1169) and are converted into real (1967) dollars and made per capita. In our 
estimations, revenues and expenditures are always logged. Population and labor force data are 
drawn from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (US Census 
Bureau 1975).  
 The dependent variables in our main estimations (reported in section 3) are (log) per 
capita real revenue and expenditure series, and measures of congressional voting patterns. First, 
we consider states’ total expenditures (EXP) and total revenues (REV). Then we break down 
expenditures into different major categories: current and capital expenditures on elementary and 
secondary schools and libraries (EDU); current expenditures on social services, such as charities, 
prisons, and hospitals (SOC); current and capital highway expenditures (TRANS). Following Lott 
and Kenny (1999), we also report results based on Poole and Rosenthal (1991) NOMINATE 
scores for voting patterns in the Senate (SNOM) and the House of Representatives (HNOM). The 
NOMINATE scores map Senate and House ideology outcomes onto a scale from -1 to 1. 
Positive values indicate conservative (right; less government) values; negative values indicate 
liberal (left; more government) values. Values farther from 0 in either direction indicate greater 
ideological strength. While the revenue and expenditure dependent variables speak to the 
relationship between women’s suffrage and state governments, the NOMINATE scores give us 
some idea of whether women’s suffrage influenced the size and scope of the US federal 
government. 
 The control variable of primary interest is an interaction between a women’s suffrage 
binary variable and the 21 years and older female population share. The binary variable takes a 
value of 1 for observations corresponding to a given year and a state that has adopted women’s 
   
 
suffrage; 0 otherwise. The interaction, then, provides a measure of women’s portion of the 
electorate (which is, of course, nil if they are not permitted to vote). It is the share of women who 
are 21 or older in states that had granted the vote; zero otherwise.  Table 4.1 contains summary 
statistics for variables used in the estimations41 
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics  
 
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. Obs 
REV Natural log of state total revenue 3.388 0.736 864 
EXP Natural log of state total expenditure 3.312 0.697 768 
EDU Natural log of education expenditure 2.038 0.660 864 
SOC Natural log of expenditure on social services 1.306 0.799 864 
TRANS Natural log of expenditure on highways 2.178 1.344 720 
SNOM Senate voting patterns index -0.016 0.401 720 
HNOM House of representatives voting patterns 
index 
0.015 0.285 672 
     
Share of female population age 21 or over in the states where suffrage has 
been implemented 
0.478 0.032 698 
Binary suffrage variable Equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been 
implemented and 0 otherwise 
0.828 0.378 864 
     
Poll tax Binary variable equal to 1 if there is a poll 
tax in place and 0 otherwise 
0.220 0.414 864 
Literacy test Binary variable equal to 1 if there is a 
literacy test requirement for voting and 0 
otherwise 
0.382 0.486 864 
Secret Ballot Binary variable equal to 1 if there is a secret 
ballot in place and 0 otherwise 
0.954 0.210 864 
Motor vehicle registration Per capita motor vehicle registrations 0.235 2.384 864 
Log density Natural logarithm of population density 3.571 1.443 864 
Rural Share of rural population 0.561 0.201 864 
Fraction of the population 
that is black 
Share of the population that is black 0.097 0.142 864 
Fraction of the population 
age 65 or older 
Share of the population age 65 or older 0.052 0.015 864 
Female workers Share of the workforce that is female 0.309 0.082 864 
Manufacturing Share of the work force in manufacturing 0.115 0.083 864 
Fraction of the population 
age 10 that is illiterate 
Share of the population age 10 and older that 
is illiterate 
0.053 0.047 864 
Fraction of the population 
that is foreign-born 
Share of the population that is foreign born 0.106 0.081 864 
Real manufacturing wage Real manufacturing wage 3077.766 1517.384 864 
 
                                                 
41 Analogous to Lott and Kenny’s table 4 we report results for only this one additional control, leaving the results of  
a larger set of socio-economic controls for the appendix  (tables A1-A12). This set consists of binary variables for a 
literacy test requirement and a secret ballot; per capita motor vehicle registrations, population density, female labor 
force share, the manufacturing employment share, and the real manufacturing wage rate; population shares for rural 
areas, black individuals, 65 years or older individuals, 10 years older and illiterate, and foreign born.   
   
 
All of our regressions also include a poll tax binary variable (1 if a poll tax was in effect; 0 
otherwise). Lott and Kenny (1999) hypothesize and find empirical evidence that a poll tax will 
be, all else equal, associated with less support for taxes and government expenditures. They 
reason that a poll tax decreases voter turnout in favor of higher income members of the 
electorate, and higher income voters are less supportive of redistributive policies (Husted and 
Kenny 1997). 
The novel results reported in this paper are from the estimation of spatial econometric 
models. The data are organized into panels and spatial econometric techniques require that 
panels be balanced. As such, we employ somewhat smaller samples than those employed by Lott 
and Kenny (1999).  
Table 4.2 Years Included in Spatial Analysis for Dependent Variables 
 
 REV EXP EDU SOC TRANS HNOM SNOM 
1912        
1914        
1915        
1916        
1917        
1918        
1919        
1920        
1922        
1923        
1924        
1925        
1926        
1927        
1928        
1929        
1930        
1931        
1932        
1934        
1936        
1937        
1938        
1939        
1940        
Number of 
Years 
18 16 18 18 15 14 15 
   
 
For each dependent variable, table 4.2 reports the years for which observations are available for 
each of the 48 contiguous states. Therefore we also report OLS results (analogous to Lott and 
Kenny) to ensure that the novel spatial econometric results do not differ simply because of 
different samples.42 
To choose an appropriate spatial econometric model for each dependent variable we 
follow the procedure described in Elhorst (2010). The first step in the procedure is to estimate an 
OLS model and establish the need to include spatial and/or time-period fixed effects. The next 
step is to find out if there is any kind of spatial correlation in the data by employing Lagrange-
Multiplier (LM) tests of auto and error correlation.  
There are four LM-tests to be conducted: LM no spatial lag, LM no spatial error, robust 
LM no spatial lag, and robust LM no spatial error tests. The two robust tests allow for the 
presence of the other type of spatial correlation in the data: robust LM no spatial error test also 
allows for spatial lag, and similarly robust LM no spatial lag allows for spatial error correlation. 
As Elhorst (2010) warns including spatial and/or time period fixed effects in the model might 
lead to incorrect rejection of no spatial lag hypothesis when using a robust LM no spatial lag test. 
Furthermore, neither of the two tests allow for spatial lag of the independent variables. Thus, 
Elhorst (2010) suggests that the failure to reject no auto or no spatial error correlation should 
prompt to estimate the default spatial Durbin model (SDM): 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝑡𝛩 + 𝛤 + 𝛿𝑡𝐼𝑁 + 𝛦𝑡 (4.1) 
Where Yt = (Y1t , … , YNt)’ and each Yit (i=1,…,N) represents a vector of observations of  one of the 
dependent variables over the years T; Xt = (X’1t , … , X’Nt)’, where each Xit is a K×N matrix 
representing independent variables, one of interest being the interaction of women’s suffrage 
                                                 
42 In the next section we additionally report OLS results based on the full sample Lott and Kenny employ 
   
 
with the female population share; Et = (ε1t, …, εNt)’, with each εit being a vector of errors; Γ = (γ1,…, 
γN )’ where each element represents a vector of state fixed effects; and δt denotes time-specific 
effects (IN is an N×1 vector of ones); ρ is a spatial autoregressive coefficient;   and  are K×1 
vectors containing estimated coefficients on the independent variables; N = 48 states; T depends 
on the particular dependent variable; W = WNT = IT ⊗ WN  is a spatial weight matrix that 
characterizes the relationship of neighboring states,43 IT is a T×T identity matrix. 
Once SDM is fitted, Wald and Likelihood Ratio tests are employed to test two 
hypotheses. The first one is: Ho: 𝛩 = 0, which suggests fitting Spatial lag, or Spatial Auto 
Regressive (SAR) model: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝛤 + 𝛿𝑡𝐼𝑁 + 𝛦𝑡 (4.2) 
The second hypothesis Ho: 𝛩 +  𝜌𝛽 = 0 suggests fitting Spatial Error Model (SEM): 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡𝛽 + 𝛤 + 𝛿𝑡𝐼𝑁 + 𝛷𝑡, 𝛷𝑡 = 𝜇𝑊𝛷𝑡 + 𝛦𝑡 (4.3) 
here the spatial error term matrix 𝛷𝑡,   depends on the error terms of the neighbors and the 
random error matrix 𝐸𝑡.  Failing to reject the two hypotheses would prompt to employ SAR or 
SEM in place of SDM only if the LM tests point to that model as well, otherwise SDM is the 
suggested model. Additionally, Elhorst (2010) suggests conducting a Hausman test to decide if 
random state effects model would fit the data better than a fixed state effects model.  
 
4.3. Main Results 
We report four sets of OLS results for each dependent variable: (i) pooled, (ii) fixed state effects, 
(iii) fixed year effects, and (iv) two-way fixed effects. Table 4.3 reports these results for REV. 
                                                 
43 See appendix C on how matrix WN is constructed. 
   
 
The pooled OLS results (column 1) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported 
by Lott and Kenny (1999): female suffrage is positively and statistically significantly (1% level) 
associated with total state government revenue collected. Based on the point estimate, 
conditional on women’s suffrage a standard deviation in the (21 and older) female population 
share (0.032) is associated with about a 4.7% increase in total real per capita revenues.  
 Columns 2 and 3 of table 4.3 contain results based on, respectively, state or year fixed 
effects being included. The coefficient estimates on the women’s suffrage interaction are 
contradictory (positive for state effects only; negative for year effects only). However, likelihood 
ratio (LR) tests reject the null hypotheses that either set of effects is jointly insignificant (1% 
level in both cases).44 When both state and year fixed effects are included (column 4) the 
coefficient estimate on the women’s suffrage interaction decreases substantially (relative to that 
reported in column 1) and is only significant at the 10% level. Based on the two-way fixed 
effects point estimate, conditional on women’s suffrage a standard deviation in the female 
population share is associated with only about 1/3 of a 1% increase in total real per capita state 
revenues.  
                                                 
44 The state fixed effects LR test is based on a comparison of the model with only year fixed effects (column 2) to 
the two-way fixed effects model (column 4); the year fixed effects LR tests is based on a comparison of the model 
with only state fixed effects (column 3) to the two-way fixed effects model (column 4).  
   
 
Table 4.3 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
1.470*** 0.513*** -0.190** 0.106* 
 (13.67) (8.429) (-2.365) (1.786) 
Poll tax -0.179** -0.00506 -0.215*** -0.224*** 
 (-2.566) (-0.071) (-6.173) (-4.340) 
     
LM spatial lag 774.614*** 162.074*** 45.202*** 7.873*** 
LM spatial error 471.243*** 198.414*** 42.043*** 6.493** 
robust LM spatial lag 309.315*** 348.290*** 6.798*** 4.695** 
robust LM spatial error 5.944** 12.198*** 3.638* 3.315* 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 754.286*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 606.650*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.565 0.910 0.893 0.955 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
 The Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests reported in column 4 of table 4.3 all suggest that 
there is spatial dependence in the sample. Therefore we follow Elhorst (2010) and estimate a 
SDM and conduct Wald and LR rests to assess the more restrictive SEM and SAR alternatives. 
We also employ a Hausman test to determine whether we will include random or fixed state 
effects in the SDM model. The Hausman test fails to reject the null of a significant difference 
between the random and fixed effects models. This suggests that each US state has unobservable 
characteristics that are uncorrelated with the included controls. Since the random state effects 
model will yield efficient estimates, we report in table 4.4 the estimated results for an SDM of 
   
 
REV with random state effects and fixed year effects. Wald tests then lead to the rejection of the 
SEM and SAR models in favor of the SDM.45 
Table 4.4 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.074 -0.015 0.059 
 (1.064) (-0.143) (0.568) 
Poll tax -0.217*** -0.096 -0.312* 
 (-4.250) (-0.665) (-1.866) 
𝜌 0.138*** 
 (2.909) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 35.916*** 
Wald test spatial error 37.316*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 5.374 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.656 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Random state and time 
fixed effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random spatial effects. The null hypothesis for 
the Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state 
effects model.  
 
 Since an SDM includes the spatial autoregressive parameter () the estimated coefficients 
cannot themselves be interpreted as the correct marginal effects of the controls. This is because 
feedback effects must be taken into account. For example, the adoption of women’s suffrage in 
Colorado may affect spending patterns not only in Colorado but also in its neighbors, including 
Wyoming. However, spending patterns in Wyoming will then feedback into spending patterns in 
Colorado. To account for these feedback effects, we follow LeSage and Pace’s (2009) procedure 
for calculating the correct direct, indirect, and total effects of women’s suffrage and other 
                                                 
45 LR tests are not conducted for random effects model, as they would require estimation of spatial lag random 
effects and spatial error random effects models. 
   
 
controls. In particular, the indirect effects are cumulative, including feedback effects. The total 
effects are the sum of the direct and indirect effects. 
 As reported in table 4.4, once spatial dependence is taken into account women’s suffrage 
does not appear to have statistically significant direct or indirect effects on total state revenues. 
The spatial autoregressive parameter estimate is positive and statistically significant (1% level), 
consistent with spatial dependence. However, the correctly calculated marginal effects do not 
suggest a meaningful relationship between the adoption of women’s suffrage and states’ total 
revenue collections. 
 Turning to total state expenditures (EXP), OLS results are reported in table 4.5. 
Regarding the coefficient estimates on the women’s suffrage interaction, the results are largely 
similar to those reported for total revenues in table 4.3. (The LR tests again suggest that neither 
set of fixed effects is redundant.) However, in the case of expenditures the two-way fixed effects 
estimate is not only very small, but it is also not statistically significant. However, similar testing 
as described above suggests that there is spatial dependence in the data and that an SDM with 
random state and fixed year effects is appropriate. The results from estimating that model are 
reported in table 4.6 and, as with revenues, neither the direct nor the indirect effects are 
statistically significant. Unlike Lott and Kenny (1999), our spatial econometric results suggest 
that women’s suffrage did not affect overall state government expenditures and revenues 
patterns.  
   
 
Table 4.5 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
1.389*** 0.531*** -0.168* 0.058 
 (12.971) (7.368) (-1.932) (0.811) 
Poll tax -0.249*** -0.171* -0.293*** -0.305*** 
 (-3.418) (-1.878) (-7.394) (-4.555) 
     
LM spatial lag 645.493*** 320.040*** 39.824*** 5.989** 
LM spatial error 433.906*** 213.086*** 33.026*** 3.108* 
robust LM spatial lag 213.507*** 108.937*** 7.782*** 6.933*** 
robust LM spatial error 1.920 1.984 0.984 4.0516** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 509.211*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 500.821*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 768 768 768 768 
R-squared 0.541 0.866 0.864 0.930 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.6 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
0.040 -0.087 -0.046 
 (0.468) (-0.675) (-0.390) 
Poll tax -0.292*** -0.159 -0.451** 
 (-4.665) (-0.926) (-2.258) 
𝜌 0.114** 
 (2.235) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 26.112** 
Wald test spatial error 28.758** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 33.077 
    
States 48 
Observations 768 
R-squared 0.616 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Random state and time 
fixed effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
   
 
 We now disaggregate state government expenditures into some major categories and 
consider them separately. In table 4.7 we report OLS estimates based on educational 
expenditures (EDU) at the dependent variable. The results are again qualitatively quite similar to 
those reported in tables 4.3 and 4.5. In particular, the two-way fixed effects coefficient estimate 
on the women’s suffrage interaction is small and statistically insignificant. Also, in this case the 
LM tests associated with the two-way fixed effects model (column 4) do not suggest that the data 
are characterized by spatial dependence. We therefore consider the OLS two-way fixed effects as 
preferred and conclude that women’s suffrage does not have a meaningful association with state 
education expenditure patterns. 
Table 4.7 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Education Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.866*** 0.277*** -0.187 0.044 
 (8.130) (4.038) (-1.468) (0.537) 
Poll tax -0.282*** -0.313*** -0.302*** -0.438*** 
 (-4.084) (-3.900) (-5.502) (-6.200) 
     
LM spatial lag 321.036*** 133.745*** 45.312*** 0.145 
LM spatial error 219.542*** 100.476*** 21.371*** 0.030 
robust LM spatial lag 104.264*** 33.752*** 30.068*** 0.437 
robust LM spatial error 2.769* 0.484 6.126** 0.321 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 997.907*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 265.293*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.469 0.857 0.666   0.895 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
  
Alternatively, we do report meaningful results in regards to state social services expenditures 
(SOC). Table 4.8 contains the OLS estimates and, while the LR tests again suggest that we focus 
   
 
on the two-way fixed effects results (column 4), in this case the women’s suffrage interaction 
enters positively and statistically significantly (1% level).  
Table 4.8 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.857*** 0.149** -0.0597 0.292*** 
 (7.947) (2.219) (-0.626) (4.023) 
Poll tax -0.207*** 0.0101 -0.212*** -0.193*** 
 (-2.952) (0.128) (-5.148) (-3.078) 
     
LM spatial lag 600.246*** 258.666*** 4.764** 3.600* 
LM spatial error 236.869*** 119.172*** 2.752* 0.625 
robust LM spatial lag 415.065*** 145.730*** 2.440 15.388*** 
robust LM spatial error 51.687*** 6.236** 0.428 12.414*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 710.389*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 436.484*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.629 0.907 0.872 0.944 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Based on the point estimate, the effect is modest: conditional on women’s suffrage a standard 
deviation increase in the female population share is associated with an increase in social services 
expenditures of just under 1%. Furthermore, the LM tests indicate spatial dependence, so in 
table 4.9 we report the SDM results. Here we see that, while the direct effects estimate is small 
and statistically insignificant, the indirect effects estimate is positive and statistically significant 
(1% level). The total effect is also positive and significant (1% level); based on the point 
estimate, conditional on women’s suffrage a standard deviation increase in a particular state’s 
female population share increases real per capita social services expenditures cumulatively 
across states by about 1.5%.  
   
 
Table 4.9 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.093 0.390*** 0.483*** 
 (1.167) (3.268) (4.516) 
Poll tax -0.243*** -0.009 -0.252 
 (-3.868) (-0.061) (-1.494) 
𝜌 -0.018 
 (0.375) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 189.353*** 
LR test spatial lag 186.546*** 
Wald test spatial error 172.070*** 
LR test spatial error 189.121*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 97.368*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.350 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
We likewise report positive and significant effects for women’s suffrage in relation to state 
transportation expenditures. The two-way fixed effects OLS estimate on the women’s suffrage 
interaction is positive, large, and statistically significant (table 4.10; column 4). The LM tests 
support the presence of spatial dependence in the data, so we will focus again on the SDM results 
(table 4.11). Unlike the case of social services expenditures, with regards to transportation 
expenditures the direct effect estimate for women’s suffrage is positive and statistically 
significant; the indirect effect estimate is near zero and statistically insignificant. Perhaps not 
surprisingly then, the OLS two-way fixed effects estimate on women’s suffrage is about the 
same size as the direct effect estimate from the SDM model. Conditional on women’s suffrage in 
either case, a standard deviation increase in a state’s female population share is associated with 
around a 14% increase in its real per capita transportation expenditures. 
   
 
Table 4.10 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
5.026*** 4.858*** 4.638*** 4.394*** 
 (14.92) (14.393) (13.875) (13.123) 
Poll tax -0.248 -0.175 -0.459** -0.379** 
 (-1.597) (-1.156) (-2.546) (-2.161) 
     
LM spatial lag 0.058 0.296 2.406 1.724 
LM spatial error 0.471 1.716 5.639** 3.902** 
robust LM spatial lag 0.343 0.931 0.654 0.389 
robust LM spatial error 0.757 2.351 3.886** 2.566 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 63.426*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 80.821*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.453 0.492 0.504 0.546 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.11 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
4.558*** -0.080 4.479*** 
 (13.328) (-0.131) (6.431) 
Poll tax -0.436** -0.684** -1.120*** 
 (-2.541) (-2.056) (-3.043) 
𝜌 -0.206*** 
 (-3.502) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 31.900*** 
LR test spatial lag 29.636*** 
Wald test spatial error 26.035** 
LR test spatial error 25.424** 
  
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.491 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Time fixed effects 
are included in the regression.  
   
 
 Now we turn to the congressional voting patterns as captured by the House of 
Representatives (HNOM) and Senate (SNOM) NOMINATE scores. While the expenditure and 
revenue dependent variables reported on above are state-level variables, the NOMINATE scores 
speak to changes that might have been taking place at the level of the federal government. To 
save space, while we report OLS results for HNOM in table 4.12 we focus here on the SDM 
model results (table 4.13) as supported by the LM tests. The estimate direct, indirect, and total 
effects of women’s suffrage on House voting patterns are all small and statistically insignificant. 
We similarly find no evidence that women’s suffrage is associated with changes in Senate voting 
patterns. The OLS results for SNOM are reported in table 4.14 and the LM tests do not suggest 
that the data are characterized by spatial dependence. The two-way fixed effects estimate on the 
women’s suffrage interaction is small and statistically insignificant46.  
                                                 
46 Appendix B contains tables that report results of SDM estimations for Senate voting patterns. Once we take 
spatial correlation into account we find there to be a negative and significant relationship between women’s suffrage 
and Senate voting patterns in the same state, similar to the finding of Lott and Kenny (1999).  This difference in 
results for Senate and House voting patterns could be  explained by higher turnover in the House of Representatives 
than in the Senate (compare 2 and 6 year terms) which then translates into short and long-term responses to 
constituents’ requests.  
   
 
Table 4.12 OLS Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.0772 0.180*** 0.163** 0.011 
 (1.647) (3.694) (2.234) (0.155) 
Poll tax -0.011 0.045 -0.004 0.043 
 (-0.364) (0.907) (-0.141) (0.930) 
     
LM spatial lag 64.589*** 98.488*** 15.866*** 14.444*** 
LM spatial error 33.277*** 76.980*** 0.541 4.473** 
robust LM spatial lag 37.131*** 32.909*** 45.174*** 49.150*** 
robust LM spatial error 5.819** 11.401*** 29.850*** 39.179*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 269.678*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 130.728*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.620 0.737 0.676 0.783 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.13 SDM Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.005 0.062 0.057 
 (-0.073) (0.497) (0.492) 
Poll tax 0.073 0.186 0.259* 
 (1.487) (1.532) (1.851) 
𝜌 0.111** 
 (2.054) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 65.528*** 
LR test spatial lag 70.260*** 
Wald test spatial error 71.660*** 
LR test spatial error 78.535*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 62.424*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 672 
R-squared 0.266 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
Table 4.14 OLS Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.042 0.122* 0.017 -0.136 
 (-0.604) (1.752) (0.153) (-1.312) 
Poll tax -0.054 0.115 -0.049 0.141* 
 (-1.178) (1.524) (-1.105) (1.880) 
     
LM spatial lag 11.335*** 9.130*** 2.269 0.481 
LM spatial error 2.227 5.920** 0.003 0.474 
robust LM spatial lag 22.498*** 6.654** 14.959*** 0.009 
robust LM spatial error 13.389*** 3.444* 12.693*** 0.002 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 321.784*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 44.192*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.480 0.669 0.513 0.689 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
4.4. Further Results 
In this section we employ several alternative specifications.  To begin we first report OLS results 
based on the whole sample (years 1870 to 1940) to ensure that we are able to reproduce the 
results Lott and Kenny (1999) report. We then employ an alternative control variable of interest. 
It is a binary variable equal to 1 if there are female suffrage laws in place in a given year and a 
state; 0 otherwise. The reason to employ the binary variable and omit multiplying it by the shares 
of women is to avoid possible correlation between the shares of women in neighboring states. In 
the next alternative specification we employ placebo laws technique, similar to Bertrand et al 
(2004). If the results reported in the previous section still hold under the placebo laws, the 
identification strategy should be questioned. For each state we randomly assign the year when 
the suffrage laws were implemented, while keeping the mean and standard deviation of the non-
   
 
placebo year variable. Finally we report results of the three specifications described above based 
on a limited sample, that omits years 1920 and onwards, when women’s suffrage was nationally 
established by the 19th amendment. 
The results reported in column 1 of table 4.15 are again, as in the previous section, 
qualitatively and quantitavely similar to those reported by Lott and Kenny (1999): the coefficient 
on the women’s suffrage interaction is 0.213 and is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. Column 2 contains results of a regression employing the full sample with total tax revenue 
as the dependent variable and women’s suffrage binary variable as the independent variable of 
interest. Although it is smaller in magnitude (compare 0.090 and 0.213 in column 1), it is still of 
the same sign. With the introduction of placebo laws (column 3 of table 4.15) the coefficient on 
the independent variable of interest changes, specifically it switches the sign.
   
 
Table 4.15 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Total Revenue on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary Suffrage 
Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
0.213*   0.115   
 (1.880)   (0.696)   
Suffrage binary variable  0.090*   0.065  
  (1.779)   (0.894)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   -0.097*   0.047 
   (-1.880)   (0.657) 
Poll tax -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.126*** 0.032 0.034 0.028 
 (-2.726) (-2.658) (-2.754) (0.487) (0.521) (0.424) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,832 1,832 1,832 1,179 1,179 1,179 
R-squared 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.740 0.740 0.740 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is REV. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables. 
   
 
Next, we employ a subsample, excluding year 1920 and onward, when women’s suffrage 
was nationally established, columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 4.15. In none of the specifications the 
independent variables of interest: women’s suffrage interaction variable (column 4), suffrage 
binary variable (column 5), placebo binary variable (column 6) have statistically significant 
coefficients on them.  
We then conduct a spatial analysis similar to the one described in section 3, however, 
now the independent variables of interest are either the binary suffrage variable or the placebo 
binary suffrage variable. For this spatial analysis, as in section 3, we are using subsample of year 
identified in table 4.2 to preserve a balanced panel.  
Column 4 of table 4.16 contains results of an ordinary least squares regression with total 
state revenue as the dependent variable (REV) and suffrage binary variable as the independent 
variable of interest. The coefficient is marginally significant (10 percent level), however it is 
smaller in magnitude than the comparable coefficient on women’s suffrage interaction, contained 
in column 4 of table 4.3 (compare 0.055 and 0.106).47  
                                                 
47 Tables 4.16, 4.18, 4.21, 4.23, 4.29, 4.31, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41 contain results of OLS specifications that based on 
the testing procedure described in the previous section indicate spatial dependence in the data generating processes 
and suggest use of fixed state and year effects.  
   
 
Table 4.16 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.717*** 
 
0.245*** 
 
-0.062 
 
0.055* 
  (13.598) (8.378) (-1.625) (1.947) 
Poll tax -0.172** 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.214*** 
 
-0.223*** 
 
 (-2.458) (-0.050) (-6.153) (-4.337) 
     
LM spatial lag 785.571*** 349.953*** 44.549*** 7.869*** 
LM spatial error 305.358*** 163.773*** 41.778*** 4.733** 
robust LM spatial lag 485.260*** 198.043*** 6.477** 6.288** 
robust LM spatial error 5.046** 11.862*** 3.707* 3.152* 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 758.114***  
Time period fixed effects LR Test 609.754*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.564 0.909 0.892 0.955 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.17 contains results of estimating an SDM with total state revenue as the 
dependent variable and binary suffrage variable as the primary control of interest. Similar to the 
result reported in section 3 there is no statistically significant direct nor indirect relationship 
between women’s suffrage and total state revenue. At the same time increase in state total 
revenue in one state is associated with increases in state revenue in neighboring states. This latter 
result also holds when placebo effects are in place, table 4.19. Only the year when suffrage was 
implemented in each state is changed, while the state’s total revenue and its geographical 
location is still the same. This could serve as additional evidence to no relationship between state 
total revenue and women’s suffrage. 
   
 
Table 4.17 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.038 0.0003 0.038 
 (1.161) (0.005) (0.771) 
Poll tax -0.213*** -0.091 -0.304* 
 (-4.044) (-0.656) (-1.858) 
𝜌 0.198*** 
 (7.048) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 35.203*** 
Wald test spatial error 36.536*** 
    
Random Effects Hausman Test 22.845 
  
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.655 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regression though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
Table 4.18 OLS Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.657*** 
 
0.078** 
 
0.055 
 
-0.026 
 (12.502) (2.449) (1.616) (-0.994) 
Poll tax -0.215*** 
 
0.012 
 
-0.215*** 
 
-0.227*** 
 
 (-3.023) (0.168) (-6.165) (-4.412) 
     
LM spatial lag 773.371*** 378.758*** 43.566*** 7.962*** 
LM spatial error 419.470*** 183.555*** 42.562*** 5.518** 
robust LM spatial lag 361.699*** 207.175*** 5.478** 4.099** 
robust LM spatial error 7.798*** 11.972*** 4.475** 1.656 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 755.303***  
Time period fixed effects LR Test 669.317*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.551 0.903 0.892 0.955 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
   
 
Table 4.19 SDM Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.017 0.004 -0.014 
 (-0.657) (0.051)   (-0.175) 
Poll tax -0.221*** -0.105 -0.326** 
 (-4.402) (-0.766) (-2.044) 
𝜌 0.199*** 
 (7.049) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 35.494*** 
Wald test spatial error 37.022*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 33.729 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.659 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
The next dependent variable is state total expenses (EXP). A regression based on full 
sample (column 1, table 4.20) delivers similar to Lott and Kenny (1999) effects, specifically 
positive and statistically significant relationship. A change of the independent variable of interest 
from the suffrage interaction variable to a suffrage binary variable (column 2, table 4.20) still 
leads to a positive and significant relationship, however the estimated coefficient is lower than 
that in column 1 (compare 0.099 and 0.227). Randomly shuffling suffrage years (column 3, table 
4.20) produces negative and statistically significant effect. Truncating the sample (columns 4, 5, 
and 6, table 4.20) does not produce any meaningful results.
   
 
Table 4.20 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Total Expenses on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary Suffrage 
Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population that is 
female 
0.227**   0.018   
 (1.990)   (0.122)   
Suffrage binary variable  0.099*   0.020  
  (1.941)   (0.307)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   -0.097*   0.041 
   (-1.884)   (0.648) 
Poll tax -0.110** -0.107** -0.112** 0.029 0.030 0.027 
 (-2.446) (-2.372) (-2.485) (0.503) (0.518) (0.461) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,881 1,881 1,881 1,230 1,230 1,230 
R-squared 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.780 0.780 0.780 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables. 
   
 
Table 4.21 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.671*** 0.253*** -0.051 0.035 
 (12.770) (7.329) (-1.252) (1.022) 
Poll tax -0.242*** -0.170* -0.293*** -0.304*** 
 (-3.315) (-1.864) (-7.369) (-4.550) 
     
LM spatial lag 653.175*** 322.859*** 39.031*** 5.970** 
LM spatial error 441.611*** 217.360*** 32.727*** 3.098* 
robust LM spatial lag 213.318*** 107.080*** 7.346*** 6.840*** 
robust LM spatial error 1.754 1.581 1.043 3.968** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 513.035*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 503.760*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 768 768 768 768 
R-squared 0.538 0.865 0.864 0.930 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.22 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.028 -0.041 -0.013 
 (0.743) (0.696) (-0.229) 
Poll tax -0.299*** -0.175 -0.474** 
    
 (-4.614) (-1.008) (-2.313) 
𝜌 0.258*** 
 (7.128) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 24.215** 
Wald test spatial error 26.859** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 35.044 
    
States 48 
Observations 768 
R-squared 0.796 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
   
 
Table 4.23 OLS Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.564*** 0.102*** 0.006 -0.045 
 (10.700) (2.714) (0.152) (-1.436) 
Poll tax 3.389*** -0.155* -0.291*** -0.310*** 
 (12.305) (-1.649) (-7.320) (-4.632) 
     
LM spatial lag 663.992*** 350.397*** 38.368*** 6.071** 
LM spatial error 387.496*** 239.352*** 33.558*** 3.286* 
robust LM spatial lag 285.180*** 113.071*** 6.320** 6.448** 
robust LM spatial error 8.684*** 113.071*** 1.510 3.663* 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 515.636*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 550.117*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 768 768 768 768 
R-squared 0.512 0.857 0.864 0.930 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.24 SDM Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.055* -0.075 -0.130 
 (-1.733) (-0.923)   (-1.368) 
Poll tax -0.298*** -0.146 -0.445** 
 (-4.891) (-0.879) (-2.283) 
𝜌 0.265*** 
 (7.138) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 25.037** 
Wald test spatial error 27.940*** 
  
Random Effects HausmanTest 36.164*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 768 
R-squared 0.621 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
The results contained in tables 4.22 and 4.24 again suggest that while there is no 
relationship between women’s suffrage and state expenses, expenditure increases in one state are 
associated with expenditure increases in neighboring states. Implementing placebo effects in 
place of suffrage years does not alter the parameter 𝜌 from table 4.22 to table 4.24, again 
suggesting no relationship between state expenditure and women’s suffrage rights. 
Considering state spending on education (EDU), the results reported in table 4.25 suggest 
no statistically significant relationship between women’s suffrage and education spending. 
Likewise, as reported in tables 4.26 and 4.27, there is no evidence of spatial correlation in the 
data generating process, which is similar to the results reported in the previous section (table 
4.7), nor there seems to be any statistically significant relationship between women’s suffrage 
and state education spending. 
   
 
 
Table 4.25 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Education Expenses on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary 
Suffrage Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population that 
is female 
-0.129   0.020   
 (-0.703)   (0.070)   
Suffrage binary variable  -0.092   -0.022  
  (-1.106)   (-0.171)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   0.304***   0.514*** 
   (3.749)   (4.231) 
Poll tax -0.375*** -0.379*** -0.368*** -0.284** -0.286** -0.308*** 
 (-5.097) (-5.141) (-5.023) (-2.456) (-2.469) (-2.680) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,173 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.731 0.731 0.733 0.635 0.635 0.641 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary
   
 
Table 4.26 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Education Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.421*** 0.132*** -0.076 0.024 
 (8.055) (4.017) (-1.266) (0.658) 
Poll tax -0.278*** -0.312*** -0.302*** -0.438*** 
 (-4.019) (-3.891) (-5.505) (-6.200) 
     
LM spatial lag 323.641*** 101.383*** 45.143*** 0.144 
LM spatial error 103.707*** 33.507*** 21.585*** 0.427 
robust LM spatial lag 222.479*** 113.071*** 29.342*** 0.030 
robust LM spatial error 2.545 0.419 5.784 0.312 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 998.566*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 266.145*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.468 0.857 0.666 0.895 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.27 OLS Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) State Education Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.388*** 0.047 0.010 -0.015 
 (7.538) (1.338) (0.180) (-0.415) 
Poll tax -0.303*** -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.440 
 (-4.360) (-5.462) (-5.462) (-6.230) 
     
LM spatial lag 340.461*** 148.300*** 44.602*** 0.131 
LM spatial error 129.298*** 116.806*** 22.470*** 0.015 
robust LM spatial lag 214.462*** 31.532*** 26.633*** 0.559 
robust LM spatial error 3.299* 0.038 4.501** 0.443 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 999.895*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 280.294*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.455 0.855 0.666 0.895 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant.
   
 
Table 4.28 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Social Services Expenses on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary 
Suffrage Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.080   0.174   
 (0.488)   (0.690)   
Suffrage binary variable  0.024   0.070  
  (0.322)   (0.616)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   0.113   0.029 
   (1.553)   (0.272) 
Poll tax 0.0927 0.093 0.093 0.235** 0.237** 0.230** 
 (1.362) (1.367) (1.372) (2.271) (2.282) (2.219) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,795 1,795 1,795 1,141 1,141 1,141 
R-squared 0.759 0.759 0.759 0.662 0.662 0.662 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables. 
   
 
Likewise, there is no statistically significant relationship between social services 
spending and women’s suffrage when the full sample is used, or when years 1920 and onward 
are excluded (table 4.28). However, employing the balanced panel subsample starting in 1915 
(table 4.29) with binary suffrage variable as the control variable of primary interest reveals a 
positive statistically significant relationship, similarly to what is discussed in the previous section 
(table 4.8).  The magnitude of the coefficient on the suffrage binary variable is larger than that 
on women’s suffrage interaction variable. Compare (column 4 table 4.8 and column 4 table 
4.29): a standard deviation increase in women’s suffrage interaction variable is associated with 
about a 1 percent increase in spending on social services, and one standard deviation increase in 
suffrage binary variable is associated with about a 5 percent increase in spending on social 
services.  
Table 4.29 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.431*** 0.069** -0.007 0.132*** 
 (8.177) (2.138) (-0.146) (3.846) 
Poll tax -0.203*** 0.011 -0.212*** -0.191*** 
 (-2.900) (0.135) (-5.136) (-3.052) 
     
LM spatial lag 605.490*** 259.138*** 4.558** 3.836* 
LM spatial error 242.871*** 119.950*** 2.358 0.770 
robust LM spatial lag 414.196*** 145.232*** 2.902* 14.992*** 
robust LM spatial error 51.578*** 6.044 0.702 11.927*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 709.665*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 435.206*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.629 0.907 0.872 0.944 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
   
 
Moving on to taking into account spatial correlation (table 4.30) we find that a standard 
deviation increase in suffrage binary variable in one state is associated with about a 7 percent 
increase in spending on social services in other states  and a women’s suffrage interaction 
variable in one state (column 2 table 4.9),   and a standard deviation increase in a 7 percent 
increase of spending on social services in other states (column 2 table 4.30) and over 8 percent 
overall increase in spending on social services (column 3 table 4.30). These magnitudes of 
changes in cumulative social services spending associated with changes in the suffrage binary 
variable are larger than the changes associated with one changes in women’s suffrage interaction 
variable reported in the previous section. This difference comes from excluding the share of 
women from the independent variable of interest, suggesting that results contained in table 4.9 
could be picking up spatial correlation between shares of women in neighboring states. 
Table 4.30 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Expenses on Social Services on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.035 0.185*** 0.219*** 
 (0.899) (3.302) (4.385) 
Poll tax -0.241*** -0.012 -0.253 
 (-3.896) (-0.083) (-1.561) 
𝜌 -0.016 
 (-0.316) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 188.482*** 
LR test spatial lag 185.537*** 
Wald test spatial error 171.171*** 
LR test spatial error 188.139*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 101.049*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.348 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
   
 
Including placebo tests in the analysis (table 4.32) further suggests that the relationship 
between women’ suffrage and state spending on social services is not spurious. Contrary to the 
results reported in table 4.30, the statistically significant relationship is the direct one (not 
indirect) and is negative (column 1, table 4.32). 
Table 4.31 OLS Estimates from Placebo Test Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.383*** -0.161*** 0.019 -0.086*** 
 (7.333) (-4.778) (0.478) (-2.685) 
Poll tax -0.228*** 0.006 -0.212*** -0.203*** 
 (-3.229) (0.076) (-5.150) (-3.217) 
     
LM spatial lag 604.508*** 230.562*** 4.368* 4.462** 
LM spatial error 233.808*** 87.154*** 2.212 2.562 
robust LM spatial lag 418.525*** 156.354*** 2.907* 4.503** 
robust LM spatial error 47.825*** 12.946*** 0.751 2.604 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 701.853*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 409.360*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.624 0.909 0.872 0.943 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of likelihood 
ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood ratio time 
period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
   
 
Table 4.32 SDM Estimates from Placebo Regressions of (Log) State Expenses on Social 
Services on Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.087*** -0.060 -0.147 
 (-2.754) (-0.769) (-1.651) 
Poll tax -0.265*** -0.147 -0.413** 
 (-4.260) (-0.974) (-2.415) 
𝜌 0.029 
 (0.591) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 182.463*** 
LR test spatial lag 180.570*** 
Wald test spatial error 164.832*** 
LR test spatial error 181.600*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 105.871*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.340 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
Considering the next dependent variable, TRANS. Employing full sample, changing the 
main control to a binary variable, including placebo effects, or truncating the sample (table 4.33) 
does not suggest any evidence of a relationship between women’s suffrage and highway 
spending. Interestingly, while the magnitude of the relationship between women’s suffrage, 
measured by the interaction of women shares and suffrage laws binary variables, and state 
highway spending is large and statistically significant (column 4 table 4.10) it is not statistically 
different from zero, when the independent variable of interest does not contain the shares of 
women by state (column 4 table 4.34). Moreover, removing shares of women from the 
independent variable of interest in spatial analysis (table 4.35) also leads to the coefficients 
being statistically not different from zero, while the results that do include women’s shares by 
state (table 4.11) suggest an up to a 14 percent cumulative increase on spending on highway 
   
 
Table 4.33 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Transportation Expenses on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary 
Suffrage Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and onwards 
omitted 
Female suffrage x 
fraction of the 
population that is 
female 
0.205   -0.459   
 (0.665)   (-0.985)   
Suffrage binary 
variable 
 0.163   -0.139  
  (1.160)   (-0.658)  
Placebo suffrage binary 
variable 
  -0.188   0.007 
   (-1.360)   (0.035) 
Poll Tax -0.279* -0.274* -0.294* 0.385* 0.384* 0.392* 
 (-1.840) (-1.805) (-1.940) (1.810) (1.804) (1.843) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,539 1,539 1,539 885 885 885 
R-squared 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.780 0.780 0.780 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables.
   
 
spending with one standard deviation increase in women’s suffrage interaction variable. 
Plausibly, the correlation, including spatial correlation, is between highway spending and share 
of women independently of suffrage rights. Women could be choosing to move to states with 
better highway quality. Additionally, there is positive correlation between highway spending in 
neighboring states, as signified by parameter 𝜌. It is positive and significant. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that placebo test results (table 4.37) suggest a statistically significant negative 
relationship between suffrage and highway spending. 
Table 4.34 OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 2.470*** 1.633*** 0.090 0.032 
 (14.727) (12.780) (0.587) (0.234) 
Poll tax -0.220 -0.042 -0.324*** -0.300 
 (-1.410) (-0.172) (-3.030) (-1.447) 
     
LM spatial lag 418.300*** 227.170*** 57.848*** 37.880*** 
LM spatial error 278.784*** 141.408*** 38.032*** 21.317*** 
robust LM spatial lag 141.726*** 91.823*** 22.942*** 27.839*** 
robust LM spatial error 2.210 6.061*** 3.127* 11.277*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 316.877*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 302.660*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.450 0.746 0.741 0.833 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
   
 
Table 4.35 SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.210 -0.479* -0.269 
 (1.412) (-1.915) (-1.074) 
Poll tax -0.201 -0.605 -0.806 
 (-1.270) (-1.115) (-1.265) 
𝜌 0.528*** 
 (7.719) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 85.373*** 
Wald test spatial error 90.351*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 39.496* 
  
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.466 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
Table 4.36 OLS Estimates from Placebo Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 1.765*** 1.064*** -0.533*** -0.376*** 
 (9.958) (7.657) (-3.709) (-2.920) 
Poll tax -0.269 0.045 -0.310*** -0.322 
 (-1.615) (0.173) (-2.922) (-1.558) 
     
LM spatial lag 443.106*** 267.810*** 60.415*** 39.194*** 
LM spatial error 236.319*** 151.290*** 37.493*** 21.746*** 
robust LM spatial lag 245.307*** 149.032*** 27.388*** 28.399*** 
robust LM spatial error 38.519*** 32.512*** 4.467** 10.951*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 311.929*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 403.515*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.369 0.712 0.746 0.836 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
   
 
Table 4.37 SDM Estimates from Placebo Regressions of (Log) State Transportations Expenses 
on Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.444*** -0.226 -0.671 
 (3.195) (-0.535) (-1.332) 
Poll tax -0.281 -1.004 -1.285 
 (-1.279) (-1.512) (-1.660) 
𝜌 0.271*** 
 (5.737) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 43.581*** 
LR test spatial lag 48.446*** 
Wald test spatial error 56.312*** 
LR test spatial error 63.513*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 40.146** 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.362 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
Next dependent variable is HNOM, voting patterns in the House of Representatives. Lott 
and Kenny (1999) find there to be a negative relationship between HNOM and women’s suffrage 
interaction variable, which is successfully replicated and holds for binary suffrage variable as the 
independent variable of interest (table 4.38 columns 1 and 2).  However, allowing for spatial 
correlation reveals no statistically significant relationship between voting patterns in the House 
of Delegates and women’s suffrage (table 4.40).   Similarly, conducting placebo tests (tables 
4.41 and 4.42) does not provide any meaningful results. 
   
 
Table 4.38 OLS Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary Suffrage 
Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards 
omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.243***   -0.350***   
 (-3.583)   (-3.453)   
Suffrage binary variable  -0.107***   -0.156***  
  (-3.601)   (-3.552)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   -0.085***   -0.045 
   (-3.029)   (-1.196) 
Poll Tax -0.122*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.139*** -0.141*** -0.134*** 
 (-5.278) (-5.379) (-5.294) (-3.952) (-4.010) (-3.788) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,059 1,059 1,059 
R-squared 0.696 0.696 0.696 0.706 0.706 0.702 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables. 
   
 
Table 4.39 OLS Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.038* 0.082*** 0.068** 0.0001 
 (1.682) (3.548) (2.000) (0.002) 
Poll tax -0.530*** 0.046 -0.003 0.043 
 (-4.772) (0.936) (-0.129) (0.934) 
     
LM spatial lag 64.566*** 99.452*** 16.319*** 13.651*** 
LM spatial error 33.357*** 79.074*** 0.669 4.829*** 
robust LM spatial lag 36.886*** 30.474*** 45.012*** 47.404*** 
robust LM spatial error 5.673** 10.095*** 29.363*** 37.582*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 270.065*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 132.077*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.620 0.736 0.676 0.783 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.40 SDM Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.011 0.025 0.015 
 (-0.292) (0.421) (0.248) 
Poll tax 0.074 0.180 0.255* 
 (1.539) (1.467) (1.816) 
𝜌 0.117** 
 (2.172) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 64.364*** 
LR test spatial lag 68.878*** 
Wald test spatial error 70.342*** 
LR test spatial error 76.980*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 148.206*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 672 
R-squared 0.264 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
Table 4.41 OLS Estimates from Placebo Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.037 0.087*** 0.037 0.008 
 (1.623) (3.552) (1.172) (0.289) 
Poll tax -0.011 0.050 -0.006 0.043 
 (-0.399) (1.010) (-0.216) (0.938) 
     
LM spatial lag 65.538*** 101.229*** 17.949*** 14.528*** 
LM spatial error 35.513*** 79.369*** 1.575 4.781** 
robust LM spatial lag 34.678*** 34.883*** 41.247*** 46.670*** 
robust LM spatial error 4.653** 13.023*** 24.873*** 36.924*** 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 272.820*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 132.131*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.620 0.736 0.674 0.783 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.42 SDM Estimates from Placebo Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.005 -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.161) (-0.287) (-0.209) 
Poll tax 0.074 0.182 0.256* 
 (`1.558) 1.466 (1.783) 
𝜌 0.113** 
 (2.114) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 64.417*** 
LR test spatial lag 68.837*** 
Wald test spatial error 70.401*** 
LR test spatial error 76.888*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 47.644** 
    
States 48 
Observations 672 
R-squared 0.264 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
Finally, although Lott and Kenny (1999) find a negative and statistically significant 
association (column 1, table 4.43) between voting patterns in the Senate (SNOM) and women’s 
suffrage interaction variable, this relationship does not hold for the balanced panel subsample. 
Additionally, there seems to be no spatial correlation in the data generating process (table 4.44 
column 4) and in the data generating process with placebo effects included, table 4.45.              
   
 
Table 4.43 OLS Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage Interaction Variable, Binary Suffrage 
Variable, and Placebo Binary Suffrage Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Full sample Full sample  Full sample Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Years 1920 and 
onwards omitted 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.468***   -0.791***   
 (-4.732)   (-5.806)   
Suffrage binary variable  -0.210***   -0.351***  
  (-4.863)   (-5.985)  
Placebo suffrage binary variable   -0.157***   -0.148*** 
   (-3.820)   (-2.912) 
Poll Tax -0.209*** -0.214*** -0.208*** -0.195*** -0.201*** -0.177*** 
 (-6.171) (-6.315) (-6.138) (-4.114) (-4.240) (-3.686) 
       
States 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 1,059 1,059 1,059 
R-squared 0.674 0.674 0.672 0.733 0.734 0.726 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are 
included in regressions though not reported above. The independent variable of interest in columns (1) and (4) is female suffrage interaction variable. In columns 
(2) and (5) binary variable equal to 1 if suffrage rights have been implemented in a state and 0 otherwise. In columns (3) and (6) placebo suffrage binary 
variables. 
 
   
 
Table 4.44 OLS Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.024 0.051 -0.007 -0.072 
 (-0.724) (1.534) (-0.137) (-1.504) 
Poll tax -0.054 0.117 -0.050 0.140* 
 (-1.183) (1.540) (-1.114) (1.869) 
     
LM spatial lag 11.374*** 9.307*** 2.295 0.474 
LM spatial error 2.284 6.204** 0.002 0.481 
robust LM spatial lag 22.237*** 6.230** 14.948*** 0.002 
robust LM spatial error 13.147*** 3.127 12.654*** 0.009 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 322.166*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 45.384*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.481 0.669 0.513 0.689 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
 
Table 4.45. OLS Estimates from Placebo Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage binary variable 0.003 0.071** 0.026 -0.049 
 (0.082) (2.017) (0.554) (-1.102) 
Poll tax -0.054 0.120 -0.050 0.143* 
 (-1.187) (1.581) (-1.126) (1.917) 
     
LM spatial lag 10.985*** 7.775*** 2.004 0.676 
LM spatial error 1.946 4.748** 0.013 0.570 
robust LM spatial lag 23.729*** 7.124*** 15.055*** 0.166 
robust LM spatial error 14.690*** 4.097** 13.064*** 0.060 
     
State fixed effects LR Test 320.808*** 
Time period fixed effects LR Test 42.582*** 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.480 0.670 0.514 0.689 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. The null of 
likelihood ratio state fixed effects test is that the state fixed effects are jointly insignificant. The null of likelihood 
ratio time period fixed effects test is that the time period fixed effects are jointly insignificant. 
   
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Literature finds that women and men commonly prefer different public goods, with women 
favoring health and education spending. This difference in preferences combined with granting 
women suffrage rights in the early 20th century in the U.S. has been shown to increase 
government size and scope. 
At the same time the literature does not take into account possible spatial dependence 
between the time the suffrage laws were introduced and spatial dependence of government 
growth in neighboring states, both of which could be explained by yardstick competition. 
Ignoring spatial correlation could lead to biased results. 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between female suffrage and government 
spending, while accounting for spatial spillover effects, captured by direct, indirect, and total 
effects commonly used in spatial econometrics empirical literature. We find that female suffrage 
is associated with increases in social services spending in neighboring states. We additionally 
find that there is an auto-regressive positive correlation in the size of total spending and total 
revenue of neighboring states.  There is also positive correlation in voting patterns of house state 
representatives of neighboring states. At the same time, contrary to the previous literature, there 
seems to be no relation between women’s suffrage and state total spending, total revenue, and 
voting patterns of congressmen when spatial dependence is accounted for.  
To sum up, we find that while women’s suffrage did not change the overall size of 
government it is associated with changes in its spending on certain categories. This paper 
additionally reveals that analysis of local government institutional arrangements and policies 
aimed at changing such arrangements need to address and take into account potential spatial 
correlation.  
   
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The objective of this dissertation is to incorporate institutional analysis into economics of gender. 
All three essays aim to point out the importance of institutions when considering women’s 
economic status. The main finding of the second chapter is that globalization does not 
necessarily create or diminish income inequality as measured by labor share. Mobility of women, 
as a part of globalization, has a positive association with labor share, while mobility of men has a 
negative association with labor share. This essay leaves some questions unanswered, such as, 
what are the underlying processes of the opposite outcomes of male and female mobility? I argue 
it is the difference of bargaining power between man and women. However, I also believe the 
issue is more complicated and the processes are different for the two genders, the two migration 
directions, the two types of destinations (developed and developing countries) and the two types 
of origin countries (also developed and developing).  
In the third chapter by conducting a cross-country comparison I consider the relation 
between women’s representation in management positions and economic institutions, measured 
by Economic Freedom of the World index. I find that countries with economically freer 
institutions enjoy higher ratio of female to male managers. I argue that based on Becker (1971) 
theory discriminating employers would not be able to survive competition and will be forced to 
leave the market leading to lower discrimination levels. I find that it is lower levels of regulation 
in the economy and regulation of credit market specifically that have a strong and positive 
association with female representation in management. While I do find correlation between the 
two, further research would have to be concentrated on the causation part of the argument. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, jointly with Andrew Young, we find that women’s suffrage 
did not lead to higher government spending and higher tax revenue collection in states with 
   
 
higher share of women in the beginning of the 20th century. This finding is contrary to the 
previous research. We add to the literature by employing a spatial analysis. Omitting spatial 
correlation plausibly led previous research to the conclusion that women’s suffrage is to blame 
for government growth. We find that there is spatial correlation (yard-stick competition) between 
neighboring states when it comes to the spending and taxation decisions. We additionally find 
that government spending on social services (hospitals, prisons, and charities) is positively 
associated with female suffrage in the same state and female suffrage in neighboring states, 
through spatial spillovers. A possible extension of this research would be to conduct a spatial 
analysis of the relationship between voting rights of other disenfranchised groups, such as 
immigrants, and government spending.  
The overall policy suggestion of this research is to consider institutional framework, a 
bigger picture. Chapter 2 presents globalization as a highly complicated issue with not one but 
many outcomes. The findings suggest that policy focused on income inequality as a result of 
decreasing labor share should not view globalization as necessarily causing or decreasing income 
inequality and instead take into account the disparity in bargaining power between men and 
women. This requires a better understanding of underlying causes and determinants of such 
disparity and creates ideas for future research. For example, would increase in migrant flows of 
women from developing to developed countries increase bargaining power of women in 
developed countries? 
Chapter 3 suggests concentrating on creating facilitating economic environment for 
women’s success. Such environment would need to have low government regulation and, 
especially so, low credit market regulation. This suggestion is contrary to the mandated share of 
women in upper management in some countries. Finally, chapter 4 suggests that giving voting 
   
 
rights to a previously disenfranchised group does not necessarily lead to government growth. 
While the research of chapter 4 concentrates on the beginning of the 20th century, its outcomes 
pertain to today’s world. Women are often viewed as the ones to vote less conservatively, as 
indicated by the quote in the beginning of chapter 4. We, however, believe that women do not 
prefer a larger government overall, rather higher spending on certain categories. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Full Tables 
 
Table A1. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
1.470*** 0.513*** -0.190** 0.106* 
 (13.67) (8.429) (-2.365) (1.786) 
Poll tax -0.179** -0.00506 -0.215*** -0.224*** 
 (-2.566) (-0.071) (-6.173) (-4.340) 
Literacy test 0.189*** 0.143* 0.106*** 0.0244 
 (4.522) (1.658) (4.992) (0.392) 
Secret Ballot 0.235** 0.343*** 0.149*** 0.122** 
 (2.370) (4.530) (2.981) (2.232) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.0108 -0.00372 0.00228 -0.00118 
 (1.528) (-1.096) (0.636) (-0.483) 
Log density -0.172*** 0.628*** -0.172*** 0.206* 
 (-7.491) (4.038) (-14.55) (1.773) 
Rural -1.110*** -2.231*** -0.176* 0.802** 
 (-6.060) (-4.634) (-1.798) (2.163) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
0.530 3.222** 1.114*** 2.065** 
 (1.179) (2.466) (4.925) (2.107) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
18.34*** 49.47*** 3.007*** 8.222*** 
 (9.890) (21.81) (3.048) (3.255) 
Female workers 0.258 -0.0311 -1.880*** -0.482 
 (0.458) (-0.0598) (-6.365) (-1.268) 
Manufacturing -1.891*** -1.469** 1.151*** 0.767* 
 (-4.469) (-2.485) (5.153) (1.723) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-1.039 -7.877*** 0.0295 -0.479 
 (-1.524) (-8.892) (0.0853) (-0.670) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
0.332 3.378*** 3.290*** 5.375*** 
 (0.652) (4.034) (12.22) (8.486) 
Real manufacturing wage -0.00003** -0.0000006 -0.00001 -0.00009*** 
 (-2.067) (-0.0856) (-0.558) (-4.256) 
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.565 0.910 0.893 0.955 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A2. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
1.389*** 0.531*** -0.168* 0.0581 
 (12.971) (7.368) (-1.932) (0.811) 
Poll tax -0.249*** -0.171* -0.293*** -0.305*** 
 (-3.418) (-1.878) (-7.394) (-4.555) 
Literacy test 0.136*** -0.00467 0.0802*** -0.147* 
 (3.137) (-0.0452) (3.338) (-1.926) 
Secret Ballot 0.169* 0.159* 0.0653 -0.0780 
 (1.693) (1.702) (1.188) (-1.127) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.00964 -0.00418 0.00393 -0.000183 
 (1.399) (-1.055) (1.025) (-0.0625) 
Log density -0.167*** 0.187 -0.188*** -0.0855 
 (-6.996) (0.936) (-13.94) (-0.557) 
Rural -0.907*** -2.592*** -0.266** 0.0760 
 (-4.760) (-4.225) (-2.384) (0.157) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
1.005** 1.719 1.586*** 2.548** 
 (2.125) (1.038) (6.095) (1.973) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
17.68*** 46.35*** 3.176*** 10.02*** 
 (9.174) (15.72) (2.828) (2.989) 
Female workers -0.0941 0.0283 -2.391*** -0.641 
 (-0.163) (0.0424) (-7.256) (-1.272) 
Manufacturing -1.385*** -0.451 1.223*** 1.520*** 
 (-3.169) (-0.605) (4.851) (2.633) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-0.219 -8.302*** 0.287 -1.606* 
 (-0.317) (-7.257) (0.751) (-1.696) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
0.695 2.330** 3.541*** 5.219*** 
 (1.316) (2.140) (11.69) (6.214) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.00002* 0.00003 *** -0.00009 *** -0.0002*** 
 (1.750) (3.325) (-3.557) (-6.683) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 768 768 768 768 
R-squared 0.541 0.866 0.864 0.930 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A3. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Education Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.866*** 0.277*** -0.187 0.0440 
 (8.130) (4.038) (-1.468) (0.537) 
Poll tax -0.282*** -0.313*** -0.302*** -0.438*** 
 (-4.084) (-3.900) (-5.502) (-6.200) 
Literacy test 0.298*** 0.321*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 
 (7.217) (3.303) (7.217) (2.764) 
Secret Ballot 0.0945 0.264*** 0.0288 0.119 
 (0.962) (3.093) (0.365) (1.586) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.00591 -0.00229 0.000223 -0.000714 
 (0.845) (-0.598) (0.0393) (-0.213) 
Log density -0.147*** 1.153*** -0.145*** 0.985*** 
 (-6.487) (6.580) (-7.790) (6.172) 
Rural -1.014*** -0.341 -0.377** 1.339*** 
 (-5.589) (-0.630) (-2.429) (2.633) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
2.116*** -0.654 2.557*** -1.006 
 (4.753) (-0.445) (7.160) (-0.748) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
10.82*** 32.28*** 0.897 8.818** 
 (5.890) (12.64) (0.576) (2.544) 
Female workers -2.270*** 0.760 -3.738*** 0.0471 
 (-4.061) (1.297) (-8.009) (0.0903) 
Manufacturing -2.767*** -2.072*** -0.684* -0.511 
 (-6.603) (-3.113) (-1.938) (-0.838) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-1.393** -6.495*** -0.629 -2.069** 
 (-2.064) (-6.511) (-1.151) (-2.109) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
1.214** 6.717*** 3.149*** 7.719*** 
 (2.401) (7.125) (7.406) (8.881) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.000005 0.000009 0.00003 -0.00004 
 (0.416) (1.210) (1.083) (-1.334) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.469 0.857 0.666 0.895 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A4. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.857*** 0.149** -0.0597 0.292*** 
 (7.947) (2.219) (-0.626) (4.023) 
Poll tax -0.207*** 0.0101 -0.212*** -0.193*** 
 (-2.952) (0.128) (-5.148) (-3.078) 
Literacy test 0.130*** -0.0405 0.0333 -0.0154 
 (3.104) (-0.426) (1.328) (-0.204) 
Secret Ballot 0.202** 0.103 0.177*** -0.0996 
 (2.030) (1.239) (2.986) (-1.495) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.0119* -0.000958 0.00330 0.00195 
 (1.676) (-0.256) (0.776) (0.656) 
Log density -0.0363 0.625*** -0.00818 0.387*** 
 (-1.582) (3.644) (-0.584) (2.737) 
Rural -1.455*** -1.184** -0.282** 1.496*** 
 (-7.919) (-2.230) (-2.424) (3.316) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
-0.815* 5.366*** -0.420 4.313*** 
 (-1.809) (3.726) (-1.565) (3.619) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
21.57*** 54.30*** 8.210*** 14.93*** 
 (11.60) (21.72) (7.018) (4.861) 
Female workers 1.727*** 1.619*** 0.473 0.830* 
 (3.051) (2.824) (1.349) (1.796) 
Manufacturing -4.150*** -3.603*** -1.008*** -0.211 
 (-9.781) (-5.530) (-3.804) (-0.390) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-1.089 -7.876*** 0.440 -0.259 
 (-1.593) (-8.067) (1.074) (-0.298) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
0.631 3.396*** 2.613*** 3.456*** 
 (1.233) (3.681) (8.189) (4.487) 
Real manufacturing wage -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 0.000009 -0.0002*** 
 (-15.99) (-25.36) (0.360) (-9.536) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 864 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.629 0.907 0.872 0.944 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A5. OLS Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
5.026*** 4.858*** 4.638*** 4.394*** 
 (14.92) (14.393) (13.875) (13.123) 
Poll tax -0.248 -0.175 -0.459** -0.379** 
 (-1.597) (-1.156) (-2.546) (-2.161) 
Literacy test 0.288*** 0.014 0.009 0.006 
 (3.082) (0.950) (0.623) (0.437) 
Secret Ballot 0.140 0.297*** 0.364*** 0.376*** 
 (0.577) (3.058) (3.482) (3.410) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.016 0.084 0.318 0.324 
 (1.119) (0.349) (1.280) (1.318) 
Log density -0.379*** -0.361*** -0.340*** -0.317*** 
 (-7.374) (-7.217) (-6.793) (-6.545) 
Rural -2.049*** -2.176*** -2.543*** -2.778*** 
 (-4.981) (-5.426) (-5.780) (-6.481) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
0.116 0.415 1.526 2.067* 
 (0.113) (0.408) (1.328) (1.827) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
26.27*** 27.826*** 29.838*** 32.255*** 
 (6.136) (6.623) (6.350) (7.020) 
Female workers -1.558 -2.577* -3.357** -4.975*** 
 (-1.106) (-1.842) (-2.180) (-3.247) 
Manufacturing 2.350** 2.041** 2.861 2.358** 
 (2.424) (2.158) (2.866) (2.436) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
2.957* 3.328** 0.874*** 1.384 
 (1.789) (2.048) (0.443) (0.716) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
-4.389*** -3.846*** -6.509*** -5.982*** 
 (-3.647) (-3.239) (-5.003) (-4.686) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (4.696) (5.072) (5.766) (6.383) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.453 0.492 0.504 0.546 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A6. OLS Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.0772 0.180*** 0.163** 0.011 
 (1.647) (3.694) (2.234) (0.155) 
Poll tax -0.011 0.045 -0.004 0.043 
 (-0.364) (0.907) (-0.141) (0.930) 
Literacy test 0.00714 -0.0525 0.0111 -0.0411 
 (0.419) (-0.798) (0.691) (-0.677) 
Secret Ballot -0.0213 0.0193 -0.00510 0.0411 
 (-0.521) (0.343) (-0.133) (0.780) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.00125 0.00257 0.00135 0.00182 
 (0.488) (1.123) (0.556) (0.857) 
Log density -0.000920 0.00903 0.00305 -0.102 
 (-0.0984) (0.0887) (0.341) (-1.028) 
Rural 0.461*** 0.103 0.417*** -0.181 
 (6.171) (0.316) (5.601) (-0.553) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
-0.224 -0.0149 -0.245 -0.726 
 (-1.307) (-0.0173) (-1.525) (-0.881) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
2.037*** -1.541 3.188*** -2.020 
 (2.740) (-0.983) (4.347) (-0.927) 
Female workers -0.538** -0.263 -0.230 0.0249 
 (-2.581) (-0.858) (-1.143) (0.0855) 
Manufacturing 1.363*** 0.230 1.115*** -0.279 
 (7.936) (0.577) (6.572) (-0.708) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-1.285*** -1.083* -1.502*** -1.626*** 
 (-4.645) (-1.872) (-5.754) (-2.697) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
1.489*** 2.388*** 1.136*** 2.034*** 
 (7.484) (4.356) (5.855) (3.835) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.00004*** 0.00003 *** 0.00008*** 0.00009*** 
 (6.974) (6.131) (4.621) (4.512) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 672 672 672 672 
R-squared 0.620 0.737 0.676 0.783 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A7. OLS Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pooled OLS State Fixed 
Effects 
Time-period 
Fixed Effects 
Two way fixed 
effects 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.042 0.122* 0.017 -0.136 
 (-0.604) (1.752) (0.153) (-1.312) 
Poll tax -0.054 0.115 -0.049 0.141* 
 (-1.178) (1.524) (-1.105) (1.880) 
Literacy test 0.0606** 0.102 0.0724*** 0.0875 
 (2.234) (1.057) (2.707) (0.914) 
Secret Ballot 0.0880 -0.0520 0.0934 -0.0242 
 (1.388) (-0.619) (1.499) (-0.288) 
Motor vehicle registration -0.000352 0.00148 0.000925 0.00139 
 (-0.0833) (0.413) (0.221) (0.390) 
Log density 0.00566 0.172 0.00467 0.114 
 (0.379) (1.125) (0.312) (0.714) 
Rural 0.327*** -0.00726 0.172 -0.612 
 (2.747) (-0.0148) (1.379) (-1.160) 
Fraction of the population that is 
black 
-0.634** -2.567** -0.625** -2.134 
 (-2.312) (-1.993) (-2.320) (-1.611) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or 
older 
1.153 -1.313 3.185*** 3.554 
 (0.980) (-0.554) (2.610) (1.009) 
Female workers -0.481 0.956** -0.260 1.038** 
 (-1.474) (2.051) (-0.788) (2.192) 
Manufacturing 2.504*** 2.028*** 2.050*** 1.067* 
 (9.215) (3.377) (7.283) (1.676) 
Fraction of the population age 10 
that is illiterate 
-0.554 -0.958 -0.881** -2.245** 
 (-1.289) (-1.101) (-2.072) (-2.317) 
Fraction of the population that is 
foreign-born 
0.555* 3.524*** 0.202 3.771*** 
 (1.766) (4.259) (0.629) (4.406) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.00005*** 0.00004*** 0.00005* 0.00003 
 (5.521) (4.585) (1.837) (0.958) 
     
States 48 48 48 48 
Observations 720 720 720 720 
R-squared 0.480 0.669 0.513 0.689 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above.  
   
 
Table A8. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Revenue on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
0.074 -0.015 0.059 
 (1.064) (-0.143) (0.568) 
Poll tax -0.217*** -0.096 -0.312* 
 (-4.250) (-0.665) (-1.866) 
Literacy test 0.062 -0.144 -0.082 
 (1.346) (-1.151) (-0.569) 
Secret Ballot 0.134** -0.273** -0.139 
 (2.661) (-2.141) (-0.990) 
Motor vehicle registration -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 
 (-0.631) (-0.913) (-1.028) 
Log density -0.147*** 0.030 -0.117** 
 (-3.391) (0.519) (-2.523) 
Rural 0.072 0.180 0.252 
 (0.284) (0.354) (0.449) 
Fraction of the population that is black 0.707 -0.927 -0.220 
 (1.142) (-0.904) (-0.238) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 6.001*** -18.881*** -12.880*** 
 (2.828) (-4.208) (-2.970) 
Female workers -0.588 1.235* 0.646 
 (-1.610) (1.726) (0.860) 
Manufacturing -0.182 1.423* 1.241* 
 (-0.361) (1.924) (1.814) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
0.359 -1.011 -0.652 
 (0.577) (-0.664) (-0.407) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
3.294*** 0.341 3.635*** 
 (5.678) (0.334) (4.062) 
Real manufacturing wage -0.00006** 0.00003 -0.00003 
 (-2.279) (0.698) (-0.996) 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.238 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is REV. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Random state and time 
fixed effects are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Table A9. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Total State Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
0.040 -0.087 -0.046 
 (0.468) (-0.675) (-0.390) 
Poll tax -0.292*** -0.159 -0.451** 
 (-4.665) (-0.926) (-2.258) 
Literacy test -0.033 -0.141 -0.174 
 (-0.644) (-1.020) (-1.065) 
Secret Ballot -0.021 -0.324** -0.346** 
 (-0.325) (-2.196) (-2.134) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.0003 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.105) (-1.425) (-1.250) 
Log density -0.222*** 0.029 -0.193*** 
 (-4.627) (0.464) (-3.788) 
Rural -0.287 -0.227 -0.514 
 (-0.987) (-0.420) (-0.873) 
Fraction of the population that is black 1.449** -0.575 0.874 
 (2.080) (-0.500) (0.811) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 4.895** -15.550*** -10.655** 
 (2.091) (-2.927) (-2.070) 
Female workers -1.241** -0.089 -1.330 
 (-2.580) (-0.099) (-1.414) 
Manufacturing 0.578 1.088 1.666** 
 (1.038) (1.321) (2.092) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
0.256 0.673 0.929 
 (0.351) (0.368) (0.503) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
2.996*** 1.106 4.102*** 
 (4.274) (0.930) (4.027) 
Real manufacturing wage -0.0001*** 0.0001 -0.0002*** 
 (-2.709) (-1.444) (-4.248) 
    
States 48 
Observations 768 
R-squared 0.616 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EXP. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Random state and time 
fixed effects are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Table A10. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Social Services Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
0.093 0.390*** 0.483*** 
 (1.167) (3.268) (4.516) 
Poll tax -0.243*** -0.009 -0.252 
 (-3.868) (-0.061) (-1.494) 
Literacy test -0.069 0.207 0.138 
 (-0.905) (1.119) (0.654) 
Secret Ballot -0.154** -0.382** -0.536*** 
 (-2.247) (-2.637) (-3.442) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.667) (-0.274) (0.102) 
Log density -0.292* 1.052*** 0.760** 
 (-1.751) (3.349) (2.312) 
Rural 2.720*** -4.996*** -2.276** 
 (5.694) (-5.060) (-2.240) 
Fraction of the population that is black 4.952*** -0.253 4.699* 
 (3.213) (-0.085) (1.795) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 12.634*** -34.598*** -21.965*** 
 (3.319) (-4.713) (-3.200) 
Female workers 1.372*** -2.855*** -1.483 
 (2.721) (-2.835) (-1.403) 
Manufacturing -1.414 1.857 0.444 
 (-1.581) (1.588) (0.440) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
1.615 3.326 4.940** 
 (1.608) (1.627) (2.247) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
3.517*** -3.036* 0.481 
 (3.292) (-1.798) (0.375) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.00003 -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (-0.252) (-6.116) (-9.699) 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.350 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SOC. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Table A11. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Transportation Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
4.558*** -0.080 4.479*** 
 (13.328) (-0.131) (6.431) 
Poll tax -0.436** -0.684** -1.120*** 
 (-2.541) (-2.056) (-3.043) 
Literacy test 0.390*** 0.158 0.548** 
 (3.635) (0.832) (2.556) 
Secret Ballot 0.370 0.575 0.945* 
 (1.476) (1.223) (1.736) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.004 -0.040* -0.036 
 (0.272) (-1.705) (-1.415) 
Log density -0.323*** 0.103 -0.220* 
 (-6.281) (1.065) (-1.887) 
Rural -2.533*** 0.389 -2.143** 
 (-5.900) (0.449) (-2.139) 
Fraction of the population that is black 1.449 2.673 4.122 
 (1.260) (1.197) (1.630) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 28.951*** -0.174 28.777*** 
 (6.368) (-0.019) (2.875) 
Female workers -3.042** -0.030 -3.071 
 (-2.030) (-0.011) 
) 
(-0.980) 
Manufacturing 2.948*** 0.696 3.644* 
 (2.994) (0.374) (1.687) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
-0.082 -6.213 -6.295 
 (-0.042) (-1.595) (-1.402) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
-6.516*** 2.510 -4.006 
 (-5.200) (0.972) (-1.361) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.0002*** 0.00005 0.0001 
 (6.279) (-0.993) (1.629) 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.491 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is TRANS. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Time fixed effects 
are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Table A12. SDM Estimates from Regressions of House Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the population 
that is female 
-0.005 0.062 0.057 
 (-0.073) (0.497) (0.492) 
Poll tax 0.073 0.186 0.259* 
 (1.487) (1.532) (1.851) 
Literacy test 0.043 0.145 0.189 
 (0.729) (0.825) (0.925) 
Secret Ballot 0.035 -0.248* -0.213 
 (0.609) (-1.922) (-1.467) 
Motor vehicle registration 0.002 0.004 0.006 
 (1.044) (0.925) (1.198) 
Log density -0.128 -0.824*** -0.952*** 
 (-1.092) (-3.218) (-3.448) 
Rural -0.065 -1.025 -1.090 
 (-0.176) (-1.212) (-1.233) 
Fraction of the population that is black -2.369** 0.326 -2.042 
 (-2.264) (0.140) (-0.910) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older -1.981 -0.739 -2.720 
 (-0.661) (-0.123) (-0.462) 
Female workers 0.695678** 2.380*** 3.075*** 
 (2.276465) (3.088) (3.692) 
Manufacturing 0.060 -1.141 -1.081 
 (0.097857) (-1.259) (-1.263) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
-0.708 -6.735*** -7.443*** 
 (-0.960448) (-3.988) (-3.890) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
-1.110 4.511*** 3.401*** 
 (-1.421838) (3.611) (3.345) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.000 0.00006 0.0001*** 
 (1.216892) (1.385) (2.862) 
    
States 48 
Observations 672 
R-squared 0.266 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is HNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Appendix B. SDM Estimates for Education Expenses and Senate Voting Patterns 
 
Table B1. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) Education Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.013 0.025 0.012 
 (-0.135) (0.169) (0.085) 
Poll tax -0.303*** 0.021 -0.282 
 (-4.252) (0.113) (-1.341) 
𝜌 0.050 
 (1.015) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 102.667*** 
LR test spatial lag 106.714*** 
Wald test spatial error 99.662*** 
LR test spatial error 106.826*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 163.620*** 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.378 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. Random state and 
time fixed effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis 
for the Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state 
effects model.  
 
   
 
Table B2. SDM Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.308** 0.152 -0.157 
 (-2.552) (0.884) (-1.056) 
Poll tax 0.081* -0.183 -0.102 
 (1.206) (-1.108) (-0.524) 
𝜌 0.030 
 (0.549) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 49.377*** 
Wald test spatial error 47.829*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 10.615 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.510 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
   
 
Table B3. SDM Estimates from Regressions of (Log) State Education Expenses on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.003 0.008 0.005 
 (-0.068) (0.123) (0.085) 
Poll tax -0.301*** 0.012 -0.289 
 (-4.248) (0.064) (0.168) 
𝜌 0.050 
 (1.015) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 102.512*** 
LR test spatial lag 106.560*** 
Wald test spatial error 99.526*** 
LR test spatial error 106.673*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 125.059*** 
  
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.378 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
   
 
Table B4. SDM Estimates from Placebo Regressions of (Log) State Education Expenses on 
Female Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.039 -0.420*** -0.459*** 
 (-1.090) (-5.024) (-4.734) 
Poll tax -0.374*** -0.012 -0.386** 
 (-5.373) (-0.074) (-2.044) 
𝜌 0.005 
 (0.102) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 181.223*** 
Wald test spatial error 173.055*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 34.737 
  
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.390 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
Table B5. SDM Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.146*** 0.077 -0.069 
 (-2.694) (0.972) (-1.016) 
Poll tax 0.076 -0.183 -0.107 
 (1.183) (-1.149) (-0.569) 
𝜌 0.028 
 (0.512) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 49.771*** 
Wald test spatial error 48.120*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 21.574 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.511 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM.  Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
   
 
Table B6. SDM Estimates from Placebo Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female 
Suffrage Binary Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage binary variable -0.047 0.095 0.048 
 (-1.064) (0.827) (0.385) 
Poll tax 0.077 -0.173 -0.095 
 (1.177) (-1.067) (-0.495) 
𝜌 0.028 
 (0.512) 
  
Wald test spatial lag 44.494*** 
Wald test spatial error 43.788*** 
  
Random Effects Hausman Test 20.976 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.515 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. Random effects refer to random state effects. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that there is significant difference between the random state effects model and the fixed state effects 
model.  
 
 
 
   
 
Table B7. SDM Estimates from Regressions of State Education Expenses on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.010 0.028 0.019 
 (-0.105) (0.195) (0.139) 
Poll tax -0.298*** 0.027 -0.272 
 (-3.979) (0.142) (-1.231) 
Literacy test 0.302*** -0.233 0.070 
 (3.504) (-0.999) (0.258) 
Secret Ballot 0.058 -0.378* -0.320 
 (0.001) (-1.998) (-1.520) 
Log density 0.739*** -0.888** -0.149 
 (3.690) (-2.326) (-0.364) 
Rural 0.952* 3.105** 4.058*** 
 (1.730) (2.471) (3.088) 
Fraction of the population that is black 2.457 -7.887** -5.430 
 (1.382) (-2.120) (-1.601) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 14.804*** -59.215*** -44.411*** 
 (3.156) (-6.306) (-4.737) 
Female workers -0.627 2.424* 1.797 
 (-1.064) (1.882) (1.378) 
Manufacturing -2.515** 6.772*** 4.257*** 
 (-2.469) (4.702) (3.292) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
-3.593*** 3.894 0.300 
 (-2.928) (1.461) (0.106)** 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
8.759*** -5.346** 3.414** 
 (6.208) (-2.585) (2.065) 
Real manufacturing wage -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0001 
 (-2.747) (2.699) (1.310) 
    
States 48 
Observations 864 
R-squared 0.378 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is EDU. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. 
   
 
Table B8. SDM Estimates from Regressions of Senate Voting Patterns on Female Suffrage 
Interaction Variable  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Female suffrage x fraction of the 
population that is female 
-0.308** 0.152 -0.157 
 (-2.552) (0.884) (-1.056) 
Poll tax 0.081 -0.183 -0.102 
 (1.206) (-1.108) (-0.524) 
Literacy test 0.079 0.068 0.147 
 (1.515) (0.568) (1.041) 
Secret Ballot 0.030 -0.100 -0.070 
 (0.417) (-0.622) (-0.409) 
Log density -0.026 0.096* 0.070 
 (-0.602) (1.678) (1.662) 
Rural 0.010 0.233 0.243 
 (0.039) (0.471) (0.471) 
Fraction of the population that is black -1.918*** 1.736 -0.182 
 (-3.093) (1.644) (-0.186) 
Fraction of the population age 65 or older 2.628 -11.295** -8.667* 
 (1.133) (-2.239) (-1.835) 
Female workers 0.893** -2.276*** -1.383* 
 (2.066) (-3.025) (-1.800) 
Manufacturing 2.056*** -0.416 1.640** 
 (3.583) (-0.490) (2.185) 
Fraction of the population age 10 that is 
illiterate 
-0.305 0.432 0.127 
 (-0.422) (0.258) (0.078) 
Fraction of the population that is foreign-
born 
-0.957 4.045*** 3.088*** 
 (-1.414) (3.539) (3.256) 
Real manufacturing wage 0.0001* -0.00004 0.00003 
 (1.838) (-0.6447) (0.7784) 
    
States 48 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.510 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. t-statistics is in parentheses 
Dependent variable is SNOM. Constants are included in regressions though not reported above. State and time fixed 
effects are included in the regression. 
 
   
 
Appendix C. Matrix  WN 
To construct WN we first construct matrix DN, where each element 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is equal to 1 if it satisfies 
the minimum distance requirement of being one of the four nearest neighbors and zero 
otherwise, i and j = (1, …, N). The minimum distance is calculated as the distance between the 
centers of geographic mass of each state. Another common technique in spatial econometrics is 
to specify the spatially weighted matrix, based on the contiguity of the states. This technique is 
usually employed when Alaska and Hawaii are included in the sample. However, the two states 
are not in the sample in this paper. 
 As LeSage and Pace (2014) point out, the choice of the number of nearest neighbors in 
construction of a weight matrix does not alter the results, as long as the estimates are interpreted 
correctly and the spatial model is properly specified. Matrix WN then is a row-standardized 
version of matrix DN: 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑑𝑖𝑗/Σ𝑗=1
𝑁 𝑑𝑖𝑗. The row-standardization is done to ease interpretation 
of operations with the weight matrix as an average of neighboring values. 
 
